/gate-security

name: gate-security
description: >-
  Detects leaked secrets, injection patterns, and sensitive data exposure
  across changed files. Uses real tooling when configured, LLM judgment
  for analysis. Internal gate — invoked by verify.
allowed-tools:
  - Read
  - Bash
  - Glob
  - Grep
  - Write

Gate: Security

Goal

Ensure the codebase doesn't leak secrets, introduce injection vulnerabilities, or expose sensitive data. Use real security tooling when available. Use LLM judgment for analysis that tools can't do.

Inputs

• `{projectArtifactsRoot}/config.json` -- `commands.lint`, SAST tool config if available
• `{repoStateRoot}/work/{selectedWork.id}/workflow.json` -- selected work unit
• Changed files (detected via `git diff`)

Outputs

• Evidence file at `{workDir}/evidence/security-report.md`
• Gate status in the selected work's `workflow.json`
• Findings shown inline with severity, location, and remediation

Constraints

**Scope (MEDIUM freedom):**

• Focus on changed files. Use `git diff --name-only` against main branch.
• If no changed files detected, check all files in work scope.

**Phase 1 — Detection (LOW freedom, BLOCK severity):**

• Scan for secrets: API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys in source files.
• Scan for .env files, credential files, or key files staged for commit.
• Check .gitignore covers sensitive patterns.
• If a configured SAST tool exists (e.g., `semgrep`, `eslint-plugin-security`), run it.
• Any secret or credential found = BLOCK finding.

**Phase 2 — Analysis (HIGH freedom, WARN severity):**

• Review changed code for injection patterns (SQL, command, XSS, path traversal).
• Check that external data is treated as untrusted (per Constitution security practices).
• Check that authentication/authorization patterns aren't weakened (per Constitution auth/authz practices).
• Findings are WARN unless clearly exploitable (then BLOCK).

**Phase 3 — Logical security (HIGH freedom, WARN severity):**

• Missing authentication (CWE-306): mutation-capable handler functions (HTTP routes, gRPC handlers, GraphQL resolvers) performing state-changing operations without any visible auth check. Only flag when auth is completely absent. Skip if no mutation-capable handler patterns detected in changed files.
• For code-level error handling analysis (CWE-636, CWE-209), defer to gate-semantic which owns those categories with tiered tooling.
• All Phase 3 findings are WARN. Never BLOCK.
• Phase 3 focuses on logical control-flow; defer to Phase 2 when a finding is already captured as an injection pattern.

**Verdict (LOW freedom):**

• Follow `protocols/evidence.md#verdict-rendering`.
• Any BLOCK finding = gate FAIL.
• WARN-only findings = gate WARN (passes but flagged).
• Cite relevant Constitution practices where applicable.

Protocol References

• `protocols/evidence.md#verdict-rendering` -- verdict rendering
• `protocols/evidence.md` -- evidence storage
• `protocols/state.md` -- gate status updates

Failure Modes

| Condition | Action | |-----------|--------| | No SAST tool configured | Skip tool-based detection, rely on LLM analysis | | No changed files detected | Scan all project source files | | SAST tool not installed | WARN finding, suggest installation, continue with LLM |