/security-threat-model
Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation. Use when touching authentication, authorization, payments, secrets, user data, uploads, webhooks, admin tools,
$ npx -y skills add majiayu000/spellbook --skill security-threat-model --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
- Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
- You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
- Slash command
/security-threat-model
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Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation. Use when touching authentication, authorization, payments, secrets, user data, uploads, webhooks, admin tools,
SKILL.md
security-threat-model.SKILL.mdname: security-threat-model
description: Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation. Use when touching authentication, authorization, payments, secrets, user data, uploads, webhooks, admin tools, innerHTML/eval/exec, dependency upgrades, or cross-tenant access.
Security Threat Model
Purpose
Use this skill before implementing or approving security-sensitive changes. It complements `auth-security` and `server-security` by mapping assets, attackers, trust boundaries, and concrete controls.
Scope First
Identify:
1. Assets: credentials, tokens, user data, tenant data, money movement, admin actions. 2. Actors: anonymous user, authenticated user, tenant admin, internal operator, compromised dependency. 3. Trust boundaries: browser/server, service/service, tenant/tenant, CI/runtime, third-party callbacks. 4. Entry points: API routes, CLI commands, jobs, webhooks, uploads, config files. 5. Existing controls: validation, authz, rate limits, audit logs, secret storage.
Threat Checklist
Check at least:
- Spoofing: can an identity, tenant, callback, or service be forged?
- Tampering: can payloads, configs, migrations, artifacts, or logs be altered?
- Repudiation: is there an audit trail for sensitive actions?
- Information disclosure: can secrets, PII, logs, or tenant data leak?
- Denial of service: can expensive paths be amplified?
- Elevation of privilege: can user or service permissions expand?
- Supply chain: can dependencies, scripts, CI, or generated files introduce risk?
Required Controls
Every finding needs one of:
- preventive control in production code,
- detective control with alerting,
- compensating manual control with owner and expiry,
- explicit accepted risk with rationale.
Do not accept "warn and continue" for authz, secrets, tenant isolation, injection, or payment/security-critical failures.
Output Shape
scope:
assets:
trust_boundaries:
entry_points:
threats:
required_controls:
tests_or_probes:
residual_risks:
review_gate:
For implementation work, include exact files and verification commands that prove the controls are active.
Read more
name: security-threat-model description: Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation. Use when touching authentication, authorization, payments, secrets, user data, uploads, webhooks, admin tools, innerHTML/eval/exec, dependency upgrades, or cross-tenant access.
Security Threat Model
Purpose
Use this skill before implementing or approving security-sensitive changes. It complements `auth-security` and `server-security` by mapping assets, attackers, trust boundaries, and concrete controls.
Scope First
Identify:
1. Assets: credentials, tokens, user data, tenant data, money movement, admin actions. 2. Actors: anonymous user, authenticated user, tenant admin, internal operator, compromised dependency. 3. Trust boundaries: browser/server, service/service, tenant/tenant, CI/runtime, third-party callbacks. 4. Entry points: API routes, CLI commands, jobs, webhooks, uploads, config files. 5. Existing controls: validation, authz, rate limits, audit logs, secret storage.
Threat Checklist
Check at least:
- Spoofing: can an identity, tenant, callback, or service be forged?
- Tampering: can payloads, configs, migrations, artifacts, or logs be altered?
- Repudiation: is there an audit trail for sensitive actions?
- Information disclosure: can secrets, PII, logs, or tenant data leak?
- Denial of service: can expensive paths be amplified?
- Elevation of privilege: can user or service permissions expand?
- Supply chain: can dependencies, scripts, CI, or generated files introduce risk?
Required Controls
Every finding needs one of:
- preventive control in production code,
- detective control with alerting,
- compensating manual control with owner and expiry,
- explicit accepted risk with rationale.
Do not accept "warn and continue" for authz, secrets, tenant isolation, injection, or payment/security-critical failures.
Output Shape
scope: assets: trust_boundaries: entry_points: threats: required_controls: tests_or_probes: residual_risks: review_gate:
For implementation work, include exact files and verification commands that prove the controls are active.
Cross-runtime skills for Claude Code, Codex, and multi-agent workflows.
Repo: majiayu000/spellbook
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