agent-runtime-validati…
Plans and evaluates bounded runtime tests of AI agents, tools, memory, hooks, approvals, and scope enforcement. Use when static…
Reviews an already-supplied lateral movement candidate for exact upstream map binding, authorization, non-production isolation, containment, telemetry, stop control, rollback, cleanup ownership, custody, tool governance, and a separate-validation handoff. Use before transferring
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill lateral-movement-readiness --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill lateral-movement-readiness -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill lateral-movement-readiness -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill lateral-movement-readiness -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill lateral-movement-readiness -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill lateral-movement-readiness -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill lateral-movement-readiness -a windsurf -y
name: lateral-movement-readiness description: "Reviews an already-supplied lateral movement candidate for exact upstream map binding, authorization, non-production isolation, containment, telemetry, stop control, rollback, cleanup ownership, custody, tool governance, and a separate-validation handoff. Use before transferring a candidate to a lab validation team." allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
This skill answers one narrow question: may an already-supplied movement candidate be handed to a separate validation team? It checks records; it does not grant execution authority.
Never create, select, rank, enrich, or modify a movement candidate. Never produce commands, credentials, payloads, protocols, target locators, evasion, deployment, execution steps, or infrastructure. Accept only opaque identifiers and digests from the supplied record.
1. Set one engagement assessment time and window. Record the governing policy and every supplied movement; the review treats all of them as the denominator. 2. Bind each movement to the exact upstream map identifier and digest, scope, source, destination, policy, and environment. A digest or reference change is a different candidate, not a harmless edit. 3. Accept only `isolated-lab` or `dedicated-non-production` environments. A production, shared, ambiguous, or merely named “test” environment is not eligible. 4. Record bounded `separate-validation` authority. Bind it to the complete movement tuple and assessment window. Revocation and expiry take effect immediately. 5. Cite independent evidence for map receipt, environment assurance, containment, telemetry, stop pretest, rollback, cleanup readiness, custody, and tool governance. Evidence must be current, eligible, and exactly bound. 6. Assign cleanup ownership before readiness. A plan without an accountable owner remains blocked. 7. Record one coverage cell for every movement and required role. Missing cells cannot become implicit non-applicability. 8. Record a handoff only after exact approval and record receipts. Map drift, expiry, revocation, or a fired stop makes an existing handoff `withdrawal-required`. Resumption needs a new review; it is never automatic. 9. For withdrawal, cite a later exact withdrawal receipt. Preserve the prior record and chronology. 10. Complete the assessment and resolve every finding without altering the supplied movement identity.
yet effective; it does not mean “almost approved.”
contradictory, including a fired stop.
its supporting state ceases to be current, and `withdrawn` only after proof.
Return the candidate ID, derived gate and validity, blocking codes, coverage counts, handoff state, and the next governance action. Keep all identifiers opaque. Do not quote restricted input in diagnostics or narrative.
implementation back to their accountable owners.
environment safety, operator competence, or execution authorization.
containment.
invalidates the reviewed identity.
candidate, environment, bindings, action, and time window.
only after current observability assurance exists.
correctly bound pretest evidence; firing it invalidates readiness.
prerequisites, not post-run paperwork.
review are required; no auto-resume exists.
supplied facts.
Portable, evidence-bound security skills for authorized defensive assessment, penetration testing, red teaming, detection engineering, purple teaming, and engagement operations. The collection contains 56 skills in 10 installable plugins from zero-lab.ai.
Plans and evaluates bounded runtime tests of AI agents, tools, memory, hooks, approvals, and scope enforcement. Use when static…
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