/centralization-risk

name: "centralization-risk"
description: "Trigger Protocol has privileged roles (admin, operator, governance, resource account owner) - Covers Single points of failure, privilege escalation, external governance dependen..."

Skill: CENTRALIZATION_RISK

> **Trigger**: Protocol has privileged roles (admin, operator, governance, resource account owner) > **Covers**: Single points of failure, privilege escalation, external governance dependencies > **Required**: NO (optional -- recommended when protocol has 3+ distinct privileged roles) > **Inject Into**: Breadth agents

Trigger Patterns

admin|owner|operator|governance|signer_cap|SignerCapability|resource_account|
has_role|is_admin|only_admin|assert_admin|get_signer

Aptos Capability Model Context

Aptos Move uses a capability-based access control model fundamentally different from EVM modifiers:

• **Signer-based**: Functions receive `&signer` and check `signer::address_of(account) == @admin`
• **Capability pattern**: `SignerCapability` stored in resources grants signing rights to resource accounts
• **No modifiers**: Access control is enforced via `assert!` checks inside function bodies
• **Resource accounts**: Accounts controlled by `SignerCapability` rather than a private key
• **Object ownership**: `Object<T>` has an owner chain; ownership transfers control access

Reasoning Template

Step 1: Privilege Inventory

Enumerate ALL capability-gated functions by searching for signer checks and capability usage:

| # | Function | Module | Access Gate | What It Controls | Impact If Abused | |---|----------|--------|------------|------------------|-----------------| | 1 | {func} | {module} | `assert!(addr == @admin)` | {parameter/state} | {worst case} | | 2 | {func} | {module} | `SignerCapability` stored in {resource} | {operation} | {worst case} | | 3 | {func} | {module} | `Object<T>` ownership check | {asset control} | {worst case} |

**MANDATORY GREP**: Search all `.move` files for:

• `signer::address_of` followed by equality checks
• `SignerCapability` usage (creation, storage, `account::create_signer_with_capability`)
• `object::is_owner` and ownership assertions
• Named address references (`@admin`, `@operator`, `@governance`, `@protocol`)

**Categorize each by impact**:

• **FUND_CONTROL**: Can move, lock, freeze, or destroy user funds/assets
• **PARAMETER_CONTROL**: Can change fees, rates, thresholds, delays
• **OPERATIONAL_CONTROL**: Can pause, unpause, add/remove components, whitelist/blacklist
• **UPGRADE_CONTROL**: Can upgrade module code (publish new version)

Step 2: Role Hierarchy and Capability Delegation

Map the capability hierarchy:

| Role/Capability | Granted By | Can Delegate? | Stored Where? | Revocable? | Timelock? | |----------------|-----------|---------------|--------------|-----------|-----------| | Admin signer | Deployment (named address) | NO (fixed) | N/A -- address-based | NO (immutable) | NO | | SignerCapability | account::create_resource_account | YES (if stored with `store`) | {resource at @addr} | {depends on module logic} | {YES/NO} | | Object owner | object::transfer | YES (transfer ownership) | Object metadata | YES (transfer away) | NO |

**Aptos-specific checks**:

• [ ] Are FUND_CONTROL and UPGRADE_CONTROL separated into different addresses/capabilities?
• [ ] Does any single address have both PARAMETER_CONTROL and FUND_CONTROL?
• [ ] Can `SignerCapability` be duplicated? (if the resource containing it has `copy` ability -- CRITICAL)
• [ ] Can capabilities be extracted from the storing resource by anyone? (check resource field visibility)
• [ ] Is the resource account SignerCapability stored behind proper access control?

Step 3: Single Points of Failure

For each privileged role:

| Role | Key Compromise Impact | Mitigation | Residual Risk | |------|----------------------|------------|---------------| | @admin (EOA) | {what attacker can do} | {multisig? module-level checks?} | {what remains} | | Resource account | {what attacker can do if SignerCapability leaked} | {capability stored in immutable resource?} | {what remains} | | Object owner | {what attacker can do with object control} | {ownership transfer gated?} | {what remains} |

**Severity assessment**:

• Single EOA address with FUND_CONTROL -> HIGH centralization risk
• Multisig controlling admin address (off-chain, not verifiable on-chain) -> MEDIUM
• Resource account with properly guarded SignerCapability -> LOW (but document)
• Module published as `immutable` -> eliminates UPGRADE_CONTROL risk entirely

**Aptos-specific risk**: `SignerCapability` is the most dangerous capability -- it grants FULL control over the resource account, including publishing modules and transferring all assets. If the resource containing the capability has improper access control, it is equivalent to leaking a private key.

Step 4: External Governance Dependencies

Identify parameters or behaviors controlled by EXTERNAL governance:

| Dependency | External Entity | What They Control | Protocol Impact If Changed | Notification? | |------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------| | {dep} | {entity} | {parameter/behavior} | {impact on this protocol} | YES/NO |

**Aptos-specific patterns**:

• **Framework governance**: `aptos_framework` parameters controlled by Aptos governance (staking, gas, transaction limits)
• **External module upgrades**: Modules the protocol depends on upgrading under `compatible` policy -- new abort conditions, changed behavior
• **Oracle operator changes**: Oracle price feed operators changing configs, adding latency, pausing feeds
• **Bridge governance**: Wormhole guardian set changes, LayerZero oracle/relayer config

**Check**:

• Can external governance changes break protocol invariants?
• Does the protocol have circuit breakers for external changes?
• Are external governance timelines aligned with this protocol operational timelines?

Step 5: Emergency Po