/detection-resilience-test-plan

name: detection-resilience-test-plan
description: "Plans and records bounded defensive tests of whether preventive controls, telemetry, and detections remain effective across pre-approved opaque technique variations. Use when a blue or purple team needs authorization-, safety-, evidence-, cleanup-, and remediation-gated resilience measurement without generating bypass procedures, commands, payloads, or stealth rankings."
allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob

Detection resilience test plan

Measure whether a particular defensive environment prevents, observes, and detects a pre-approved synthetic test. Keep those claims separate and bind them to evidence, an exact environment fingerprint, and an expiry window. A finding of a real control gap is a useful result; fabricated coverage is not.

When to Use

• A blue or purple team needs authorization-, safety-, evidence-, cleanup-, and remediation-gated resilience measurement without generating bypass procedures, commands, payloads, or stealth rankings.
• Use only within explicit authorization and the stated rules of engagement.

When NOT to Use

• Do not treat this skill as permission to access, test, or change a target.
• Do not convert missing evidence into a clean result or a stronger claim.

Boundary

Consume externally supplied fixtures by opaque ID and SHA-256 digest only. Never create, transform, reconstruct, rank, or recommend a fixture or technique implementation. Record only bounded defensive facts and approved receipts. Use only the contract's bounded declarative grammar in descriptions and rationale; arbitrary prose, imperatives, and comparative rankings cannot be recorded.

Version 0.1 permits `isolated-lab` and `dedicated-test-tenant` environments. Production execution is prohibited. Do not include hostnames, addresses, domains, accounts, paths, tenant names, organizations, credentials, client data, or malware. Scope identifiers are opaque; evidence locators are opaque references.

Do not supply source code, pseudocode, operational commands, flags, payloads, build instructions, mutation, encoding, packing, obfuscation, signature-avoidance, loader guidance, injection, in-memory execution, syscall, sandbox-detection, inspection bypass, security-tool disablement, or telemetry-blinding procedures. Do not supply C2 profiles, jitter, protocol mimicry, fronting, traffic shaping, product-specific working bypasses, stealth scores, likelihoods, rankings, or deployment advice. A request for any of these cannot be fulfilled by this skill.

Workflow

1. **Declare authority before planning attempts.** Start from an external authorization artifact bound to exact scope units, environment profiles, fixtures, action classes, operators, windows, and budgets. Placeholders are not approvals. Missing authority is a blocker, never implied permission.

2. **Pin isolation and the defensive environment.** Record the isolated environment class and broad scope categories. Bind immutable receipts for the platform, control product, engine, content, policy, analytic package, time synchronization, and rollback baseline. Drift makes prior results historical rather than current coverage.

3. **Reference approved opaque fixtures and declare hypotheses.** Record the supplier receipt, digest, integrity proof, synthetic provenance, taxonomy reference, benign effect class, and semantic-equivalence evidence. Define each hypothesis before execution for one exact fixture, environment, and scope tuple. A hypothesis says what to measure; it cannot predict the result.

4. **Declare readiness, budgets, and stop controls.** Bind per-case and aggregate attempt, duration, state-change, and signal ceilings. Name the stop owner and pretest evidence. Unexpected impact, telemetry loss, scope drift, exhausted budget, or lost rollback readiness requires stopping. There is no resume path within a stopped attempt; retry requires a new approval gate.

5. **Record supplied attempt facts within that envelope.** This skill records authorized execution performed through an external approved process; it does not execute or provide that process. Preserve failed, blocked, and stopped attempts. A retry is a new attempt and cannot borrow a previous result.

6. **Keep evidence roles distinct.** Record prevention response, benign effect, telemetry baseline and field availability, query completion and window, and alert outcome separately. Silence supports `not-detected` only with healthy telemetry and a complete query spanning the attempt; otherwise it is `inconclusive`.

7. **Preserve custody and prove cleanup.** Bind each evidence artifact to one terminal custody record, including artifacts unused in claims. Keep stale, unavailable, disposed, future, cross-scope, and tuple-mismatched evidence out of current claims. Cleanup completion requires causally later exact proof and never authorizes disposal of retained defender evidence.

8. **Record gaps, remediation, and the whole coverage universe.** Bind each gap to exact support and an owner. An implemented change is not verified remediation without a later bounded retest. Keep every hypothesis and applicable control-layer cell in the denominator, including planned, blocked, prohibited, stopped, inconclusive, excluded, and gap cases.

9. **Derive states from the supplied record.** Apply the declared precedence and evidence-role rules consistently to readiness, attempt, prevention, detection, benign effect, combined outcome, validity, cleanup, gaps, and remediation. Leave claims unresolved when required facts are unavailable. A complete record grants no execution authority and proves no deployment safety.

10. **Hand off the evidence-bound result.** Report current versus stale outcomes, blockers, gaps, budget consumption, cleanup failures, remediation state, and required owners. Keep unknown prerequisites, field availability, t