active-directory-attac…
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay…
Use when recalling prior techniques at recon/weaponize, or recording a confirmed finding at report — cross-engagement pattern memory ranked by impact
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill engagement-memory --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill engagement-memory -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill engagement-memory -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill engagement-memory -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill engagement-memory -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill engagement-memory -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill engagement-memory -a windsurf -y
name: engagement-memory description: Use when recalling prior techniques at recon/weaponize, or recording a confirmed finding at report — cross-engagement pattern memory ranked by impact metadata: type: support phase: all tools: pattern_db.py, schemas.py, rotation.py kill_chain: phase: [recon, weaponize, report] step: [1, 2, 8] attck_tactics: [] attck_techniques: [] depends_on: [vulnerability-analysis] feeds_into: [recon-osint, exploit-development, web-pentest] inputs: [confirmed_findings, target, tech_stack] outputs: [prior_intel, ranked_patterns] references: [] scripts: - scripts/pattern_db.py - scripts/schemas.py - scripts/rotation.py
Append-only JSONL store (`~/.claude/engagement-memory/patterns.jsonl`, override `$ENGAGEMENT_DB`). Three record types in their own files so they never mix: **patterns** (`patterns.jsonl`), **target profiles** (`profiles.jsonl`), **audit log** (`audit.jsonl`, disposable). A pattern is keyed by `(target, vuln_class, technique)`, ranked by **severity / CVSS / confidence** (real impact, never payout), and carries a **lifecycle status** (`proposed/active/stale/deprecated/...`). Recall is an **explicit top-N query** (anti-context-bloat). Duplicates **merge** (count bumped, most-recent status wins), never blind-discarded; `compact` runs automatically over a size threshold and stays lossless. TTL `stale` patterns and `deprecated/rejected` ones drop out of default recall but are kept.
# RECALL — relevance-ranked (stdlib BM25 + aliases), active-only by default
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py match --vuln-class ssrf --query "imds metadata" --tech-stack aws
# INJECT — budgeted prior-intel card for a phase (top-N, byte-capped; $ENGAGEMENT_MEMORY_MODE=auto|debug|off)
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py inject --vuln-class ssrf --query imds --max-bytes 1500
# RECORD a confirmed finding (flags or finding JSON). A key collision needs --resolve update|merge|reject|force.
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py record --target acme.com --vuln-class ssrf \
--cwe CWE-918 --attack-id T1190 --severity high --cvss 9.1 --tech-stack nginx,aws --technique "metadata theft"
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py record --json '<finding json from validate_findings>'
# LIFECYCLE + cross-client
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py promote --target acme.com --vuln-class ssrf --technique "metadata theft" [--global]
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py deprecate --target acme.com --vuln-class ssrf --technique "metadata theft"
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py match --vuln-class ssrf --include-global # add sanitized cross-client TTPs
# PROFILES + housekeeping + observability
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py profile --target acme.com --tech-stack nginx,aws --endpoints /api,/admin
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py recall-profile --target acme.com
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py compact # manual lossless dedup-merge
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py stats # patterns by class + profile count
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py audit-stats # action log: by tool/action/outcomeOr use the `/engage.memory` command (recall | inject | record | promote | deprecate | gc | stats).
| Concern | Note | |---------|------| | Secrets at rest | Stores technique + CWE/CVSS + an evidence *reference*, never loot. A **secret-input guard** rejects `evidence_ref`/`source` that look like inline secrets (private keys, `password=`, AKIA, JWTs, tokens) — store a path; **rotate** the exposed credential, don't just delete. | | Cross-client bleed | Per-client isolation is the default (`$ENGAGEMENT_DB`). The shared global store is opt-in (`promote --global` / `record --global`) and **sanitized** (target + evidence blanked); recall it only with `--include-global`. | | Trust | New auto-captures can be `proposed`; only confirmed/reviewed findings are `active`. A key collision is **review-gated** (`--resolve`), not silently merged. | | Auditability | Every record/match/compact/promote — and every refused line (`denial`) — is written to `audit.jsonl` (rotated by discard, with a retention-gap marker). The append-only patterns journal + audit log ARE the history. | | Integrity | Records carry `schema_version`; malformed/type-poisoned/foreign lines are skipped on read, never trusted. |
A spec-driven offensive security framework for Claude Code — structured engagement workflows based on the Cyber Kill Chain, 32 kill-chain skills (multi-file progressive-disclosure) plus a discipline layer (a SessionStart dispatcher + 6 process/discipline
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay…
--- name: advanced-redteam-ops description: Use when designing C2 infrastructure or OPSEC for a long-haul red-team op —…
Use when red-teaming an agentic AI / LLM application — indirect & zero-click prompt injection, MCP tool poisoning, persistent…
Use when attacking an AI/ML system or model — prompt injection & jailbreaks (Crescendo, Skeleton Key, Best-of-N), RAG/vector…
Use when building a client-side browser exploit — V8/JSC JIT type confusion to renderer R/W, V8 heap-sandbox escape,…
Use when attacking or auditing a CI/CD pipeline or software supply chain — pwn requests, poisoned pipeline execution,…
Use for authorized security assessment of REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, or SOAP APIs, including discovery, authentication,…
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys)…
Clean and finalize authorized natural-language text intended for readers by auditing suspicious invisible Unicode and rewriting…