/validate

name: validate
description: Validate a finding — runs 7-Question Gate + 4-gate checklist. Kills weak findings before report writing. Prevents N/A submissions that hurt validity ratio. Usage: /validate

/validate

Run full validation on the current finding before writing a report.

What This Does

1. Runs 7-Question Gate (one wrong answer = kill it) 2. Checks against the always-rejected list 3. Runs 4 pre-submission gates 4. Outputs: PASS (write the report) or KILL (move on)

Usage

/validate

Describe the finding when prompted. Include:

• The endpoint
• The bug class
• What the PoC shows
• The target program

The 7-Question Gate

Answer each. ONE wrong answer = STOP.

Q1: Can I demonstrate this step-by-step RIGHT NOW?

Write this out:

1. Setup:   I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body]
3. Result:  Response shows [exact data / action completed]
4. Impact:  Real consequence is [account takeover / PII exposed / money stolen]
5. Cost:    Time: [X min], Capital: [$0 / $X]

If step 2 is "I need to look at the code more" → KILL IT.

Q2: Is the impact accepted by this program?

Check program scope page. Is your bug class listed? Is it excluded?

Q3: Is the vulnerable asset in scope?

Exact domain in scope? Not staging/dev? Not a third-party service?

Q4: Does it need admin or privileged access that an attacker can't get?

"Admin can do X" → KILL IT. "Regular user can do X that only admin should" → valid.

Q5: Is this known or documented behavior?

Search disclosed reports + changelog + API docs.

Q6: Can you prove impact beyond "technically possible"?

• XSS → actual cookie value in exfil request, not just alert()
• SSRF → response body from internal service, not just DNS callback
• IDOR → actual other-user's private data in response, not just 200 status

Q7: Is this on the never-submit list?

Missing headers, GraphQL introspection alone, clickjacking without PoC,
self-XSS, open redirect alone, SSRF DNS-only, logout CSRF, banner disclosure,
rate limit on non-critical forms, missing cookie flags alone...

If yes → KILL IT unless you have a chain.

Check: Conditionally Valid?

If it's on the never-submit list, can you chain it?

| You Have | Chain Available? | |---|---| | Open redirect | + OAuth code theft → ATO? | | SSRF DNS-only | + internal service data? | | Clickjacking | + sensitive action + PoC? | | CORS wildcard | + credentialed data exfil? | | Prompt injection | + IDOR → other user's data? |

If no chain → KILL IT. If chain confirmed → report both together.

4 Gates — All Must Pass

**Gate 0 (30 sec):**

[ ] Confirmed with real HTTP requests (not just code reading)
[ ] In scope (checked program page)
[ ] Reproducible from scratch
[ ] Evidence captured

**Gate 1 — Impact (2 min):**

[ ] Can answer "What does attacker walk away with?"
[ ] More than "sees non-sensitive data"
[ ] Real victim exists
[ ] No unlikely preconditions

**Gate 2 — Dedup (5 min):**

[ ] Searched HackerOne Hacktivity for endpoint + bug class
[ ] Searched GitHub issues
[ ] Read 5 most recent disclosed reports
[ ] Not in changelog as known issue

**Gate 3 — Report quality (10 min):**

[ ] Title formula: [Class] in [Endpoint] allows [actor] to [impact]
[ ] Steps have exact HTTP request
[ ] Evidence shows actual impact
[ ] CVSS calculated
[ ] Fix: 1-2 concrete sentences

Output

**PASS:** "All 7 questions pass. All 4 gates pass. Proceed to /report."

**KILL:** "Q[N] fails because [reason]. Kill this finding. Reason: [explanation]. Move on."

**DOWNGRADE:** "Q6 only shows technical possibility. Downgrade from High to Medium. Requires showing actual data exfil in PoC."