/bugcrowd-reporting

name: bugcrowd-reporting
description: "Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation."

BUGCROWD REPORTING — Program-Specific Tactics

> Companion to the generic `report-writing` skill. Use when working specifically on Bugcrowd submissions where VRT mapping, OOS-clause rebuttals, or per-program target selection matter.

This skill encodes patterns that apply specifically to Bugcrowd's submission flow. For the generic per-platform templates (HackerOne / Bugcrowd / Intigriti / Immunefi report bodies), use the `report-writing` skill. For the 7-Question Gate before deciding to report at all, use `triage-validation`.

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1. VRT Category Selection — Search & Fallback Strategy

Bugcrowd's submission form requires a single VRT (Vulnerability Rating Taxonomy) selection. The dropdown's default severity is bound to the chosen node — pick wrong and the form auto-suggests a lower priority (often P4) when the actual impact is P3 or P2.

> Note: VRT default severities are not fixed constants. Bugcrowd revises the VRT schema across versions, and individual programs can remap defaults via their own priority configuration. The P-values shown in the examples below (e.g., "No Rate Limiting on Form → Login" defaulting to P4) are the typical baseline at time of writing — always read the severity the *current* form actually auto-suggests for *this* program rather than assuming the value here.

1.1 Search hierarchy (try in order, pick the highest-severity match that still describes the bug)

For any finding, search the VRT dropdown with these terms in this order:

1. **The bug's primary class** — e.g., `IDOR`, `XSS`, `SSRF`, `auth bypass`, `2FA bypass` 2. **The data category exposed** — e.g., `PII`, `sensitive data exposure`, `disclosure of secrets` 3. **The control bypassed** — e.g., `broken access control`, `authentication bypass` 4. **The endpoint type** — e.g., `no rate limiting on form > login`, `no rate limiting on form > change password` 5. **The generic parent node** — e.g., `Server Security Misconfiguration > Other`, `Broken Access Control > Other`

1.2 Pick the highest-severity match that still accurately describes the bug

Never select a VRT that misrepresents the bug just to get a higher default severity. Triagers will reassign and may flag the misrepresentation. The discipline is: pick the most specific *accurate* VRT, then use §2 (Manual Severity Override) if the default is wrong.

1.3 Common mappings worth knowing

| Finding type | First-choice VRT | Fallback | |---|---|---| | ATO via missing 2FA on password change | Broken Authentication & Session Management → Second Factor Authentication (2FA/MFA) → Bypass | Broken Auth → Authentication Bypass → Other | | Password oracle without rate limit | Broken Authentication & Session Management → Authentication Bypass → Other | Server Security Misconfiguration → No Rate Limiting on Form → Login | | GraphQL introspection / APQ allowlist bypass | Server Security Misconfiguration → Other (justify in body) | Broken Access Control → Other | | Username → real name PII enumeration | Sensitive Data Exposure → PII Leakage / Disclosure of Secrets → Non-Corporate User | Broken Access Control → Other | | State desync on security-sensitive action | Application-Level DoS → Other (with state-desync framing) | Server Security Misconfiguration → Other | | Email/SMS pumping on auth-flow endpoint | Server Security Misconfiguration → No Rate Limiting on Form → Email-Triggering / SMS-Triggering | Server Security Misconfiguration → No Rate Limiting on Action | | Token brute-force (email-change OTP, password reset) | Broken Authentication → Authentication Bypass → Other | Server Security Misconfiguration → No Rate Limiting on Action |

1.4 If no good VRT exists

Pick `Server Security Misconfiguration → Other` or `Broken Access Control → Other` and **lead the description body with a "VRT mapping note"** explaining why the chosen node is the closest available match and what the bug actually is.

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2. Manual Severity Override

Bugcrowd's form lets you manually set Technical Severity *separate from the VRT default*. The form text itself states: *"A severity rating suggested by the VRT is not guaranteed to be the severity rating applied to your submission."*

2.1 When to override

Override the VRT default when:

• The chained outcome is a higher severity than the standalone bug class (chain → ATO)
• The VRT category is approximate and its default doesn't reflect the actual impact class
• The program's own Focus Areas explicitly list this outcome at a higher severity than VRT's default
• The data class exposed is more sensitive than the VRT's example uses (e.g., real-name PII vs. handle enumeration)

2.2 How to override (form mechanics)

1. Select the VRT that most accurately describes the bug (per §1) 2. Note the auto-suggested severity (P4, P3, etc.) 3. In the **Technical Severity** field, manually pick the severity you're requesting 4. Add a **Severity Request** paragraph as the FIRST section of the description body (per §3)

2.3 Don't over-claim

P1 inflation is the fastest way to lose triager trust. Reserve P1 for ATO without interaction, RCE, mass PII