agent-runtime-validati…
Plans and evaluates bounded runtime tests of AI agents, tools, memory, hooks, approvals, and scope enforcement. Use when static…
Governs an exact current binary-fault-triage assessment result and recorded validation-readiness handoff for separate isolated-lab review. Use when checking defensive authority, isolation, budget, stop, cleanup, custody, and independent-review readiness without analyzing faults,
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill binary-fault-validation-readiness --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill binary-fault-validation-readiness -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill binary-fault-validation-readiness -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill binary-fault-validation-readiness -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill binary-fault-validation-readiness -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill binary-fault-validation-readiness -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add zero-lab-ai/skills --skill binary-fault-validation-readiness -a windsurf -y
name: binary-fault-validation-readiness description: "Governs an exact current binary-fault-triage assessment result and recorded validation-readiness handoff for separate isolated-lab review. Use when checking defensive authority, isolation, budget, stop, cleanup, custody, and independent-review readiness without analyzing faults, creating tests or inputs, determining exploitability, or authorizing execution or development." allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
Validate a supplied closed readiness ledger and produce, at most, a non-authorizing handoff for separate isolated validation review. A complete ledger establishes internal consistency only; it does not approve, perform, or describe validation.
Never inspect or analyze a binary fault. Never execute, mutate, fuzz, debug, disassemble, reproduce, or validate anything. Never create a test, input, exploit, payload, proof of concept, command, pseudocode, debugger syntax, address, offset, register, instruction, gadget, memory layout, primitive, bypass, path, or target. Never determine exploitability, severity, success, or validation outcome. Never authorize execution, exploit development, or use of a production environment.
1. Accept only a supplied exact `binary-fault-triage/v2` assessment result whose review status is `passed` and whose upstream handoff is recorded `validation-readiness`. 2. Stop on operational or restricted content. Do not quote rejected values. 3. Verify the canonical imported receipt over the complete opaque binary, build, architecture, provenance, fault, input, environment, observation, artifact, review, policy, and upstream handoff bindings. 4. Record only supplied passive sanitized receipts. Never contact an artifact, source, lab, target, or downstream operator. 5. Instantiate all nine essential readiness checks. None is not-applicable. 6. Keep authority actions limited to `readiness-review` and `handoff-recording`; neither grants execution authority. 7. Require every satisfied check to carry one canonical role-specific subject proof. Require an isolated non-production lab, exact numeric ceilings, exact stop-pretest proof, ready cleanup, retained custody, and genuinely independent review lineage. 8. Derive gate precedence as `prohibited`, `triage-refresh-required`, `approval-required`, `blocked`, then `handoff-ready`. 9. Treat `handoff-ready` as readiness for separate review only. It is not execution permission, validation success, or a technical conclusion. 10. Keep handoffs exact-bound and chronological. Null ownership derives `withheld`; a recorded occurrence requires an opaque owner and later receipt. 11. Derive withdrawal after authority expiry or revocation, bound drift, custody disposal, budget exhaustion, a fired stop, or cleanup loss. Require a later exact trigger-bound receipt for `withdrawn`.
State the ledger identifier, contradictions, exact gate and handoff counts, blocker gate IDs, and withdrawal handoff IDs. Add: “Internal readiness consistency only; no fault analysis, validation, execution authority, exploitability determination, or development authorization occurred.”
receipt starts governance only; this skill never validates.
exploitability, and this ledger cannot add that claim.
identity only; restricted artifacts stay opaque.
are independent mandatory checks.
review; downstream execution authority is outside this skill.
exists; refresh the evidence and establish a new readiness record.
Portable, evidence-bound security skills for authorized defensive assessment, penetration testing, red teaming, detection engineering, purple teaming, and engagement operations. The collection contains 56 skills in 10 installable plugins from zero-lab.ai.
Plans and evaluates bounded runtime tests of AI agents, tools, memory, hooks, approvals, and scope enforcement. Use when static…
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Assesses whether direct, indirect, multi-turn, retrieved, or tool-mediated instructions can override an AI system's intended…
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Tracks embedded-device and firmware assessment coverage across exact units, acquisition methods, debug interfaces, stored…
Use for authorized security assessment of REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, or SOAP APIs, including discovery, authentication,…
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys)…
Clean and finalize authorized natural-language text intended for readers by auditing suspicious invisible Unicode and rewriting…