account-hygiene
Periodic hygiene review of a client's 1Password account for QBRs and license true-ups: reconciling active and suspended seats…
Reviewing who holds LastPass admin rights: admin levels (RBAC roles) and their permissions, the users in each level, the MSP cross-tenant admin-user report, and how to cross-check admins for MFA, dormancy and leaver status. Produces an access-review record suitable for SOC 2,
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add wyre-ai/msp-claude-plugins --skill privileged-access --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add wyre-ai/msp-claude-plugins --skill privileged-access -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add wyre-ai/msp-claude-plugins --skill privileged-access -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add wyre-ai/msp-claude-plugins --skill privileged-access -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add wyre-ai/msp-claude-plugins --skill privileged-access -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add wyre-ai/msp-claude-plugins --skill privileged-access -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add wyre-ai/msp-claude-plugins --skill privileged-access -a windsurf -y
name: "LastPass Privileged Access Review" description: > Reviewing who holds LastPass admin rights: admin levels (RBAC roles) and their permissions, the users in each level, the MSP cross-tenant admin-user report, and how to cross-check admins for MFA, dormancy and leaver status. Produces an access-review record suitable for SOC 2, ISO 27001 or cyber-insurance evidence. when_to_use: >- When running a periodic access review of LastPass admins for one client or across the whole client book, or answering "who can administer this client's LastPass". Use when: lastpass admins, lastpass admin levels, lastpass rbac, privileged access review lastpass, who is a lastpass admin, super admin lastpass, or access review evidence password manager.
A LastPass admin can change policies, reset or remove users, and manage shared folders, so admin membership is the access worth reviewing most often. LastPass models admin rights as **admin levels**: named roles with a permission set. Each user has at most one `adminLevelId`.
Every tool here is tier **read** in Conduit; none is admin-gated. Removing an admin level happens in the LastPass Admin Console.
[security-posture](../security-posture/SKILL.md); this skill only looks at admins.
[offboarding-review](../offboarding-review/SKILL.md), which covers the rest of their access too.
1. Pull `lastpass_reports_admin_users_list` with `max_results: 500`, paging with `page_token`. Each row is `userEmail`, `adminLevel` and `company`, across every child and grandchild company. This is the fastest view of every admin the MSP is responsible for. 2. Group by company. Flag companies with zero admins (nobody can manage them except the MSP) and companies with an unusually high admin count. 3. Flag admins whose email domain does not match the client's domain. MSP technicians are expected; anyone else (a former vendor, a personal address) needs an owner. 4. For any company that needs detail, run the single-company workflow.
1. List the roles: `lastpass_managed_company_admin_levels_list` (or `lastpass_admin_levels_list` for the key's own company). 2. For each level, read its permissions with `lastpass_managed_company_admin_level_get` (or `lastpass_admin_level_get`) and its holders with `lastpass_managed_company_admin_level_users_list` (or `lastpass_admin_level_users_list`). Page members with `page_token`. 3. For each holder, read the user with `lastpass_managed_company_user_get` (or `lastpass_user_get`) and check `accountStatus`, `advancedMfaStatus`, `lastLoginTime` and `masterPasswordScore`. 4. Record the review.
| Finding | Why it matters | |---------|----------------| | Admin without MFA | One phished master password exposes the whole tenant | | Admin with a weak `masterPasswordScore` | Same exposure | | Admin not logged in for 90+ days | Standing privilege nobody uses; remove it | | Admin who is `disabled` but still holds the level | Clean-up was half done | | Custom level with broad permissions held by many users | Role sprawl | | Shared or generic admin mailbox (`it@`, `admin@`) | No individual accountability | | Admin outside the client's domain and not MSP staff | Unknown third party |
An access-review record per company: date of review, reviewer, each admin level with its permissions summarised, each holder with status, MFA, last login and a keep or remove recommendation, and the list of Admin Console changes to make. Keep it factual so it can be filed as audit evidence; note that the review was read-only and no changes were made by the reviewer.
`lastpass_managed_company_*` tools need an MSP key (403 otherwise). With a Business key, use the own-company admin-level tools.
level only. Pull the user record for MFA and last login.
name; a level called "Helpdesk" can hold super-admin rights.
One command to supercharge Claude Code for MSP workflows. Then restart Claude Code. That's it. Documentation: wyre-ai.github.io/msp-claude-plugins
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