/hunt-tls-network

name: hunt-tls-network
description: "Hunt TLS/SSL and DNS misconfigurations — missing HSTS (downgrade attack), weak cipher suites, expired/invalid certificates, mTLS bypass, missing SPF/DKIM/DMARC (email spoofing), DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR), dangling CNAME subdomain takeover, CAA records. Most of these are Info/Low on their own — this skill is opinionated about which findings actually pay (spoofable DMARC with delivered-to-inbox proof, AXFR returning internal hosts, dangling-CNAME takeover) versus which get rejected as best-practice noise (missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM position). Use during recon to find infrastructure weaknesses, and to TRIAGE them honestly before reporting."
sources: portswigger_research, ssl_labs_research, hstspreload_org

HUNT-TLS-NETWORK — TLS/SSL & DNS Security

Reality Check (Read First)

Most findings in this class are **Info/Low and routinely rejected** as "best-practice" / "missing-hardening" by triage. This skill exists to stop you wasting a submission. Two questions before you report anything here:

1. **Is there a real victim and a real action?** "Missing HSTS" is not a vulnerability — *demonstrated session-cookie capture from a victim you MitM'd* is. "Missing CAA" is never a vulnerability you can demonstrate. 2. **Does the program accept it?** Many programs explicitly list missing SPF/DMARC, missing security headers, weak ciphers without exploit, and CAA as **out of scope**. Read scope first; quote the in-scope line in your report.

**What actually pays in this class (in order):**

• **Dangling-CNAME / dangling-A subdomain takeover** — you control content on `target.com` subdomain. Real impact, real bounty. (Owned in depth by `hunt-subdomain`; covered here for the TLS/DNS recon angle.)
• **Spoofable DMARC, proven by delivered-to-inbox email** — not "p=none exists" but an actual mail from `ceo@target.com` landing in a real inbox with a passing/none DMARC verdict in the headers.
• **DNS AXFR returning internal hosts** — full internal hostname/IP map. Concrete recon value, often Medium.
• **mTLS / client-cert bypass on an internal service** — reaching authenticated-only functionality without the cert. Real auth bypass = High.
• **Exploited TLS weakness with a working decrypt/MitM PoC** — almost never achievable remotely in 2024-2026 against a patched stack; see Phase 1 caveats.

**What does NOT pay (do not report standalone):** missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM PoC, missing security headers alone, weak-cipher *support* without an exploit, self-signed cert on a non-prod host, TLS 1.0/1.1 *enabled* without a downgrade victim.

---

Phase 1 — TLS/SSL Audit

# Quick TLS test with testssl.sh
brew install testssl
testssl.sh --fast $TARGET 2>/dev/null | grep -E "CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|OK|NOT" | head -30

# Or use sslyze (Python)
pip3 install sslyze
python3 -m sslyze $TARGET --json_out /tmp/sslyze_$TARGET.json 2>/dev/null
cat /tmp/sslyze_$TARGET.json | python3 -m json.tool | grep -i "vulnerability\|insecure\|error" | head -20

# Check certificate expiry and chain
echo | openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -servername $TARGET 2>/dev/null | \
  openssl x509 -noout -dates -subject -issuer 2>/dev/null

# Check for weak ciphers manually (a successful handshake = the cipher is OFFERED, not exploitable)
openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher RC4-SHA 2>/dev/null | grep -i "cipher\|handshake"
openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher DES-CBC3-SHA 2>/dev/null | grep -i "cipher\|handshake"

# Protocol downgrade surface — TLS 1.0/1.1 still negotiable?
openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1   2>/dev/null | grep -E "Protocol|Cipher"
openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1_1 2>/dev/null | grep -E "Protocol|Cipher"

**Accuracy / triage notes — do not over-claim TLS bugs:**

• **Offered ≠ exploitable.** testssl/sslyze flagging RC4, 3DES, or TLS 1.0 means the server *negotiates* it. That is a hardening finding, **not** a demonstrated decrypt. Without a PoC it is Info/Low and frequently OOS.
• **SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183)** — 3DES birthday attack. Requires a long-lived TLS session, an on-path attacker, and ~hundreds of GB / hours of same-key traffic. Realistically un-demonstrable in a bug bounty; report only the *support* of 3DES, expect Low/Info.
• **POODLE (CVE-2014-3566)** — SSLv3 CBC padding oracle. Needs **SSLv3 actually enabled**; almost no modern stack offers it. Confirm with `testssl.sh --poodle` (or `nmap --script ssl-poodle`) — modern OpenSSL 3.x dropped the `-ssl3` flag. If SSLv3 won't negotiate, there is no POODLE.
• **FREAK (CVE-2015-0204)** and **DROWN (CVE-2016-0800)** — require export-grade RSA / a shared SSLv2 endpoint respectively. Both are pre-conditions you must *prove present*, not assume. DROWN needs SSLv2 reachable on *some* host sharing the cert/key — scan for SSLv2 with `testssl.sh --drown` (or `nmap --script sslv2-drown`) across the cert's SAN list before claiming it; modern OpenSSL has no `-ssl2` flag.
• **Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)** — if you genuinely find an unpatched OpenSSL 1.0.1 leaking memory, that *is* High/Critical with a real PoC (dump containing keys/cookies). Verify with `testssl.sh --heartbleed` and capture leaked bytes; this is the rare TLS bug worth a full report.

---

Phase 2 — HSTS Check

# Check HSTS header on main domain and all subdomains
curl -sI "https://$TARGET/" | grep -i "strict-transport-security"
# Expected: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload

# Check critical subdomains (login, api, auth)
for sub in login auth api account pay www; do
  HSTS=$(curl -sI "https://$sub.$TARGET/" 2>/dev/null | grep -i "strict-transport-security")
  if [ -z "$HSTS" ]; then
    echo "[!] MISSING HSTS: https://$sub.$TARGET/"
  else
    echo "[OK] $sub.$TARGET: $HSTS"
  fi
done

# Check HTTP (non-HTTPS) redirect
curl -sI "http://$TARGET/" | grep -i "location"
# Should redirect to HTTPS immediately

# HSTS preload check
curl -s "https://hstspreload.org/ap