a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity,…
Aggregate a fast, diff-scoped security check before `git commit`/`git push` — secrets/gitignore hygiene, SAST/SCA on changed files, and IaC/Claude-config checks where relevant — into a single go/no-go verdict. Use before committing or pushing, not as a full-repo audit.
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill pre-commit-gate --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill pre-commit-gate -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill pre-commit-gate -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill pre-commit-gate -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill pre-commit-gate -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill pre-commit-gate -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill pre-commit-gate -a windsurf -y
name: pre-commit-gate description: >- Aggregate a fast, diff-scoped security check before `git commit`/`git push` — secrets/gitignore hygiene, SAST/SCA on changed files, and IaC/Claude-config checks where relevant — into a single go/no-go verdict. Use before committing or pushing, not as a full-repo audit.
A single **BLOCK** or **PASS** verdict on the current changeset, fast enough to run before every commit — by aggregating existing scanning skills, not reimplementing them.
1. **Scope to the diff.** Use `git status` / `git diff --cached` (or `git diff` if nothing is staged yet) to get the changed-file list. Never widen to a full-repo scan here — that's what `sast-sca`/`infrastructure-security` are for on demand; this gate only exists because it's fast. 2. **Secrets & gitignore hygiene** — run `infrastructure-security:secrets-management-review` scoped to the changed files: hardcoded secrets in the diff, and the gitignore-hygiene check (sensitive paths like `.env`, keys, `.claude/`, `terraform.tfstate*` actually excluded, and not already tracked via `git ls-files`). 3. **SAST** — run `sast-sca:sast-review` on changed code files for unsafe methods/APIs, with the safe-pattern fix. For Python/React specifically, also note whether `secure-coding:safe-function-lint`'s curated rule pack (and its installed git hooks) already cover this changeset — if `secure-coding` isn't installed/enforced in this repo, flag that as a gap alongside the findings. 4. **SCA** — if a dependency manifest changed (`package.json`, `requirements.txt`, `go.mod`, `pom.xml`, lockfiles, etc.), run `sast-sca:sca-review` for outdated/vulnerable libraries and the safe version to move to. 5. **IaC** — if Terraform/CloudFormation/Kubernetes manifests changed, cross-ref `infrastructure-security:iac-security-review`. 6. **Claude/agent config** — if `.claude/`, `.mcp.json`, or an agent/skill definition changed, cross-ref `claude-config-security:config-security-scan` (a misconfigured AI-agent setup is itself an attack surface). 7. **Aggregate.** Any confirmed live secret, or any HIGH+ finding from the above → **BLOCK**. Everything else → **PASS with warnings** (list them, don't block).
Top line: **BLOCK** or **PASS**. Then a verdict table: check · result · blocking findings (file:line · severity · fix). For BLOCK, give the exact fix per finding, not just the diagnosis, so the developer can resolve it and re-run immediately.
This is deliberately a thin orchestrator over `sast-sca`, `infrastructure-security`, and `claude-config-security` — it owns no scanning logic of its own. It's also the diff-scoped, multi-language, Claude-session-only counterpart to `secure-coding`'s narrower but *enforced* Python/React git hooks — install both; this gate catches what the hooks don't cover (other languages, SCA, IaC), and the hooks catch commits made outside a Claude Code session. Staying scoped to the diff is the point: a gate that takes minutes gets skipped; a gate that takes seconds gets run. For anything the diff-scoped pass can't catch (architecture-level issues, cross-file trust boundaries), that's what a full `security-architect:security-design-review` or `threat-modeling` pass is for — this skill is the fast last line, not the only line.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity,…
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