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/agentic-ai-risk-assess

Assess agentic AI applications against the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026. Use when reviewing autonomous AI agents, multi-agent systems, or agentic workflows for security risks including goal hijacking, tool misuse, privilege abuse, and rogue agent behavior.

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agent-security-playbook
20018 skills6 agents
Install
$ npx -y skills add owasp/secure-agent-playbook --skill agentic-ai-risk-assess --agent claude-code

How it fires

How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.

  • Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
  • You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
  • Slash command/agentic-ai-risk-assess

Context preview

The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.

Assess agentic AI applications against the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026. Use when reviewing autonomous AI agents, multi-agent systems, or agentic workflows for security risks including goal hijacking, tool misuse, privilege abuse, and rogue agent behavior.

SKILL.md

agentic-ai-risk-assess.SKILL.md
name: agentic-ai-risk-assess
description: Assess agentic AI applications against the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026. Use when reviewing autonomous AI agents, multi-agent systems, or agentic workflows for security risks including goal hijacking, tool misuse, privilege abuse, and rogue agent behavior.
license: CC-BY-4.0

Agentic AI Risk Assessment

Evaluate agentic AI applications against all 10 risk categories by following the full procedure in `plays/agentic-ai-risk-assess.md`.

Steps

1. **Architecture Mapping** — Identify agent type (single/multi-agent), autonomy level, tool ecosystem, memory systems, inter-agent communication protocols, and human oversight mechanisms.

2. **Assess Each Agentic Top 10 Risk**:

  • **ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack** — Hidden prompts, instruction override, silent exfiltration via copilot patterns
  • **ASI02 Tool Misuse** — Legitimate tools bent into destructive outputs, tool parameter manipulation
  • **ASI03 Identity & Privilege Abuse** — Leaked credentials, excessive permissions, agent operating beyond scope
  • **ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain** — Poisoned MCP/A2A components, runtime component tampering, dynamic ecosystem risks
  • **ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution** — Natural language execution paths leading to RCE, code generation vulnerabilities
  • **ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning** — Long-term behavior manipulation via memory attacks, context window exploits
  • **ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication** — Spoofed messages, man-in-the-middle between agents, cluster misdirection
  • **ASI08 Cascading Failures** — False signals propagating through automated pipelines, escalating impact chains
  • **ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation** — Confident misleading explanations, social engineering of human operators
  • **ASI10 Rogue Agents** — Misalignment, concealment, self-directed action, emergent harmful behavior

3. **Synthesize Findings** — Assign severity based on exploitability and deployment context. Provide code locations, configuration gaps, and concrete remediation.

Output

Architecture overview, risk matrix (all 10 categories with status), detailed findings using `templates/finding.md`, positive controls observed, and prioritized recommendations.

OWASP References

  • OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026
  • OWASP GenAI Security Project
  • OWASP Agentic Security Initiative
Read more
Ships withagent-security-playbook

An open-source security playbook for AI agents. Structured, OWASP-grounded procedures that enable agents to perform security engineering tasks — from code review to AI agent security audits.

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