acquiring-disk-image-w…
Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images using dd and dcfldd while preserving evidence integrity through
Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege
$ npx -y skills add Mikaru0Mystic/sectinel --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunkContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege
name: analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk description: 'Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when SOC analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats, build detection queries, or perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers. ' domain: cybersecurity subdomain: soc-operations tags: - soc - splunk - windows-events - sysmon - event-logs - mitre-attack - active-directory version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 d3fend_techniques: - Restore Access - Password Authentication - Biometric Authentication - Strong Password Policy - Restore User Account Access nist_csf: - DE.CM-01 - DE.AE-02 - RS.MA-01 - DE.AE-06
Use this skill when:
**Do not use** for Linux/macOS endpoint analysis or network-only investigations.
**Brute Force Detection (EventCode 4625 — Failed Logon):**
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625
| stats count, dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, values(TargetUserName) AS targeted_users
by src_ip, Logon_Type, Status
| where count > 20
| eval attack_type = case(
Logon_Type=3, "Network Brute Force",
Logon_Type=10, "RDP Brute Force",
Logon_Type=2, "Interactive Brute Force",
1=1, "Other"
)
| eval status_meaning = case(
Status="0xc000006d", "Bad Username or Password",
Status="0xc000006a", "Incorrect Password (valid user)",
Status="0xc0000234", "Account Locked Out",
Status="0xc0000072", "Account Disabled",
1=1, Status
)
| sort - count
| table src_ip, attack_type, status_meaning, count, unique_users, targeted_users**Password Spray Detection:**
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 | bin _time span=10m | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, count AS total_attempts, values(TargetUserName) AS users_targeted by src_ip, _time | where unique_users > 10 AND total_attempts < unique_users * 3 | eval spray_confidence = if(unique_users > 25, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")
**Successful Logon After Failures (Compromise Indicator):**
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) src_ip!="127.0.0.1" | sort _time | stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen, sum(eval(if(EventCode=4625,1,0))) AS failures, sum(eval(if(EventCode=4624,1,0))) AS successes by src_ip, TargetUserName, ComputerName | where failures > 10 AND successes > 0 | eval time_to_success = round((last_seen - first_seen)/60, 1) | sort - failures
**New Admin Account Created (T1136.001):**
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720
| join TargetUserName type=left [
search index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 TargetUserName="Administrators"
| rename MemberName AS TargetUserName
]
| table _time, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| eval alert = "New account created and added to Administrators group"**Special Privileges Assigned (EventCode 4672):**
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4672
SubjectUserName!="SYSTEM" SubjectUserName!="LOCAL SERVICE" SubjectUserName!="NETWORK SERVICE"
| stats count, values(PrivilegeList) AS privileges by SubjectUserName, ComputerName
| where count > 0
| search privileges IN ("SeDebugPrivilege", "SeTcbPrivilege", "SeBackupPrivilege",
"SeRestorePrivilege", "SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege")**Token Manipulation Detection (T1134):**
index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe"
GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010", "0x1038", "0x1fffff", "0x40")
| stats count by SourceImage, SourceUser, Computer, GrantedAccess
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(svchost|csrss|wininit|MsMpEng|CrowdStrike)")
| sort - count**Scheduled Task Creation (T1053.005):**
index=wineventlog (sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698)
OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image="*\\schtasks.exe")
| eval task_info = coalesce(TaskContent, CommandLine)
| search task_info="*powershell*" OR task_info="*cmd*" OR task_info="*http*" OR task_info="*\\Temp\\*"
| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, task_info**Registry Run Key Modification (T1547.001):**
index=sysmon EventCode=13 TargetObject IN ( "*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*", "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*", "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\\*", "*\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\*" ) | stats count by Computer, Image, TargetObject, Details | where NOT match(Image, "(explorer\.exe|msiexec\.exe|setup\.exe)") | sort - count
**WMI Event Subscription (T1546.003):**
index=sysmon EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21 | stats count by Computer, Operation, Consumer, EventNamespace | where count > 0
**Remote Service Exploitation (T1021.002 — SMB/Windows Admin Shares):**
index=wineventlog sourcetype="
Open-source security arsenal for AI coding agents: 784 cybersecurity skills, scanner integrations, and a security MCP for Claude Code, Cursor, opencode, Gemini CLI, Cline, and any agentskills.io agent. Mapped to OWASP, MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF, D3FEND, ATLAS.
Repo: Mikaru0Mystic/sectinel
Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images using dd and dcfldd while preserving evidence integrity through
Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3 to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and
Perform static analysis of Android APK malware samples using apktool for decompilation, jadx for Java source
Parses API Gateway access logs (AWS API Gateway, Kong, Nginx) to detect BOLA/IDOR attacks, rate limit bypass,
Analyze advanced persistent threat (APT) group techniques using MITRE ATT&CK Navigator to create layered heatmaps
Queries Azure Monitor activity logs and sign-in logs via azure-monitor-query to detect suspicious administrative