a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity,…
Design and run a safety evaluation suite for an AI model or feature across harm categories — refusals on disallowed content, robustness, over-refusal vs helpfulness, groundedness/truthfulness — with rubrics and pass/fail thresholds. Use to measure an AI system's safety,
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill safety-evaluation --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill safety-evaluation -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill safety-evaluation -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill safety-evaluation -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill safety-evaluation -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill safety-evaluation -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill safety-evaluation -a windsurf -y
name: safety-evaluation description: >- Design and run a safety evaluation suite for an AI model or feature across harm categories — refusals on disallowed content, robustness, over-refusal vs helpfulness, groundedness/truthfulness — with rubrics and pass/fail thresholds. Use to measure an AI system's safety, establish a baseline, or gate a release.
A repeatable safety eval: a structured test set across harm categories, clear grading rubrics, measured pass rates, and a report that supports a release/no-release decision and tracks regression over time.
the harm categories from `harm-modeling`? (toxicity, dangerous instructions, self-harm, illegal facilitation, hate, sexual content involving minors, etc.)
that destroys utility is its own failure; measure both.
encoded, and multi-turn pressure? (Deeper adversarial work: `safety-red-team`.)
correct and properly hedged/cited? (RAG groundedness: see `rag-security`.)
`bias-fairness-assessment`).
1. Derive harm categories and high-stakes scenarios from `harm-modeling`. 2. Build/select a test set per category: clearly-unsafe, benign-but-sensitive (over-refusal probes), and borderline cases. Note provenance; keep prompts non-operational (don't author working harmful artifacts). 3. Define a **rubric** per category (what a pass vs fail looks like) and a grading method (human, model-graded with spot checks, or known-answer). 4. Run, score, and compute pass rates with thresholds per category. 5. Report results, failures with examples, trends vs prior runs, and gaps.
A safety eval report: per-category pass rate vs threshold, notable failures (redacted), over- vs under-refusal balance, and prioritized fixes. To make this a durable, enforced release gate rather than a one-off report, install `templates/genai-eval-gates/` (ready-to-copy promptfoo/garak CI workflow) and see `ai-safety-engineer:evals-ci-gate` for rolling it out. Use `security-diagramming:infographic` for a scorecard and `security-reporting` for the writeup.
Measure both safety **and** helpfulness — a model that refuses everything scores "safe" but is useless. Keep the eval set versioned so results are comparable across releases. Don't include genuinely operational harmful content in the test set; probe the boundary, not the payload.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
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