/hunt-html-injection
Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting
$ npx -y skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-html-injection --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
- Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
- You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
- Slash command
/hunt-html-injection
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The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting
SKILL.md
hunt-html-injection.SKILL.mdname: hunt-html-injection
description: "Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting via injected forms. Use when testing text-display surfaces (search results, profile fields, comments, error messages, feedback forms). For markup that executes JavaScript, escalate to hunt-xss."
What is HTML Injection
HTML Injection occurs when user input is inserted into a page's HTML without escaping, so injected tags are rendered by the browser as markup rather than displayed as literal text. Unlike XSS, the injected content does not require JavaScript execution — injecting `<b>`, `<h1>`, `<a>`, `<img>`, or `<form>` tags is sufficient.
**To PROVE impact unambiguously, escalate to an active vector carrying a unique numeric canary** — e.g. `"><img src=x onerror=alert(91234)>` or `<svg onload=alert(91234)>`. A distinctive 4+ digit number (not `alert(1)`) distinguishes YOUR reflected injection from the example payloads practice pages embed in their own hint text. Proof = the raw, unescaped vector with your canary appears in the response.
**Impact:**
- Phishing via injected `<form>` or `<a href="attacker.com">` tags
- UI defacement — `<h1>HACKED</h1>` renders visually on the page
- Credential harvesting via injected login forms
- Redirect via `<meta http-equiv="refresh">`
- Stepping stone to XSS (may be blocked by WAF on `<script>` but not `<img onerror>`)
Attack Surface
Any input that is reflected or stored and then displayed in an HTML context:
- Search boxes (`?q=`)
- Comments, feedback, reviews
- Profile fields (name, bio, username)
- Error messages (`?error=`, `?message=`)
- Subject / body of contact forms
- Admin-visible fields (ticket titles, usernames in logs)
Autonomous Testing Priority
**Inject a recognisable HTML tag with a unique canary string. Unescaped angle brackets in the response = confirmed injection.**
**Pattern 1 — Basic HTML tag injection:**
<b>CANARY</b>
"><b>CANARY</b>
Use a unique string as CANARY (something distinct to this test run). **Proof:** the response contains `<b>CANARY` with literal `<` angle brackets — not `<b>CANARY`. A properly encoded app would escape `<` to `<`.
**Try multiple tag types when `<b>` is filtered:**
- `<h1>CANARY</h1>` — heading tag (often less filtered)
- `<img src=x onerror=CANARY>` — attribute context
- `<a href="https://attacker.com">click</a>` — link injection (phishing proof)
**For stored injection:** inject into the storage endpoint, then GET the page where the value is displayed and check for unescaped tags.
**Escalate immediately:** if `<b>` injection works, try `<script>alert(1)</script>` — the same unsanitised input may allow full XSS.
Proof
Confirmed when your injected tag appears in the response body with literal `<` angle brackets (not HTML-encoded). A safe app renders `<b>CANARY</b>`; a vulnerable app renders `<b>CANARY</b>`.
Distinguishing HTML Injection from XSS
- HTML injection: `<b>text</b>` renders as **text** in the browser — no JS execution needed.
- XSS: `<script>alert(1)</script>` executes JavaScript.
Some WAFs block `<script>` but pass `<b>` or `<img>` — start with non-script tags, then escalate.
Read more
name: hunt-html-injection description: "Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting via injected forms. Use when testing text-display surfaces (search results, profile fields, comments, error messages, feedback forms). For markup that executes JavaScript, escalate to hunt-xss."
What is HTML Injection
HTML Injection occurs when user input is inserted into a page's HTML without escaping, so injected tags are rendered by the browser as markup rather than displayed as literal text. Unlike XSS, the injected content does not require JavaScript execution — injecting `<b>`, `<h1>`, `<a>`, `<img>`, or `<form>` tags is sufficient.
**To PROVE impact unambiguously, escalate to an active vector carrying a unique numeric canary** — e.g. `"><img src=x onerror=alert(91234)>` or `<svg onload=alert(91234)>`. A distinctive 4+ digit number (not `alert(1)`) distinguishes YOUR reflected injection from the example payloads practice pages embed in their own hint text. Proof = the raw, unescaped vector with your canary appears in the response.
**Impact:**
- Phishing via injected `<form>` or `<a href="attacker.com">` tags
- UI defacement — `<h1>HACKED</h1>` renders visually on the page
- Credential harvesting via injected login forms
- Redirect via `<meta http-equiv="refresh">`
- Stepping stone to XSS (may be blocked by WAF on `<script>` but not `<img onerror>`)
Attack Surface
Any input that is reflected or stored and then displayed in an HTML context:
- Search boxes (`?q=`)
- Comments, feedback, reviews
- Profile fields (name, bio, username)
- Error messages (`?error=`, `?message=`)
- Subject / body of contact forms
- Admin-visible fields (ticket titles, usernames in logs)
Autonomous Testing Priority
**Inject a recognisable HTML tag with a unique canary string. Unescaped angle brackets in the response = confirmed injection.**
**Pattern 1 — Basic HTML tag injection:**
<b>CANARY</b> "><b>CANARY</b>
Use a unique string as CANARY (something distinct to this test run). **Proof:** the response contains `<b>CANARY` with literal `<` angle brackets — not `<b>CANARY`. A properly encoded app would escape `<` to `<`.
**Try multiple tag types when `<b>` is filtered:**
- `<h1>CANARY</h1>` — heading tag (often less filtered)
- `<img src=x onerror=CANARY>` — attribute context
- `<a href="https://attacker.com">click</a>` — link injection (phishing proof)
**For stored injection:** inject into the storage endpoint, then GET the page where the value is displayed and check for unescaped tags.
**Escalate immediately:** if `<b>` injection works, try `<script>alert(1)</script>` — the same unsanitised input may allow full XSS.
Proof
Confirmed when your injected tag appears in the response body with literal `<` angle brackets (not HTML-encoded). A safe app renders `<b>CANARY</b>`; a vulnerable app renders `<b>CANARY</b>`.
Distinguishing HTML Injection from XSS
- HTML injection: `<b>text</b>` renders as **text** in the browser — no JS execution needed.
- XSS: `<script>alert(1)</script>` executes JavaScript.
Some WAFs block `<script>` but pass `<b>` or `<img>` — start with non-script tags, then escalate.
A self-contained Claude skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work · 82 skills · 15 slash commands · 681 disclosed-report patterns across 24 core vulnerability classes · enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices · engagement-folder
Repo: elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
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