a2a-security-review
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity,…
Systematically enumerate the potential HARMS of an AI system — to users, third parties, vulnerable groups, and society — under normal use, misuse, and malfunction, then rank them and map mitigations. This is the AI-safety analog of threat modeling (which targets attackers). Use
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill harm-modeling --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill harm-modeling -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill harm-modeling -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill harm-modeling -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill harm-modeling -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill harm-modeling -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add jassics/awesome-claude-security --skill harm-modeling -a windsurf -y
name: harm-modeling description: >- Systematically enumerate the potential HARMS of an AI system — to users, third parties, vulnerable groups, and society — under normal use, misuse, and malfunction, then rank them and map mitigations. This is the AI-safety analog of threat modeling (which targets attackers). Use when designing or reviewing an AI feature for safety, not security.
A harm model: who could be harmed, how, under what conditions, how badly, and what reduces it — the safety counterpart to a security threat model.
compromise the system?* The actor is adversarial.
via normal use, foreseeable misuse, malfunction, bias, or over-reliance. Use both for a complete picture.
1. **Define the system & context** — purpose, users (including vulnerable populations: minors, patients, at-risk groups), deployment context, and the stakes of the decisions it influences. 2. **Identify stakeholders** — direct users, non-user subjects (people the output is *about*), bystanders/third parties, and society at large. 3. **Enumerate harm categories** (see `reference.md`): physical, psychological, financial, discrimination/unfairness, privacy/dignity, misinformation, manipulation/autonomy, societal/democratic, environmental, and dangerous- capability/misuse harms. 4. **For each plausible harm, capture the condition**: normal use, foreseeable misuse, malfunction/error (hallucination, failure), distribution shift, or feedback effects at scale. Note *who* is harmed and how severe/irreversible. 5. **Rate** severity × likelihood × affected-population (weight irreversible and vulnerable-group harms up). Reuse `threat-modeling:risk-rank` scoring. 6. **Map mitigations** — design changes, guardrails, evals, human oversight, disclosures, usage policy, monitoring — and note residual harm.
A harm-model table: stakeholder · harm category · condition · severity · likelihood · affected group · mitigation · residual. Plus a top-harms summary and recommended safeguards. Use `security-reporting` for the writeup and `security-diagramming` to map harm pathways.
Always include foreseeable **misuse** and **malfunction**, not just intended use — most real-world AI harms come from those. Give extra weight to harms that are irreversible or fall on people who can't opt out.
A Claude Code plugin marketplace for the full cybersecurity & GenAI-security lifecycle — from recon and threat modeling to detection engineering, GRC, and CISO-level strategy. A pentester knows which OWASP test bends a broken-access-control endpoint.
Review agent-to-agent (A2A) / multi-agent-system trust: peer identity and authentication, message integrity,…
Test the agent execution harness/runtime itself — LangChain/LangGraph, AutoGen, CrewAI, custom ReAct-style loops, or…
Assess an autonomous / tool-using AI agent for security end-to-end: tool privileges, autonomy and approval boundaries, excessive…
Test what an AI agent will actually do without human confirmation, including under injected-goal / prompt-injection scenarios, to…
Review the security of MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers/clients an agent uses: server trust tier, tool/resource description…
Inventory the tools/functions an AI agent can call and audit their privileges, side effects, and approval requirements to find…
Use for authorized security assessment of REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, or SOAP APIs, including discovery, authentication,…
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys)…
Clean and finalize authorized natural-language text intended for readers by auditing suspicious invisible Unicode and rewriting…