/race-condition
Race condition and TOCTOU testing for web apps. Use when testing one-time operations, concurrent HTTP abuse, rate-limit bypass, Turbo Intruder gates, HTTP/2 single-packet attacks, and CWE-362-style synchronization gaps.
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/race-condition
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Race condition and TOCTOU testing for web apps. Use when testing one-time operations, concurrent HTTP abuse, rate-limit bypass, Turbo Intruder gates, HTTP/2 single-packet attacks, and CWE-362-style synchronization gaps.
SKILL.md
race-condition.SKILL.mdname: race-condition
description: >-
Race condition and TOCTOU testing for web apps. Use when testing one-time operations, concurrent HTTP abuse, rate-limit bypass, Turbo Intruder gates, HTTP/2 single-packet attacks, and CWE-362-style synchronization gaps.
SKILL: Race Conditions — Testing & Exploitation Playbook
> **AI LOAD INSTRUCTION**: Treat race conditions as **authorization/state integrity** issues: non-atomic read-then-write lets multiple requests observe stale state. Prioritize **one-time** or **balance-like** operations. Combine **parallel transport** (HTTP/1.1 last-byte sync, HTTP/2 single-packet, Turbo Intruder gates) with **application evidence** (duplicate success responses, inconsistent balances, duplicate ledger rows). **Authorized testing only.** Routing note: for business workflows, coupons, inventory, or one-time rewards, start with this skill and cross-load `business-logic-vulnerabilities`.
---
0. QUICK START — What to Test First
Target endpoints where **check** and **update** are unlikely to be a single atomic database operation:
| Priority | Operation class | Example paths / parameters | |----------|------------------|----------------------------| | 1 | One-time redeem / coupon / bonus | `redeem`, `apply_coupon`, `claim_reward`, `voucher` | | 2 | Balance / quota / stock deduction | `transfer`, `purchase`, `reserve`, `inventory` | | 3 | Invite / referral / signup bonus | `invite_accept`, `referral_claim` | | 4 | Password / email / MFA verification | `verify_token`, `confirm_email`, `reset_password` | | 5 | Idempotent-looking APIs without strong keys | `POST` that should succeed only once per user |
**First moves (conceptual)**:
1. Capture the **state-changing** request in a proxy. 2. Send **20–100** copies **as simultaneously as your tooling allows**. 3. Classify outcome: **0/1 expected successes** vs **N successes** or **inconsistent final state**.
---
1. CORE CONCEPT
1.1 TOCTOU (Time-of-check to time-of-use)
Thread A Thread B
| |
+-- CHECK (resource OK) |
| +-- CHECK (resource OK) ← both see "OK"
+-- USE / UPDATE |
| +-- USE / UPDATE ← duplicate effect
**TOCTOU** means the **decision** (check) and the **mutation** (use) are not one indivisible step.
1.2 Non-atomic read-then-write
Typical vulnerable pseudo-flow:
balance = SELECT balance FROM accounts WHERE id = ?
if balance >= amount:
UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - ? WHERE id = ?Two concurrent requests can both pass the `if` before either `UPDATE` commits.
1.3 Database-level vs application-level locking gaps
| Layer | What goes wrong | |-------|------------------| | **Application** | In-memory flag, cache, or session says "not used yet" while DB already updated — or the reverse. | | **ORM / service** | Two instances, no distributed lock; each thinks it owns the decision. | | **DB** | Missing `SELECT … FOR UPDATE`, wrong isolation level, or logic split across multiple statements without transaction. | | **API gateway** | Per-IP rate limit is **check-then-increment** — parallel burst passes duplicate checks. |
**Hint**: `UNIQUE` constraints and **idempotency keys** often eliminate entire bug classes — test whether the app **enforces** them on the hot path.
---
2. ATTACK PATTERNS
2.1 Limit-overrun (double redeem / double claim)
Send the **same** authenticated request many times in parallel:
POST /api/v1/rewards/claim HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Authorization: Bearer <token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"reward_id":"welcome_bonus"}**Success signal**: HTTP `200`/`201` more than once, duplicate ledger entries, or balance higher than policy allows.
2.2 Rate-limit bypass via simultaneity
If limits are implemented as **counters checked per request** without atomic increment:
POST /api/v1/login HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/json
{"email":"victim@example.com","password":"wrong"}Fire **N** parallel attempts in one wave; compare with **N** sequential attempts.
**Success signal**: more failures accepted than documented cap, or lockout never triggers when burst completes inside one window.
2.3 Multi-step exploitation (beat the pipeline)
Workflow: `create → pay → confirm`. If **confirm** does not cryptographically bind to **pay** completion:
1. Start two parallel pipelines from the same session/item. 2. Complete **confirm** on channel B while **pay** on channel A is still in-flight or abandoned.
**Success signal**: item marked paid/shipped without matching payment, or state skips backward.
---
3. HTTP/1.1 LAST-BYTE SYNCHRONIZATION
**Idea**: Hold all requests **blocked** until every socket has sent the full request **except the last byte** of the body; then release the final byte together so the server receives them in a tight cluster.
Client 1: [headers + body - 1 byte] ----hold----+
Client 2: [headers + body - 1 byte] ----hold----+--> flush last byte together
Client N: [headers + body - 1 byte] ----hold----+
**Why**: Reduces **network jitter** between copies compared to naive sequential paste in Repeater.
**Tooling**: Custom scripts, some Burp extensions, or **Turbo Intruder** `gate` pattern (see §5) as the practical stand-in for synchronized release.
---
4. HTTP/2 SINGLE-PACKET ATTACK
**Idea**: Multiplex several complete HTTP/2 streams and **coalesce** their frames so the first bytes of all requests exit the NIC in **one** TCP segment (or minimally separated). Receiver-side scheduling then processes them with **sub-millisecond** spacing.
**Burp Repeater (modern workflows)**:
1. Open multiple tabs or select multiple requests. 2. Use **Send group (parallel)** / **single-packet attack** where available. 3. Prefer HTTP/2 to the target if supported.
[ Req A stream ]
[ Req B stream ] -
Read more
name: race-condition description: >- Race condition and TOCTOU testing for web apps. Use when testing one-time operations, concurrent HTTP abuse, rate-limit bypass, Turbo Intruder gates, HTTP/2 single-packet attacks, and CWE-362-style synchronization gaps.
SKILL: Race Conditions — Testing & Exploitation Playbook
> **AI LOAD INSTRUCTION**: Treat race conditions as **authorization/state integrity** issues: non-atomic read-then-write lets multiple requests observe stale state. Prioritize **one-time** or **balance-like** operations. Combine **parallel transport** (HTTP/1.1 last-byte sync, HTTP/2 single-packet, Turbo Intruder gates) with **application evidence** (duplicate success responses, inconsistent balances, duplicate ledger rows). **Authorized testing only.** Routing note: for business workflows, coupons, inventory, or one-time rewards, start with this skill and cross-load `business-logic-vulnerabilities`.
---
0. QUICK START — What to Test First
Target endpoints where **check** and **update** are unlikely to be a single atomic database operation:
| Priority | Operation class | Example paths / parameters | |----------|------------------|----------------------------| | 1 | One-time redeem / coupon / bonus | `redeem`, `apply_coupon`, `claim_reward`, `voucher` | | 2 | Balance / quota / stock deduction | `transfer`, `purchase`, `reserve`, `inventory` | | 3 | Invite / referral / signup bonus | `invite_accept`, `referral_claim` | | 4 | Password / email / MFA verification | `verify_token`, `confirm_email`, `reset_password` | | 5 | Idempotent-looking APIs without strong keys | `POST` that should succeed only once per user |
**First moves (conceptual)**:
1. Capture the **state-changing** request in a proxy. 2. Send **20–100** copies **as simultaneously as your tooling allows**. 3. Classify outcome: **0/1 expected successes** vs **N successes** or **inconsistent final state**.
---
1. CORE CONCEPT
1.1 TOCTOU (Time-of-check to time-of-use)
Thread A Thread B | | +-- CHECK (resource OK) | | +-- CHECK (resource OK) ← both see "OK" +-- USE / UPDATE | | +-- USE / UPDATE ← duplicate effect
**TOCTOU** means the **decision** (check) and the **mutation** (use) are not one indivisible step.
1.2 Non-atomic read-then-write
Typical vulnerable pseudo-flow:
balance = SELECT balance FROM accounts WHERE id = ?
if balance >= amount:
UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - ? WHERE id = ?Two concurrent requests can both pass the `if` before either `UPDATE` commits.
1.3 Database-level vs application-level locking gaps
| Layer | What goes wrong | |-------|------------------| | **Application** | In-memory flag, cache, or session says "not used yet" while DB already updated — or the reverse. | | **ORM / service** | Two instances, no distributed lock; each thinks it owns the decision. | | **DB** | Missing `SELECT … FOR UPDATE`, wrong isolation level, or logic split across multiple statements without transaction. | | **API gateway** | Per-IP rate limit is **check-then-increment** — parallel burst passes duplicate checks. |
**Hint**: `UNIQUE` constraints and **idempotency keys** often eliminate entire bug classes — test whether the app **enforces** them on the hot path.
---
2. ATTACK PATTERNS
2.1 Limit-overrun (double redeem / double claim)
Send the **same** authenticated request many times in parallel:
POST /api/v1/rewards/claim HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Authorization: Bearer <token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"reward_id":"welcome_bonus"}**Success signal**: HTTP `200`/`201` more than once, duplicate ledger entries, or balance higher than policy allows.
2.2 Rate-limit bypass via simultaneity
If limits are implemented as **counters checked per request** without atomic increment:
POST /api/v1/login HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/json
{"email":"victim@example.com","password":"wrong"}Fire **N** parallel attempts in one wave; compare with **N** sequential attempts.
**Success signal**: more failures accepted than documented cap, or lockout never triggers when burst completes inside one window.
2.3 Multi-step exploitation (beat the pipeline)
Workflow: `create → pay → confirm`. If **confirm** does not cryptographically bind to **pay** completion:
1. Start two parallel pipelines from the same session/item. 2. Complete **confirm** on channel B while **pay** on channel A is still in-flight or abandoned.
**Success signal**: item marked paid/shipped without matching payment, or state skips backward.
---
3. HTTP/1.1 LAST-BYTE SYNCHRONIZATION
**Idea**: Hold all requests **blocked** until every socket has sent the full request **except the last byte** of the body; then release the final byte together so the server receives them in a tight cluster.
Client 1: [headers + body - 1 byte] ----hold----+ Client 2: [headers + body - 1 byte] ----hold----+--> flush last byte together Client N: [headers + body - 1 byte] ----hold----+
**Why**: Reduces **network jitter** between copies compared to naive sequential paste in Repeater.
**Tooling**: Custom scripts, some Burp extensions, or **Turbo Intruder** `gate` pattern (see §5) as the practical stand-in for synchronized release.
---
4. HTTP/2 SINGLE-PACKET ATTACK
**Idea**: Multiplex several complete HTTP/2 streams and **coalesce** their frames so the first bytes of all requests exit the NIC in **one** TCP segment (or minimally separated). Receiver-side scheduling then processes them with **sub-millisecond** spacing.
**Burp Repeater (modern workflows)**:
1. Open multiple tabs or select multiple requests. 2. Use **Send group (parallel)** / **single-packet attack** where available. 3. Prefer HTTP/2 to the target if supported.
[ Req A stream ] [ Req B stream ] -
Master Entry → Category Entries → Deep Topic Skills One master entry, six category entries, and 101 deep topic skills across 14 security domains.
Repo: yaklang/hack-skills
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