/infrastructure-validation

name: infrastructure-validation
description: Use when working with Terraform (.tf, .tfvars), Ansible (playbooks, roles, inventory), Docker (Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml), Kubernetes (manifests, Helm charts), CloudFormation, or any infrastructure-as-code files. Also use when running terraform plan/apply, building Docker images, writing Helm templates, or when IaC changes touch security groups, IAM policies, or secrets. Provides validation workflows, tool chains, and common mistake prevention.

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Infrastructure Validation

<activation>

Activation Triggers

• Files matching: `*.tf`, `*.tfvars`, `Dockerfile`, `docker-compose.yml`, `playbook*.yml`, `roles/`, `inventory/`
• Config: `.shipyard/config.json` has `iac_validation` set to `"auto"` or `true`
• Templates with `AWSTemplateFormatVersion` (CloudFormation)
• YAML with `apiVersion:` (Kubernetes)

Natural Language Triggers

• "validate terraform", "check docker", "lint ansible", "IaC validation", "infrastructure check"

</activation>

Overview

IaC mistakes don't cause test failures -- they cause outages, breaches, and cost overruns. Validate before every change.

**Core principle:** Never apply without plan review. Like TDD requires tests before code, IaC requires validation before apply.

<instructions>

Terraform Workflow

Run in order. Each step must pass before proceeding.

terraform fmt -check          # 1. Format (auto-fix with fmt if needed)
terraform validate            # 2. Syntax validation
terraform plan -out=tfplan    # 3. Review every change -- NEVER skip
tflint --recursive            # 4. Lint (if installed)
tfsec . OR checkov -d .       # 5. Security scan (if installed)

**Drift detection:** `terraform plan -detailed-exitcode` -- exit code 2 means drift. Document what drifted and why before overwriting.

Ansible Workflow

yamllint .                              # 1. YAML syntax
ansible-lint                            # 2. Best practices
ansible-playbook --syntax-check *.yml   # 3. Playbook syntax
ansible-playbook --check *.yml          # 4. Dry run (where supported)
molecule test                           # 5. Role tests (if configured)

Docker Workflow

hadolint Dockerfile                     # 1. Lint (if installed)
docker build -t test-build .            # 2. Build
trivy image test-build                  # 3. Security scan (if installed)
docker compose config                   # 4. Validate compose (if applicable)

Kubernetes Workflow

kubectl --dry-run=client -f manifest.yml  # 1. Client-side validation
kubectl --dry-run=server -f manifest.yml  # 2. Server-side validation (if cluster access)
kubeval --strict manifest.yml             # 3. Schema validation (if installed)
kubeconform -strict manifest.yml          # 4. Schema validation alternative
kube-linter lint .                        # 5. Best practices (if installed)
helm template . | kubeval --strict        # 6. Helm chart validation (if applicable)

</instructions>

Common Mistakes

Terraform

| Mistake | Fix | |---------|-----| | Local state file | Use remote backend (S3+DynamoDB, GCS) | | No state locking | Enable lock table | | Hardcoded secrets | Use variables + secret manager | | `*` in security groups | Restrict to specific CIDRs | | Unpinned provider version | Pin in `required_providers` | | Missing tags | Require via policy or module defaults |

Ansible

| Mistake | Fix | |---------|-----| | Plaintext secrets | `ansible-vault encrypt` | | `shell` instead of modules | Use native modules (apt, copy, etc.) | | Everything as root | `become: false` by default, escalate only when needed |

Docker

| Mistake | Fix | |---------|-----| | `FROM ubuntu:latest` | Pin to digest: `FROM ubuntu:22.04@sha256:...` | | Running as root | Add `USER nonroot` | | `COPY . .` | Use `.dockerignore`, copy specific files | | Secrets in ENV/ARG | Use build secrets or runtime injection | | No health check | Add `HEALTHCHECK` instruction | | Single-stage build | Use multi-stage builds |

Kubernetes

| Mistake | Fix | |---------|-----| | No resource limits | Set `resources.requests` and `resources.limits` | | Running as root | `securityContext.runAsNonRoot: true` | | `latest` image tag | Pin exact version or digest | | No liveness/readiness probes | Add probes matching app health endpoints | | Default namespace for workloads | Use dedicated namespaces with RBAC | | No network policies | Restrict pod-to-pod traffic with NetworkPolicy |

<rules>

Red Flags -- STOP

• `terraform apply -auto-approve` without prior plan review
• Security group with `0.0.0.0/0` on non-HTTP ports
• IAM policy with `*` action or `*` resource
• Secrets in `.tf`, `.yml`, or `Dockerfile`
• State file committed to git
• `latest` tag on any base image
• Container running as root in production

</rules>

<examples>

Validation Finding Examples

Good Finding -- specific, shows the problem, gives the fix

**IaC-Critical: Overly permissive security group in modules/network/main.tf**

Resource: aws_security_group_rule.allow_all (line 34)
Problem: Ingress rule allows 0.0.0.0/0 on port 22 (SSH).
         This exposes SSH to the entire internet.
Fix: Restrict to bastion host CIDR or VPN range:
     cidr_blocks = [var.vpn_cidr]
Validation: `tfsec .` flagged this as HIGH severity (AWS018).

Bad Finding -- vague, no location, no evidence

**Security Issue: Network configuration may be too open.**

Review the security groups for potential issues.

</examples>

Integration

**Referenced by:** `shipyard:builder` (detects IaC files, follows appropriate workflow), `shipyard:verifier` (IaC validation mode), `shipyard:auditor` (IaC security checks)

**Pairs with:** `shipyard:security-audit` (security lens for IaC), `shipyard:shipyard-verification` (IaC claims need validation evidence)