/attack-tree-construction

name: attack-tree-construction
description: Build comprehensive attack trees to visualize threat paths. Use when mapping attack scenarios, identifying defense gaps, or communicating security risks to stakeholders.

Attack Tree Construction

Systematic attack path visualization and analysis.

When to Use This Skill

• Visualizing complex attack scenarios
• Identifying defense gaps and priorities
• Communicating risks to stakeholders
• Planning defensive investments
• Penetration test planning
• Security architecture review

Core Concepts

1. Attack Tree Structure

                    [Root Goal]
                         |
            ┌────────────┴────────────┐
            │                         │
       [Sub-goal 1]              [Sub-goal 2]
       (OR node)                 (AND node)
            │                         │
      ┌─────┴─────┐             ┌─────┴─────┐
      │           │             │           │
   [Attack]   [Attack]      [Attack]   [Attack]
    (leaf)     (leaf)        (leaf)     (leaf)

2. Node Types

| Type | Symbol | Description | | -------- | --------- | ----------------------- | | **OR** | Oval | Any child achieves goal | | **AND** | Rectangle | All children required | | **Leaf** | Box | Atomic attack step |

3. Attack Attributes

| Attribute | Description | Values | | ------------- | ----------------------- | ------------------ | | **Cost** | Resources needed | $, $$, $$$ | | **Time** | Duration to execute | Hours, Days, Weeks | | **Skill** | Expertise required | Low, Medium, High | | **Detection** | Likelihood of detection | Low, Medium, High |

Templates and detailed worked examples

Full template library lives in `references/details.md`. Read that file when you need concrete templates for this skill.

Best Practices

Do's

• **Start with clear goals** - Define what attacker wants
• **Be exhaustive** - Consider all attack vectors
• **Attribute attacks** - Cost, skill, and detection
• **Update regularly** - New threats emerge
• **Validate with experts** - Red team review

Don'ts

• **Don't oversimplify** - Real attacks are complex
• **Don't ignore dependencies** - AND nodes matter
• **Don't forget insider threats** - Not all attackers are external
• **Don't skip mitigations** - Trees are for defense planning
• **Don't make it static** - Threat landscape evolves