/spray

description: Password spray with hard guards — typed-hostname confirmation, lockout warning, audit log. Modes: http-form (custom login page), oauth (password grant), o365 + okta (via TREVORspray). Default delay 30min/round + 60s jitter. Usage /spray <url> --mode <mode> --users <file> --passes <file>

/spray

Live credential spray against an authentication endpoint. **The most dangerous tool in this plugin.** Read the guards section before using.

Modes

| Mode | Use case | Engine | |---|---|---| | `http-form` | Custom login page (POST username/password) | Built-in Python + urllib | | `oauth` | OAuth password grant (`grant_type=password`) | Built-in Python + urllib | | `o365` | Microsoft 365 / Azure AD | `trevorspray` | | `okta` | Okta SSO | `trevorspray` |

Usage

# HTTP form (simplest)
/spray https://target.com/login --mode http-form \
    --users users.txt --passes ranked.txt

# HTTP form with CSRF token extraction
/spray https://target.com/login --mode http-form \
    --users users.txt --passes ranked.txt \
    --post-data "user={USER}&pass={PASS}&_token={CSRF}" \
    --csrf-extract 'name="_token" value="([^"]+)"' \
    --success-regex "Welcome" \
    --fail-regex "Invalid credentials"

# OAuth password grant
/spray https://target.com/oauth/token --mode oauth \
    --users users.txt --passes ranked.txt \
    --oauth-client-id mobile-app \
    --oauth-scope "openid profile"

# Microsoft 365 (TREVORspray)
/spray https://login.microsoftonline.com --mode o365 \
    --users users.txt --passes ranked.txt

# Dry-run (pre-flight only, no real attempts)
/spray https://target.com/login --mode http-form \
    --users users.txt --passes ranked.txt --dry-run

Hard guards (cannot be bypassed)

1. **Typed-hostname confirmation** — Pre-flight prints the target hostname and requires you to type it back. Prevents spraying the wrong target. 2. **Lockout warning** — Calculates per-user failed-attempt count from your `--passes` size and warns if it exceeds typical lockout thresholds. 3. **Audit log** — Every attempt is appended to `recon/<host>/spray/attempts-<timestamp>.jsonl`. Format: `{ts, round, user, pwd_sha256_prefix, status_code, looks_like_success, duration_ms}`. **Passwords are never logged in plaintext** — only their SHA-256 prefix. 4. **Spray order** — `pass[i] × all_users` per round (NOT brute-per-user). Each account sees at most 1 failed attempt per round.

Spray order example (3 users × 3 passwords)

Round 1:  Password1!  → alice, bob, charlie    [delay]
Round 2:  Welcome2025 → alice, bob, charlie    [delay]
Round 3:  Summer2024  → alice, bob, charlie

If `--continue-on-hit` is NOT set, spray stops at the first valid credentials.

Rate limiting

| Flag | Default | Effect | |---|---|---| | `--delay <sec>` | 1800 (30 min) | Sleep between rounds | | `--jitter <sec>` | 60 | Random ±jitter added to each delay | | `--aggressive` | off | Sets delay=60, jitter=10 (fast spray — use only when you have explicit permission and rate-limit allowance) |

For Microsoft 365 / Azure AD smart lockout: defaults are designed to stay well under the 10-min sliding window threshold. **Do not use `--aggressive` against O365** unless you've cleared it with the program.

Success detection (http-form mode)

The script checks these in order: 1. `--success-regex` matches response body → success 2. `--fail-regex` set + body does NOT match → success 3. HTTP redirect (3xx) to a path that is NOT the login page → success (heuristic) 4. None of the above → not success

If you get false positives, supply `--fail-regex` (e.g. `--fail-regex "Invalid|incorrect|wrong password"`) to anchor detection.

Success detection (oauth mode)

HTTP 200 response with `"access_token"` field in JSON body → success. HTTP 4xx (typically 400 invalid_grant / 401) → fail.

Pre-flight output (what you see before any HTTP)

=============================================
  SPRAY PRE-FLIGHT — target.com
=============================================
  Target URL:        https://target.com/login
  Mode:              http-form
  Users file:        users.txt (50 entries)
  Passes file:       ranked.txt (10 entries)
  Total attempts:    500
  Rounds:            10
  Delay/round:       1800s + 60s jitter
  Est. duration:     ~5h
=============================================

[!] LEGAL / SCOPE REMINDER
[!] Credential spray requires EXPLICIT program permission...
Type the target hostname (target.com) to confirm: _

[!] LOCKOUT WARNING
[!] Per-user failed attempts (this run):  10
[!] Estimated accounts likely to be locked: ~80% of 50 = 40
Type 'yes' to proceed (anything else aborts): _

Skipping confirmations

`--i-understand` skips both prompts. **Only use after a clean dry-run and explicit program sign-off.** The flag's name is a deliberate friction point — you should be able to truthfully say "yes I understand the risks of spraying this target right now" before adding it.

Audit log format

{"ts":"2026-05-27T22:00:01Z","round":1,"user":"alice","pwd_sha256_prefix":"a3f2b8e1c0d4","status_code":401,"looks_like_success":false,"duration_ms":320}
{"ts":"2026-05-27T22:00:02Z","round":1,"user":"bob","pwd_sha256_prefix":"a3f2b8e1c0d4","status_code":302,"redirect_to":"/dashboard","looks_like_success":true,"duration_ms":410}

Pipeline position

/wordlist-gen <target>        -> ranked.txt
/breach-check ranked.txt      -> ranked-ranked.txt (HIBP-validated)
/osint-employees <target>     -> usernames.txt
/spray <login> --users usernames.txt --passes ranked-ranked.txt

Dependencies

• Built-in modes (http-form, oauth): pure Python 3.9+ stdlib
• TREVOR modes (o365, okta): `trevorspray` from `./install_tools.sh --with-credential-attack`
• `tools/scope_checker.py` for typed-confirmation logic (Python 3.9 compat)

Underlying tool

`tools/spray_orchestrator.sh <url> --mode ... --users ... --passes ...`