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/k8s-rbac-review

Audit Kubernetes RBAC for least privilege and privilege-escalation paths — cluster-admin sprawl, wildcard/dangerous verbs, risky bindings, and service-account token exposure. Use to review who can do what in a cluster and find escalation to cluster-admin.

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awesome-claude-security
6111 skills17 agents13 commands1 MCP
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$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill k8s-rbac-review --agent claude-code

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  • Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
  • You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
  • Slash command/k8s-rbac-review

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Audit Kubernetes RBAC for least privilege and privilege-escalation paths — cluster-admin sprawl, wildcard/dangerous verbs, risky bindings, and service-account token exposure. Use to review who can do what in a cluster and find escalation to cluster-admin.

SKILL.md

k8s-rbac-review.SKILL.md
name: k8s-rbac-review
description: >-
  Audit Kubernetes RBAC for least privilege and privilege-escalation paths —
  cluster-admin sprawl, wildcard/dangerous verbs, risky bindings, and service-account
  token exposure. Use to review who can do what in a cluster and find escalation to
  cluster-admin.

Goal

An RBAC risk assessment: which subjects (users, groups, service accounts) hold excessive or dangerous permissions, and which paths lead to cluster-admin — with least-privilege fixes.

Dangerous permissions to hunt

  • **Escalation primitives** — `create`/`update` on `roles`/`clusterroles`/

`rolebindings`/`clusterrolebindings`; `escalate`/`bind` verbs; `impersonate`.

  • **Workload-to-node/secret** — `create pods` (esp. with privileged/hostPath),

`pods/exec`, `pods/attach`, `create` on `pods/ephemeralcontainers`.

  • **Secret access** — `get`/`list` on `secrets` (cluster-wide is effectively

cluster-admin via token theft).

  • **Wildcards** — `verbs: ["*"]`, `resources: ["*"]`, `apiGroups: ["*"]`, and

cluster-admin bindings.

  • **Token exposure** — service accounts with auto-mounted tokens and broad rights.

Steps

1. Enumerate Roles/ClusterRoles and their bindings; map subject → effective permissions (consider tooling like `kubectl auth can-i`, rbac audit tools). 2. Flag wildcard/admin grants, the dangerous verbs above, and broad secret access. 3. Trace escalation: can a namespace-scoped subject reach cluster-admin (e.g. via pod creation onto a privileged node, secret theft, or role self-grant)? Model the worst path (`security-diagramming:attack-tree`). 4. Record: subject · grant · risk · escalation? · least-priv recommendation.

Output

An RBAC findings table + an escalation-path diagram for the worst case. Confirmed issues → `security-reporting:finding` (rate escalation-to-cluster-admin high+).

Notes

In Kubernetes, broad `secrets` read or `pods/exec` plus a privileged node is effectively cluster-admin — treat those as escalation, not "just read access." Recommend namespaced, least-privilege Roles and disabling unneeded SA token auto-mount.

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