active-directory-attac…
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
Use when starting, planning, or running a multi-phase pentest or red-team engagement — to sequence the Cyber Kill Chain phases with quality gates instead of jumping straight to exploitation
$ npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill engagement-flow --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/engagement-flowContext preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Use when starting, planning, or running a multi-phase pentest or red-team engagement — to sequence the Cyber Kill Chain phases with quality gates instead of jumping straight to exploitation
name: engagement-flow description: Use when starting, planning, or running a multi-phase pentest or red-team engagement — to sequence the Cyber Kill Chain phases with quality gates instead of jumping straight to exploitation
A pentest/red-team engagement is a **phased pipeline with gates**, not a pile of techniques run ad hoc. This skill sequences the 9-phase Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain and routes each phase to its commands, domain skills, and discipline checks. It is the offensive analog of brainstorming → writing-plans → executing-plans: scope the work, plan it, then execute phase by phase.
Don't jump to exploitation. Earlier phases earn the access that later phases need, and each gate keeps quality high before you advance.
digraph killchain {
rankdir=LR;
scope -> recon -> weaponize -> deliver -> exploit -> install -> c2 -> actions -> report;
scope [label="0 SCOPE"]; recon [label="1 RECON"]; weaponize [label="2 WEAPONIZE"];
deliver [label="3 DELIVER"]; exploit [label="4 EXPLOIT"]; install [label="5 INSTALL"];
c2 [label="6 C2"]; actions [label="7 ACTIONS"]; report [label="8 REPORT"];
}Each transition requires a **gate** (`/engage.gate`): required artifacts present, findings carry CWE+CVSS+ATT&CK+evidence, and the automated checks pass. Gate FAIL → fix the gap before advancing.
1. Pick the workflow preset for the engagement type (web-app, network, red-team, cloud, mobile, ad-domain, bug-bounty) and drive phases with the `/engage.*` commands. 2. **Phase 0 (scope):** emit `.engage/scope/scope.json`. **REQUIRED:** scope-discipline. 3. **Phases 1-7:** before any target interaction → scope-discipline; before any outward action → opsec-discipline; invoke the matching domain skill for the technique. 4. **Recall prior intel:** at recon/weaponize, `/engage.memory recall` to start from what worked. 5. **Findings:** **REQUIRED:** finding-discipline — nothing is `[CONFIRMED]` without proof. 6. **Phase 8 (report):** record confirmed findings to engagement-memory; generate the report. 7. **Optional autopilot:** `engine/engine.py` runs the phases under a budget/loop/trace with `--resume` (`/engage.pickup`); offensive actions stay operator-gated.
| Phase | Command | Discipline / tooling | |-------|---------|----------------------| | Scope | `/engage.scope` | scope-discipline → `scope.json` | | Recon | `/engage.recon` | scope-discipline; `/engage.memory recall` | | Exploit | `/engage.exploit` | opsec-discipline; finding-discipline | | Actions | `/engage.actions` | action_guard gate; opsec-discipline | | Report | `/engage.report` | finding-discipline; record to memory | | Gate / resume | `/engage.gate`, `/engage.pickup` | automated checks; engine trace |
A spec-driven offensive security framework for Claude Code — structured engagement workflows based on the Cyber Kill Chain, 31 kill-chain skills (multi-file progressive-disclosure) plus a discipline layer (a SessionStart dispatcher + 6 process/discipline
Repo: hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu),…
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