active-directory-attac…
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
Use when starting an engagement, before exploitation, or whenever the attack surface changes — build/validate the threat model and detect drift (new unreviewed surface) before advancing
$ npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill threat-model-discipline --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/threat-model-disciplineContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Use when starting an engagement, before exploitation, or whenever the attack surface changes — build/validate the threat model and detect drift (new unreviewed surface) before advancing
name: threat-model-discipline description: Use when starting an engagement, before exploitation, or whenever the attack surface changes — build/validate the threat model and detect drift (new unreviewed surface) before advancing scripts: - scripts/threatmodel_lint.py
**You cannot test what you have not modeled.** A threat model names the assets, entry points, trust boundaries, relevant ATT&CK techniques, and existing mitigations — so coverage is deliberate, not accidental. On a long engagement the surface drifts (a new endpoint, a new dependency); **un-reviewed drift is where bugs hide.** This skill keeps the model complete and re-checks it for drift.
`threat-model.json` (see `templates/threat-model/`): five required lists — `assets`, `entry_points`, `trust_boundaries`, `attck` (technique ids), `mitigations`.
# 1. Lint - every required field present, no placeholders, valid ATT&CK ids
python skills/threat-model-discipline/scripts/threatmodel_lint.py lint .engage/recon/threat-model.json
# 2. Drift - diff a re-run against the reviewed baseline; NEW entry points/assets/boundaries are
# unreviewed surface and BLOCK the gate until re-reviewed or acknowledged
python skills/threat-model-discipline/scripts/threatmodel_lint.py drift \
.engage/recon/threat-model.baseline.json .engage/recon/threat-model.jsonOr use `/engage.threatmodel` (materialize | lint | drift).
| Excuse | Reality | |--------|---------| | "The model is obvious, skip it" | Obvious to you ≠ documented. Coverage you can't diff is coverage you can't trust. | | "Drift is just noise" | A new entry point is new attack surface. Acknowledge it explicitly or re-review. | | "ATT&CK mapping is busywork" | It turns 'we tested stuff' into 'we covered these techniques' — the report's backbone. |
Pairs with `scope-discipline` (what you may touch) and `finding-discipline` (what counts as proven).
A spec-driven offensive security framework for Claude Code — structured engagement workflows based on the Cyber Kill Chain, 31 kill-chain skills (multi-file progressive-disclosure) plus a discipline layer (a SessionStart dispatcher + 6 process/discipline
Repo: hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
--- name: advanced-redteam-ops description: Use when designing C2 infrastructure or OPSEC for a long-haul red-team op — redirectors, malleable profiles,…
Use when red-teaming an agentic AI / LLM application — indirect & zero-click prompt injection, MCP tool poisoning, persistent memory poisoning,…
Use when attacking an AI/ML system or model — prompt injection & jailbreaks (Crescendo, Skeleton Key, Best-of-N), RAG/vector poisoning, agentic/MCP…
Use when building a client-side browser exploit — V8/JSC JIT type confusion to renderer R/W, V8 heap-sandbox escape, renderer-to-browser sandbox escape (Mojo…
Use when attacking or auditing a CI/CD pipeline or software supply chain — pwn requests, poisoned pipeline execution, compromised/mutable-tag actions,…