acquiring-disk-image-w…
Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images using dd and dcfldd while preserving evidence integrity through
Deploys and monitors ransomware canary files across critical directories using Python''s watchdog library for
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Deploys and monitors ransomware canary files across critical directories using Python''s watchdog library for
name: deploying-ransomware-canary-files description: 'Deploys and monitors ransomware canary files across critical directories using Python''s watchdog library for real-time filesystem event detection. Places strategically named decoy files that mimic high-value targets (financial records, credentials, database exports) in locations ransomware typically enumerates first. Monitors for any read, modify, rename, or delete operations on canary files and triggers immediate alerts via email, Slack webhook, or syslog when interaction is detected, providing early warning before full encryption begins. ' domain: cybersecurity subdomain: ransomware-defense tags: - ransomware - canary-files - watchdog - detection - early-warning - deception - defense version: 1.0.0 author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf: - PR.DS-11 - RS.MA-01 - RC.RP-01 - PR.IR-01
**Do not use** as a replacement for endpoint protection, backup strategy, or network segmentation. Canary files are a detection layer, not a prevention mechanism.
Create decoy files with realistic names and content that attract ransomware scanners. Files should have names like `Passwords.xlsx`, `Financial_Report_2026.docx`, `backup_credentials.csv` and contain plausible-looking but fake data. Place them in directories ransomware typically targets first: user desktops, Documents folders, network share roots, and backup paths.
Use Python's watchdog library with a custom `FileSystemEventHandler` that watches canary file paths. The handler triggers on `on_modified`, `on_deleted`, `on_moved`, and `on_created` events for canary files. Any legitimate user or process should never touch these files, so any interaction is a high-confidence indicator of ransomware or unauthorized access.
Wire the filesystem monitor to multiple alert channels: email via SMTP, Slack webhook POST, syslog forwarding to SIEM, and local log file. Include the triggering event type, file path, timestamp, and process information (when available) in alert payloads.
Simulate ransomware behavior by programmatically modifying, renaming, and deleting canary files to verify the detection pipeline fires correctly. Measure time-to-alert and validate alert delivery across all configured channels.
| Term | Definition | |------|------------| | **Canary File** | A decoy file placed in a monitored directory that triggers an alert when accessed, modified, or deleted | | **Watchdog** | Python library that monitors filesystem events using OS-native APIs (inotify on Linux, FSEvents on macOS, ReadDirectoryChangesW on Windows) | | **Honey File** | Synonym for canary file; a fake document designed to attract and detect malicious activity | | **Entropy Check** | Measuring randomness in file content to detect encryption (ransomware produces high-entropy output) |
RANSOMWARE CANARY ALERT ======================== Timestamp: 2026-03-11T14:23:07Z Event: FILE_MODIFIED Canary File: /srv/shares/finance/Passwords.xlsx Directory: /srv/shares/finance SHA-256 Before: a3f2...8b4c SHA-256 After: 7e91...2d3f Alert Channels: [email, slack, syslog] Action: Investigate immediately - potential ransomware activity
Open-source security arsenal for AI coding agents: 784 cybersecurity skills, scanner integrations, and a security MCP for Claude Code, Cursor, opencode, Gemini CLI, Cline, and any agentskills.io agent. Mapped to OWASP, MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF, D3FEND, ATLAS.
Repo: Mikaru0Mystic/sectinel
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