engage.actions
CommandExecute Phase 7 - Actions on Objectives and Goal Achievement
Materialize, lint, and drift-check the engagement threat model
> /plugin marketplace add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude> /plugin install offensive-claude@offensive-claude-marketplace
description: Materialize, lint, and drift-check the engagement threat model
Builds the threat model from recon-osint output, lints it for completeness, and diffs a re-run against the reviewed baseline to catch new unreviewed attack surface (drift). Backed by `skills/threat-model-discipline/` + `scripts/threatmodel_lint.py`; the drift check hooks into `/engage.gate`.
`/engage.threatmodel {materialize|lint|drift} ...`
1. **Materialize** — from recon-osint output, fill `templates/threat-model/threat-model.md` and its machine-readable `threat-model.json` (assets, entry_points, trust_boundaries, attck, mitigations). 2. **Lint** — `threatmodel_lint.py lint .engage/recon/threat-model.json`: every required field present, no `TBD`/`[fill in]` placeholders, valid ATT&CK ids. Exit 1 if incomplete. 3. **Baseline** — after review, save `threat-model.baseline.json`. 4. **Drift** — re-run recon → regenerate `threat-model.json` → `threatmodel_lint.py drift baseline.json threat-model.json`. A NEW entry point / asset / trust boundary is unreviewed surface and **blocks the gate** (exit 1) until re-reviewed or explicitly acknowledged. Removed surface is recorded but does not block.
entry_points/assets/trust_boundaries additions block.
A spec-driven offensive security framework for Claude Code — structured engagement workflows based on the Cyber Kill Chain, 32 kill-chain skills (multi-file progressive-disclosure) plus a discipline layer (a SessionStart dispatcher + 6 process/discipline
Execute Phase 7 - Actions on Objectives and Goal Achievement
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