a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Systematically enumerate the potential HARMS of an AI system — to users, third parties, vulnerable groups, and society — under normal use, misuse, and malfunction, then rank them and map mitigations. This is the AI-safety analog of threat modeling (which targets attackers). Use
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill harm-modeling --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/harm-modelingContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Systematically enumerate the potential HARMS of an AI system — to users, third parties, vulnerable groups, and society — under normal use, misuse, and malfunction, then rank them and map mitigations. This is the AI-safety analog of threat modeling (which targets attackers). Use
name: harm-modeling description: >- Systematically enumerate the potential HARMS of an AI system — to users, third parties, vulnerable groups, and society — under normal use, misuse, and malfunction, then rank them and map mitigations. This is the AI-safety analog of threat modeling (which targets attackers). Use when designing or reviewing an AI feature for safety, not security.
A harm model: who could be harmed, how, under what conditions, how badly, and what reduces it — the safety counterpart to a security threat model.
compromise the system?* The actor is adversarial.
via normal use, foreseeable misuse, malfunction, bias, or over-reliance. Use both for a complete picture.
1. **Define the system & context** — purpose, users (including vulnerable populations: minors, patients, at-risk groups), deployment context, and the stakes of the decisions it influences. 2. **Identify stakeholders** — direct users, non-user subjects (people the output is *about*), bystanders/third parties, and society at large. 3. **Enumerate harm categories** (see `reference.md`): physical, psychological, financial, discrimination/unfairness, privacy/dignity, misinformation, manipulation/autonomy, societal/democratic, environmental, and dangerous- capability/misuse harms. 4. **For each plausible harm, capture the condition**: normal use, foreseeable misuse, malfunction/error (hallucination, failure), distribution shift, or feedback effects at scale. Note *who* is harmed and how severe/irreversible. 5. **Rate** severity × likelihood × affected-population (weight irreversible and vulnerable-group harms up). Reuse `threat-modeling:risk-rank` scoring. 6. **Map mitigations** — design changes, guardrails, evals, human oversight, disclosures, usage policy, monitoring — and note residual harm.
A harm-model table: stakeholder · harm category · condition · severity · likelihood · affected group · mitigation · residual. Plus a top-harms summary and recommended safeguards. Use `security-reporting` for the writeup and `security-diagramming` to map harm pathways.
Always include foreseeable **misuse** and **malfunction**, not just intended use — most real-world AI harms come from those. Give extra weight to harms that are irreversible or fall on people who can't opt out.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Repo: jassics/awesome-claude-security
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity, capability-negotiation trust, and delegation-chain…
Test the agent execution harness/runtime itself — LangChain/LangGraph, AutoGen, CrewAI, custom ReAct-style loops, or computer-use/browser-use agents — for…
Assess an autonomous / tool-using AI agent for security end-to-end: tool privileges, autonomy and approval boundaries, excessive agency, memory/state…
Test what an AI agent will actually do without human confirmation, including under injected-goal / prompt-injection scenarios, to validate its autonomy and…
Review the security of MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers/clients an agent uses: server trust tier, tool/resource description and result poisoning,…
Inventory the tools/functions an AI agent can call and audit their privileges, side effects, and approval requirements to find excessive-agency and…