active-directory-attac…
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
Use when about to record, claim, rate the severity of, or report any security finding — before marking anything [CONFIRMED] or writing it into the report
$ npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill finding-discipline --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/finding-disciplineContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Use when about to record, claim, rate the severity of, or report any security finding — before marking anything [CONFIRMED] or writing it into the report
name: finding-discipline description: Use when about to record, claim, rate the severity of, or report any security finding — before marking anything [CONFIRMED] or writing it into the report
**The Iron Law: No `[CONFIRMED]` without proof.** A finding is a claim about real, demonstrated impact — not a status code, a reflected string, or a hunch. This is the offensive equivalent of test-driven development: the proof is the test, and the finding does not exist until it passes.
**Violating the letter of this rule is violating its spirit.**
A status code is not impact. See `skills/references/finding-evidence-standards.md`: SSRF needs the internal response; IDOR needs *another principal's* data; RCE needs command output; XSS needs script execution; open redirect needs an external destination.
Before any finding is recorded or reported:
1. Set the structured proof signal and run `python skills/vulnerability-analysis/scripts/validate_findings.py --findings f.json --evidence ./evidence` — it rejects ungrounded findings and per-class false positives. 2. Pass it through the **REQUIRED** `finding-validator` agent (PASS / KILL / DOWNGRADE). 3. Only a `[CONFIRMED]` survivor goes in the report. Severity must match what was demonstrated (CVSS honest).
See `skills/references/finding-validation-runtime.md` for the 7-question gate.
If a function calls another, **read the callee** — do not infer what it does from its name. `sanitize()`, `is_safe()`, `validate_input()` are exactly where vulnerabilities hide; a name is a claim by the author, not evidence. The same applies to a config key, a decorator, or a CVE title: open the thing before you reason about it. An unread dependency in a data-flow claim is a hole.
Every claim in a finding carries a confidence grounded in *what you can quote*, not in how it feels:
decompiled instruction) supports the claim.
State the assumption; do not hide it.
fact.
This is orthogonal to the `[CONFIRMED]/[POSSIBLE]/[INFO]` tier (which is about *impact*); confidence is about *how well-grounded the claim is*. A High-confidence claim of a Low-impact bug is still Low.
**All of these mean: it is `[POSSIBLE]`, not `[CONFIRMED]`. Get the evidence.**
| Excuse | Reality | |--------|---------| | "Pattern-matched, clearly vulnerable" | Pattern ≠ exploit. Demonstrate impact or it's POSSIBLE. | | "I'll attach evidence later" | No artifact on disk = ungrounded = REJECTED now. | | "Blind RCE counts" | No output / no OOB confirmation = POSSIBLE, not CONFIRMED. | | "Severity is obviously Critical" | CVSS must reflect demonstrated impact, not the worst case. | | "The validator is overkill here" | Untested findings are how false positives ship. Run it. | | "The function is called `sanitize`, so it's safe" | A name is the author's claim, not proof. Read the callee. | | "The solver timed out, so it's not exploitable" | A tool limit is `feasibility:null` (manual), never `false`. |
A short list of CONFIRMED findings beats a long list of POSSIBLEs. Killing a false positive is success.
A spec-driven offensive security framework for Claude Code — structured engagement workflows based on the Cyber Kill Chain, 31 kill-chain skills (multi-file progressive-disclosure) plus a discipline layer (a SessionStart dispatcher + 6 process/discipline
Repo: hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
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