/okta-attack

name: okta-attack
description: Okta-as-IdP red-team attack chain — tenant discovery, user enumeration (multiple vectors), authentication flow analysis (factors enumeration, push-notification fatigue, SMS bypass), password spray with lockout discipline, Okta-specific phishing primitives (kits, FastPass abuse, OIDC redirect_uri tampering), MFA enumeration, post-compromise admin API surface. Many enterprise orgs use Okta instead of (or alongside) Entra ID. Distinct endpoints, distinct rate-limiting, distinct factor flows. Use when recon shows `<tenant>.okta.com`, `<tenant>.okta-emea.com`, `<tenant>.oktapreview.com`, or autodiscover-style records pointing at Okta IdP.
sources: public-okta-docs, idp-redteam-knowledge, disclosed-incidents
report_count: 8

When to use this skill

Trigger when:

• DNS shows `<tenant>.okta.com` or `<tenant>.okta-emea.com` (EMEA region)
• Login flow redirects to `<tenant>.okta.com/login` or `/app/<app_id>/sso/saml`
• Web pages reference `/signin/customize`, `oktapreview.com`, or `auth-js-sdk`
• Recon notes "uses Okta for SSO"
• A target has `*.okta.com` SAN in TLS cert
• Identity-fabric mapping returns Okta as IdP for a corporate app

DO NOT use for:

• Entra ID (use `m365-entra-attack` instead)
• Google Workspace (use `google-workspace-attack` — not yet built)
• ADFS (different protocol, on-prem)

---

Tenant discovery

Direct guesses

# Tenant subdomains often match the brand
# Replace these with your target's actual tenant slug candidates:
for tenant in target-brand target-brand-ltd target-sister-brand target-brand-short target-other-variant; do
  for region in okta okta-emea oktapreview; do
    host="$tenant.$region.com"
    code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 8 "https://$host/")
    [ "$code" != "404" ] && [ "$code" != "000" ] && echo "  $host  $code"
  done
done

Cross-ref from DNS

# Look for CNAME records pointing to Okta
# Replace with your target's actual domains:
for domain in client.example client-ltd.example; do
  dig +short "sso.$domain" CNAME
  dig +short "login.$domain" CNAME
  dig +short "auth.$domain" CNAME
  dig +short "okta.$domain" CNAME
done

Cross-ref from app HTTP flow

# Visit corporate-app login, follow redirects
curl -skL -o /dev/null -w "%{redirect_url}\n" "https://app.target.com/login"
# If redirects to <something>.okta.com → confirmed Okta tenant

---

User enumeration

Method 1 — `/api/v1/authn` differential

The auth API returns different errors for invalid users vs invalid passwords. Slightly differential.

# Probe single user — DON'T spray, this counts as auth attempt!
curl -sk -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"<email>","password":"_test_invalid_pw"}'

# Response codes:
#   401 + "errorCode":"E0000004" → invalid credentials (user exists OR doesn't — Okta unifies these)
#   401 + "errorCode":"E0000119" → account locked
#   200 → MFA prompt (cred VALID, MFA needed)
#   200 + "status":"SUCCESS" → full auth (rare in modern setups)

⚠ Okta has hardened against direct user-existence enum via `/api/v1/authn` — error message is typically uniform "Authentication failed". User enumeration via this endpoint is unreliable in 2024+.

Method 2 — `/api/v1/users/me/factors` timing

Some flows expose user existence via response time differential. Less reliable than M365 OneDrive technique.

Method 3 — Sign-in widget JS endpoint

curl -sk "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/sessions/me" \
  -H "Accept: application/json"
# Response varies by tenant config

Method 4 — Org-specific identifier probing

Some Okta orgs use email-as-username; others use `firstname.lastname` or employee-id. Test pattern guesses:

firstname.lastname@target.com
firstname_lastname@target.com  
flastname@target.com
employeeID@target.com

Method 5 — OIDC `/v1/authorize` with login_hint

# Tampering with login_hint param can reveal user existence on some configs
curl -skI "https://<tenant>.okta.com/oauth2/v1/authorize?client_id=<id>&response_type=code&scope=openid&redirect_uri=https://example.com&login_hint=<email>"
# Different redirect → user exists vs doesn't

---

Authentication flow analysis (always do this first)

# Initial auth — observe what factors come back
curl -sk -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"<valid_user>","password":"_test_invalid_pw"}' | python3 -m json.tool

Response structure reveals factor configuration:

{
  "stateToken": "00ABC...",
  "factorResult": "WAITING",
  "status": "MFA_REQUIRED",
  "_embedded": {
    "factors": [
      {"factorType": "push", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "token:software:totp", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "sms", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "call", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "email", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "question", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "webauthn", "provider": "FIDO"}
    ]
  }
}

**Critical insight:** the factor list reveals which factors are available — phishing-resistance varies dramatically:

• `webauthn` (FIDO2) — phishing-resistant
• `question` (security questions) — extremely weak; KBA attacks
• `sms` / `call` — phishing-able (push notification fatigue, SIM swap)
• `push` — phishing-able via MFA fatigue
• `email` — phishing-able if attacker has email read access
• `totp` — phishing-able via AiTM

---

Password spray (with Okta-specific lockout discipline)

Lockout policy

Okta default: **10 failed sign-ins → lockout** (configurable per-org). Some orgs configure much stricter (3 fails).

Discipline:

• ≤2 attempts per user lifetime per engagement (safer than 1 in Entra because Okta lockout is sometimes 3 fails)
• Track per-user in atomic state file
• Stop on first valid hit OR if LOCKED rate exceeds threshold

Spr