a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity,…
Audit Kubernetes RBAC for least privilege and privilege-escalation paths — cluster-admin sprawl, wildcard/dangerous verbs, risky bindings, and service-account token exposure. Use to review who can do what in a cluster and find escalation to cluster-admin.
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill k8s-rbac-review --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill k8s-rbac-review -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill k8s-rbac-review -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill k8s-rbac-review -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill k8s-rbac-review -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill k8s-rbac-review -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill k8s-rbac-review -a windsurf -y
name: k8s-rbac-review description: >- Audit Kubernetes RBAC for least privilege and privilege-escalation paths — cluster-admin sprawl, wildcard/dangerous verbs, risky bindings, and service-account token exposure. Use to review who can do what in a cluster and find escalation to cluster-admin.
An RBAC risk assessment: which subjects (users, groups, service accounts) hold excessive or dangerous permissions, and which paths lead to cluster-admin — with least-privilege fixes.
`rolebindings`/`clusterrolebindings`; `escalate`/`bind` verbs; `impersonate`.
`pods/exec`, `pods/attach`, `create` on `pods/ephemeralcontainers`.
cluster-admin via token theft).
cluster-admin bindings.
1. Enumerate Roles/ClusterRoles and their bindings; map subject → effective permissions (consider tooling like `kubectl auth can-i`, rbac audit tools). 2. Flag wildcard/admin grants, the dangerous verbs above, and broad secret access. 3. Trace escalation: can a namespace-scoped subject reach cluster-admin (e.g. via pod creation onto a privileged node, secret theft, or role self-grant)? Model the worst path (`security-diagramming:attack-tree`). 4. Record: subject · grant · risk · escalation? · least-priv recommendation.
An RBAC findings table + an escalation-path diagram for the worst case. Confirmed issues → `security-reporting:finding` (rate escalation-to-cluster-admin high+).
In Kubernetes, broad `secrets` read or `pods/exec` plus a privileged node is effectively cluster-admin — treat those as escalation, not "just read access." Recommend namespaced, least-privilege Roles and disabling unneeded SA token auto-mount.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity,…
Test the agent execution harness/runtime itself — LangChain/LangGraph, AutoGen, CrewAI, custom ReAct-style loops, or…
Assess an autonomous / tool-using AI agent for security end-to-end: tool privileges, autonomy and approval boundaries, excessive…
Test what an AI agent will actually do without human confirmation, including under injected-goal / prompt-injection scenarios, to…
Review the security of MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers/clients an agent uses: server trust tier, tool/resource description…
Inventory the tools/functions an AI agent can call and audit their privileges, side effects, and approval requirements to find…
Use for authorized security assessment of REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, or SOAP APIs, including discovery, authentication,…
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys)…
Clean and finalize authorized natural-language text intended for readers by auditing suspicious invisible Unicode and rewriting…