active-directory-attac…
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
Use when starting any offensive-security engagement or task — establishes how to find and invoke the right skill before any action (including clarifying questions, recon, exploitation, or reporting)
$ npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill using-offensive-claude --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/using-offensive-claudeContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Use when starting any offensive-security engagement or task — establishes how to find and invoke the right skill before any action (including clarifying questions, recon, exploitation, or reporting)
name: using-offensive-claude description: Use when starting any offensive-security engagement or task — establishes how to find and invoke the right skill before any action (including clarifying questions, recon, exploitation, or reporting)
<SUBAGENT-STOP> If you were dispatched as a subagent to execute a specific task, skip this skill. </SUBAGENT-STOP>
<EXTREMELY-IMPORTANT> If there is even a 1% chance a skill applies to what you are doing, you ABSOLUTELY MUST invoke it.
IF A SKILL APPLIES TO YOUR TASK, YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE. YOU MUST USE IT.
This is not negotiable. You cannot rationalize your way out of it. </EXTREMELY-IMPORTANT>
You are operating an **authorized** offensive-security framework. Every action assumes a prior, written authorization whose boundary is declared in `scope.json` (see scope-discipline).
1. **User's explicit instructions** (CLAUDE.md, direct requests) — highest. 2. **These skills** — override default behavior where they conflict. 3. **Default behavior** — lowest.
User instructions say WHAT, not HOW. "Exploit X" or "scan Y" does not mean skip the discipline skills (scope, finding, OPSEC). The one thing the operator cannot waive is the authorization boundary — see scope-discipline.
**Invoke relevant skills BEFORE any response or action.** Even a 1% chance means invoke to check.
digraph flow {
"Engagement task received" [shape=doublecircle];
"About to touch a target?" [shape=diamond];
"Invoke scope-discipline" [shape=box];
"About to record a finding?" [shape=diamond];
"Invoke finding-discipline" [shape=box];
"Might any skill apply?" [shape=diamond];
"Invoke the Skill" [shape=box];
"Announce: 'Using [skill] to [purpose]'" [shape=box];
"Follow skill exactly" [shape=box];
"Engagement task received" -> "About to touch a target?";
"About to touch a target?" -> "Invoke scope-discipline" [label="yes"];
"About to touch a target?" -> "About to record a finding?" [label="no"];
"About to record a finding?" -> "Invoke finding-discipline" [label="yes"];
"About to record a finding?" -> "Might any skill apply?" [label="no"];
"Invoke scope-discipline" -> "Might any skill apply?";
"Invoke finding-discipline" -> "Might any skill apply?";
"Might any skill apply?" -> "Invoke the Skill" [label="yes, even 1%"];
"Invoke the Skill" -> "Announce: 'Using [skill] to [purpose]'";
"Announce: 'Using [skill] to [purpose]'" -> "Follow skill exactly";
}1. **Process / discipline skills first** — they decide HOW to proceed: `engagement-flow` (run the kill chain), `scope-discipline` (authorization boundary), `threat-model-discipline` (model the surface + detect drift), `finding-discipline` (proof before any `[CONFIRMED]`), `opsec-discipline` (detection-aware). 2. **Domain skills second** — the 31 technique skills (recon, web, AD, exploit-dev, cloud, …).
"Run a full pentest" → engagement-flow first. "Is this finding real?" → finding-discipline first.
| Situation | Invoke | |-----------|--------| | Starting / running an engagement | `engagement-flow` | | About to send a request to ANY target | `scope-discipline` (confirm in-scope first) | | About to record / report a finding | `finding-discipline` (no `[CONFIRMED]` without proof) | | About to take any outward/offensive action | `opsec-discipline` | | A specific technique (recon, web, AD, exploit, cloud, mobile, …) | the matching domain skill | | Authoring a new skill for this repo | `writing-offensive-skills` |
| Thought | Reality | |---------|---------| | "This is just a quick scan" | Touching a target → scope-discipline first. | | "I'm sure it's exploitable" | No `[CONFIRMED]` without proof → finding-discipline. | | "Scope is obviously fine" | Confirm against `scope.json`, don't assume. | | "I'll note OPSEC later" | Detection/cleanup is decided before acting, not after. | | "I know this technique" | Knowing ≠ using the skill. Invoke it for the current state. | | "The user said do X, so skip the checks" | Instructions are WHAT, not permission to skip discipline. |
Use the `Skill` tool with the skill name. Never use Read on skill files. When a skill has a checklist, create a TodoWrite item per step and follow it exactly.
A spec-driven offensive security framework for Claude Code — structured engagement workflows based on the Cyber Kill Chain, 31 kill-chain skills (multi-file progressive-disclosure) plus a discipline layer (a SessionStart dispatcher + 6 process/discipline
Repo: hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
--- name: advanced-redteam-ops description: Use when designing C2 infrastructure or OPSEC for a long-haul red-team op — redirectors, malleable profiles,…
Use when red-teaming an agentic AI / LLM application — indirect & zero-click prompt injection, MCP tool poisoning, persistent memory poisoning,…
Use when attacking an AI/ML system or model — prompt injection & jailbreaks (Crescendo, Skeleton Key, Best-of-N), RAG/vector poisoning, agentic/MCP…
Use when building a client-side browser exploit — V8/JSC JIT type confusion to renderer R/W, V8 heap-sandbox escape, renderer-to-browser sandbox escape (Mojo…
Use when attacking or auditing a CI/CD pipeline or software supply chain — pwn requests, poisoned pipeline execution, compromised/mutable-tag actions,…