Skip to content
Security
Skill

/external-precondition-audit

Trigger Pattern Any external module interaction detected in attack_surface.md - Inject Into Breadth agents (merged via M5 hierarchy)

From plugin
plamen
276160 skills12 agents4 commands
Install
$ npx -y skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill external-precondition-audit --agent claude-code

How it fires

How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.

  • Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
  • You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
  • Slash command/external-precondition-audit

Context preview

The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.

Trigger Pattern Any external module interaction detected in attack_surface.md - Inject Into Breadth agents (merged via M5 hierarchy)

SKILL.md

external-precondition-audit.SKILL.md
name: "external-precondition-audit"
description: "Trigger Pattern Any external module interaction detected in attack_surface.md - Inject Into Breadth agents (merged via M5 hierarchy)"

EXTERNAL_PRECONDITION_AUDIT Skill

> **Trigger Pattern**: Any external module interaction detected in attack_surface.md > **Inject Into**: Breadth agents (merged via M5 hierarchy) > **Constraint**: Interface-level inference only -- no production fetch required

For every external module the protocol interacts with:

1. Interface-Level Requirement Inference

From the `use` imports and function calls to external modules, infer what the external module requires:

| External Function Called | Module::Function | Parameters Passed | Likely Preconditions (from signature + abort codes) | Our Protocol Validates? | |--------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------|

**Inference method**: Read the function signature, type parameters, ability constraints, and abort conditions. Example: `coin::withdraw<CoinType>(account: &signer, amount: u64)` -> infer that `account` must have sufficient balance, `CoinType` must be initialized, amount must be > 0. Check abort codes in framework source if available.

**Aptos-specific patterns**:

  • `&signer` parameters: does external module require the signer to own a specific resource?
  • Generic type parameters `<T>`: does external module require `T` to be registered/initialized?
  • `Object<T>` parameters: does external module validate object ownership or type?
  • Abort conditions: enumerate all `assert!` / `abort` in external function that could revert our call

2. Return Value Consumption

| External Call | Return Type | How Protocol Uses Return | Failure Mode if Return Unexpected | |--------------|-------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|

For each return value:

  • What happens if it returns 0? What happens if it returns `MAX_U64`?
  • What happens if the external call aborts?
  • For `Option<T>` returns: does our protocol handle `none` correctly?
  • For `FungibleAsset` returns: is metadata validated after receiving?
  • For `Object<T>` returns: is the object type verified before use?
  • For each external data structure received (Vec, array, Map, list): (a) What ordering/uniqueness does the consuming code assume? (b) Does the external contract's spec guarantee that ordering? (c) What happens if the assumption is violated (unsorted, duplicates, gaps)?

3. State Dependency Mapping

| Protocol State | Depends on External State | External Module Upgradeable? | State Can Change Without Our Knowledge? | |---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------|

For each dependency:

  • **Upgrade risk**: Aptos modules are upgradeable by default (`compatible` policy). Can the external module add new abort conditions to a function we call? Can it change return value semantics within compatible upgrade bounds?
  • **Immutability check**: Is the external module published as `immutable`? If so, behavior is frozen.
  • **State mutation timing**: Can external module state change between our module's read and use within the same transaction? (e.g., another instruction in a multi-instruction transaction modifies external state)
  • **Framework dependency**: If depending on `aptos_framework` modules, are there governance-controlled parameters that could change? (e.g., `transaction_fee`, `staking_config`)

Instantiation Parameters

{CONTRACTS}           -- List of modules to analyze
{EXTERNAL_MODULES}    -- External modules identified during recon
{FRAMEWORK_DEPS}      -- aptos_framework / aptos_std / aptos_token dependencies

Output Schema

For each finding:

## Finding [EP-N]: Title

**Verdict**: CONFIRMED / PARTIAL / REFUTED / CONTESTED
**Step Execution**: S1,S2,S3 | X(reasons) | ?(uncertain)
**Rules Applied**: [R1:Y, R4:Y, R8:Y]
**Severity**: Critical/High/Medium/Low/Info
**Location**: module::function (source_file.move:LineN)

**External Dependency**: {module::function}
**Failure Mode**: {what breaks}

**Description**: What's wrong
**Impact**: What can happen (abort DoS, wrong state, fund loss)
**Evidence**: Code showing dependency and missing validation

Step Execution Checklist

| Section | Required | Completed? | |---------|----------|------------| | 1. Interface-Level Requirement Inference | YES | Y/N/? | | 2. Return Value Consumption | YES | Y/N/? | | 3. State Dependency Mapping | YES | Y/N/? |

Read more
Ships withplamen

Autonomous Web3 security auditor for Claude Code and OpenAI Codex CLI. Orchestrates 18-100 AI agents across 40+ phases to produce audit reports with verified PoC exploits — for smart contracts and L1 node-client infrastructure.

Get the whole plugin