agentic-app-audit
Black-box security audit of a DEPLOYED AI agent (not the MCP server behind it) — tool-call hijacking, cross-session memory…
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon, pre-hunt learning, vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter --skill bug-bounty --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter --skill bug-bounty -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter --skill bug-bounty -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter --skill bug-bounty -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter --skill bug-bounty -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter --skill bug-bounty -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter --skill bug-bounty -a windsurf -y
name: bug-bounty description: Complete bug bounty workflow — recon, pre-hunt learning, vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining, bypass tables, language-specific grep patterns, and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports.
Full pipeline: Recon -> Learn -> Hunt -> Validate -> Report. One skill for everything.
> **"Can an attacker do this RIGHT NOW against a real user who has taken NO unusual actions -- and does it cause real harm (stolen money, leaked PII, account takeover, code execution)?"** > > If the answer is NO -- **STOP. Do not write. Do not explore further. Move on.**
| Pattern | Kill Reason | |---|---| | "Could theoretically allow..." | Not exploitable = not a bug | | "An attacker with X, Y, Z conditions could..." | Too many preconditions | | "Wrong implementation but no practical impact" | Wrong but harmless = not a bug | | Dead code with a bug in it | Not reachable = not a bug | | Source maps without secrets | No impact | | SSRF with DNS-only callback | Need data exfil or internal access | | Open redirect alone | Need ATO or OAuth chain | | "Could be used in a chain if..." | Build the chain first, THEN report |
**You must demonstrate actual harm. "Could" is not a bug. Prove it works or drop it.**
---
1. **READ FULL SCOPE FIRST** -- verify every asset/domain is owned by the target org 2. **NO THEORETICAL BUGS** -- "Can an attacker steal funds, leak PII, takeover account, or execute code RIGHT NOW?" If no, STOP. 3. **KILL WEAK FINDINGS FAST** -- run the 7-Question Gate BEFORE writing any report 4. **Validate before writing** -- check CHANGELOG, design docs, deployment scripts FIRST 5. **One bug class at a time** -- go deep, don't spray 6. **Verify data isn't already public** -- check web UI in incognito before reporting API "leaks" 7. **5-MINUTE RULE** -- if a target shows nothing after 5 min probing (all 401/403/404), MOVE ON 8. **IMPACT-FIRST HUNTING** -- ask "what's the worst thing if auth was broken?" If nothing valuable, skip target 9. **CREDENTIAL LEAKS need exploitation proof** -- finding keys isn't enough, must PROVE what they access 10. **STOP SHALLOW RECON SPIRALS** -- don't probe 403s, don't grep for analytics keys, don't check staging domains that lead nowhere 11. **BUSINESS IMPACT over vuln class** -- severity depends on CONTEXT, not just vuln type 12. **UNDERSTAND THE TARGET DEEPLY** -- before hunting, learn the app like a real user 13. **DON'T OVER-RELY ON AUTOMATION** -- automated scans hit WAFs, trigger rate limits, find the same bugs everyone else finds 14. **HUNT LESS-SATURATED VULN CLASSES** -- XSS/SSRF/XXE have the most competition. Expand into: cache poisoning, Android/mobile vulns, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC chains, CI/CD pipeline attacks 15. **ONE-HOUR RULE** -- stuck on one target for an hour with no progress? SWITCH CONTEXT 16. **TWO-EYE APPROACH** -- combine systematic testing (checklist) with anomaly detection (watch for unexpected behavior) 17. **T-SHAPED KNOWLEDGE** -- go DEEP in one area and BROAD across everything else 18. **LEAD BOARD — never lose a lead** -- after recon run `python3 bughunter/tools/lead_board.py ingest <target>` + `show` + `next`. Route each signal to its skill ("GraphQL → hunt-graphql"). `touch` when starting/killing/reporting. Focus on one lead; the board remembers the rest. Surface stale high-priority leads unprompted.
> **For the full hunting methodology** — 5-phase non-linear workflow, developer psychology framework, session discipline, tool routing by phase, and Wide/Deep route selection — see **`skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md`**. > > **Tool catalogue:** `bughunter/tools/README.md` (~50 tools). Orchestrator: `python3 bughunter/tools/hunt.py --target T` (auto lead ingest; add `--graphql` / `--cve-hunt` as needed).
---
Anonymous recon misses the bugs that pay most. IDOR, BOLA, mass-assignment, privilege escalation, auth bypass, SSRF behind login, and most LLM/agent bugs are invisible until you log in. Load auth **once** at session start and every downstream tool (httpx, katana, ffuf, nuclei, dalfox, the SQLi / SSTI / upload PoC verifiers) sends those headers automatically.
# Pick ONE of these and run hunt.py normally: python3 bughunter/tools/hunt.py --target T --cookie 'session=eyJabc...' python3 bughunter/tools/hunt.py --target T --bearer 'eyJhbGciOi...' python3 bughunter/tools/hunt.py --target T --auth-file .private/T.json # Or via env (persists for the shell): export BBHUNT_COOKIE='session=eyJabc...' python3 bughunter/tools/hunt.py --target T
**For IDOR / BOLA hunts**, load two sessions and diff behavior:
python3 bughunter/tools/hunt.py --target T --auth-file .private/T-user-a.json python3 bughunter/tools/hunt.py --target T --auth-file .private/T-user-b.json # Audit log entries carry different session_id hashes → diff which # endpoints behaved differently per identity.
**Safety**: cookies/tokens never appear in logs, hunt-memory, or `repr()`. Only a 12-char `session_id` hash is recorded. `.private/` is gitignored. MFA-skip and SAML signature-stripping probes deliberately stay anonymous — that's the attack they're checking for.
Full guide: `docs/auth-sessions.md`. Template: `docs/auth.example.json`.
---
**When you find bug A, systematically hunt for B and C nearby.** This
AI-powered bug bounty hunting toolkit that works with or without subscription.
Black-box security audit of a DEPLOYED AI agent (not the MCP server behind it) — tool-call hijacking, cross-session memory…
Argus — the all-seeing scanner suite. Six automated scanners for high-value web + LLM bug classes — CORS misconfiguration (origin…
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master…
CI/CD pipeline security hunting — GitHub Actions workflow injection, secret exfiltration, self-hosted runner poisoning,…
Client-side request-signing and anti-bot token reversal for bug bounty — when a request carries a…
Post-access cloud exploitation for AWS, GCP, and Azure — what to do AFTER you obtain credentials or reach a metadata endpoint.…
Use for authorized security assessment of REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, or SOAP APIs, including discovery, authentication,…
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys)…
Clean and finalize authorized natural-language text intended for readers by auditing suspicious invisible Unicode and rewriting…