sast-analysis
Perform codebase analysis and architecture mapping as the first phase of a security assessment. Explores the tech stack, frameworks, entry points, data flows,…
Consolidate all SAST vulnerability results from the sast/ folder into a single final report ranked by severity and confidentiality impact. Reads all *-results.md files and produces sast/final-report.md. Run after all vulnerability detection skills complete. Use when asked to
$ npx -y skills add utkusen/sast-skills --skill sast-report --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/sast-reportContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Consolidate all SAST vulnerability results from the sast/ folder into a single final report ranked by severity and confidentiality impact. Reads all *-results.md files and produces sast/final-report.md. Run after all vulnerability detection skills complete. Use when asked to
name: sast-report description: >- Consolidate all SAST vulnerability results from the sast/ folder into a single final report ranked by severity and confidentiality impact. Reads all *-results.md files and produces sast/final-report.md. Run after all vulnerability detection skills complete. Use when asked to generate a final report, consolidate findings, or summarize security results.
You are consolidating all completed SAST vulnerability scan results into a single prioritized security report.
**Prerequisites**: At least one `sast/*-results.md` file must exist. Run the vulnerability detection skills first if they don't.
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Only include findings with these classifications from each result file:
Exclude `[NOT VULNERABLE]` and `[NEEDS MANUAL REVIEW]` findings from the main report body (count them only in the summary).
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Assign each finding a severity tier — **Critical**, **High**, **Medium**, or **Low** — using the table below as your baseline. Adjust up or down based on context (e.g., an IDOR that exposes financial records is High, not Medium).
| Vulnerability Class | Default Severity | |---------------------|------------------| | RCE via command injection, eval, or unsafe deserialization | Critical | | SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) | Critical | | SQLi on authentication endpoints | Critical | | JWT algorithm confusion (alg:none, RS256→HS256) | Critical | | File upload leading to code execution (webshell) | Critical | | SQLi with full data extraction capability | High–Critical | | GraphQL injection (user-controlled operation document enabling unauthorized fields or gateway abuse) | High–Critical | | XXE with file read or internal SSRF | High–Critical | | Missing authentication on sensitive endpoints | High–Critical | | SSRF reaching internal services or cloud metadata | High | | Path traversal reading sensitive or config files | High | | File upload with stored content accessible to others | High | | IDOR on PII, financial, or health data | High | | XSS (stored/persistent) | High | | JWT with missing or bypassable claim validation | Medium–High | | Missing authentication on lower-sensitivity endpoints | Medium | | IDOR on non-sensitive data | Medium | | XSS (reflected or DOM) | Medium | | Business logic flaws (price manipulation, workflow bypass) | Medium | | Information disclosure of non-sensitive data | Low |
**Confidentiality as a tiebreaker**: When two findings share the same baseline severity, rank higher the one with greater confidentiality impact — i.e., the greater its potential to expose sensitive user data, credentials, or system internals.
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Perform all steps in-session (no subagents needed).
Check which of these files exist in `sast/`:
Also read `sast/architecture.md` if it exists (use it for the project name and context when writing severity rationale).
Read each existing result file. For every finding classified as `[VULNERABLE]` or `[LIKELY VULNERABLE]`, extract:
Assign each finding a severity level (Critical / High / Medium / Low) using the table above. Sort all findings:
1. Critical first, then High, Medium, Low 2. Within each tier, sort by confidentiality impact (highest first)
Use exactly this output format:
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# Security Assessment Final Report **Project**: [name from architecture.md, or infer from codebase] **Generated**: [current date] **Scans completed**: [comma-separated list of scan types that had result files] --- ## Executive Summary | Severity | Count | |----------|-------| | Critical | N | | High | N | | Medium | N | | Low | N | | **Total confirmed findings** | **N** | Scans with no confirmed vulnerabilities: [list] Findings requiring manual review: N (see individual result files for details) --- ## Vulnerability Index | # | Title | Type | Severity | Endpoint / File | |---|-------|------|----------|----------------| | 1 | ... | RCE | Critical | `POST /api/exec` | | 2 | ... | SQLi | High | `GET /api/users` | --- ## Findings ### Critical #### [Finding Title] — [Vuln Type] - **Source scan**: `sast/[type]-results.md` - **Classification**: Vulnerable *(or "Likely Vulnerable")* - **Endpoint / File**: ... - **Severity rationale**: [1–2 sentences explaining why this is Critical, with focus on confidentiality and integrity impact] - **Issue**: ... - **Impact**: ... - **Proof**:
[code path or evidence from original finding]
- **Remediation**: ... - **Dynamic Test**:
[curl command or step-by-step test instructions from original finding]
--- ### High [Same structure as Critical section] --- ### Medium [Same structure] --- ### Low [Same structure] --- ## Appendix: Scan Coverage | Scan | Result File | Status | |------|-------------|--------| | IDOR | `sast/idor-results.md` | Completed / Not run | | SQLi | `sast/sqli-results.md` | Completed / Not run | | SSRF | `sast/ssrf-results.md` | Completed / Not run | | XSS | `sast/xss-results.md` | Completed / Not run | | RCE | `sast/rce-results.md` | Completed / Not run | | XXE | `sast/xxe-results.md` | Completed / Not run | | File Upload | `sast/fileupload-results.md` | Completed / Not run | | Path Traversal | `sast/pathtraversal-results.md` | Completed /
A collection of agent skills that turn your LLM coding assistant into a fully functional SAST scanner to find vulnerabilities in your codebase. Works natively with Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and any other assistant that supports agent skills.
Repo: utkusen/sast-skills
Perform codebase analysis and architecture mapping as the first phase of a security assessment. Explores the tech stack, frameworks, entry points, data flows,…
Detect business logic vulnerabilities in a codebase using a three-phase approach: threat modeling (domain analysis and attack scenarios), batched verify (check…
Detect insecure file upload vulnerabilities in a codebase using a three-phase approach: discovery (find all upload sites), batched verify (check extension…
Detect GraphQL injection vulnerabilities in a codebase using a three-phase approach: recon (confirm GraphQL usage and find unsafe operation document assembly…
Detect hardcoded sensitive data (API keys, access tokens, private keys, passwords, etc.) in publicly accessible code — frontend JavaScript, mobile apps,…