/hunt-csrf

name: hunt-csrf
description: Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities. Built from 15 public bug bounty reports including modern variants — SameSite=Lax sibling-subdomain bypass (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424), GraphQL mutations-via-GET (GitLab $3,370), framework-wide CSRF middleware disabled (Stripe Dashboard $5,000), path-traversal CSRF-token bypass (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2022-23732 $10k), Origin-omission bypass (TikTok $2,500), OAuth-state null-byte (Streamlabs), WebSocket CSRF / CSWSH (Coda), default-SameSite email-change → ATO (YoYo Games $400), social-account-link CSRF (HackerOne), JSON-CSRF via text/plain on email-change (TikTok $500). Use when hunting modern CSRF — heavy emphasis on chain-to-ATO patterns.
sources: github, hackerone_public, bugcrowd_public, github_security_advisories
report_count: 18

Shortcut: a raw HTTP client beats a real cross-origin page for header-check CSRF

A raw HTTP client (curl, Burp Repeater, any scripting client) is not a browser: it will send whatever `Origin`/`Referer` header VALUE you set, from any path, on the same connection as your authenticated cookie. Many apps that claim to defend against CSRF only do a naive **string check** on the incoming `Origin`/`Referer` header (does it contain/equal some expected value?) rather than real same-origin enforcement — you can satisfy that check directly by setting the header, with no actual cross-site delivery (hosting an HTML page, a headless browser) required. This is faster and more reliable than building a real attacker page for this exact pattern:

POST /profile HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Origin: https://a-domain-the-app-treats-as-trusted-or-attacker-controlled.example
Cookie: <authenticated session>

username=csrf_poc

If some text names a SPECIFIC origin/domain as the "expected" attacker page, that literal value is often exactly what the server's check is looking for — try it verbatim in `Origin` (fall back to `Referer` if `Origin` alone doesn't flip it). Only build a real cross-origin page (actual browser delivery) when the target does genuine SameSite/fetch-based origin enforcement that a spoofed header can't satisfy.

Autonomous Testing Priority

**CSRF only matters on state-changing actions that a browser could be tricked into making cross-site.**

**Testing flow:** 1. **GET the form endpoint** to establish a baseline and check what fields exist (look for hidden `csrf_token`, `authenticity_token`, `_token`, `csrfmiddlewaretoken` fields). 2. **POST the state-changing action without any CSRF token field.** Send only the functional parameters (email, amount, etc.). 3. **Use a "simple-request" Content-Type** — `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, `multipart/form-data`, OR `text/plain` are the three CORS "simple" content-types a cross-origin form can send with no preflight. A JSON endpoint is CSRF-resistant **only if the server rejects those** — if it also accepts a `text/plain` body (common), craft a `text/plain` payload that parses as valid JSON (see the JSON-CSRF-via-text/plain section). Don't skip a JSON endpoint on the assumption that `application/json` alone is protective. 4. **If the action succeeds (2xx, no "invalid token" error) → CSRF is confirmed.**

**High-value targets (in order of impact):**

• Email/password change → account takeover
• Money transfer or payment → financial fraud
• Admin actions (role assignment, user deletion)
• OAuth social-account linking → persistent ATO

**Token bypass techniques when a token IS present:**

• Omit the token field entirely — some frameworks only validate if the field exists, not if it's absent
• Send an empty value (`_token=`) — some validate format, not presence
• Copy a token from another session — some tokens aren't tied to the session

**Scope:** Don't test CSRF on login forms (no existing session to exploit), logout (no real impact), or read-only GET endpoints.

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Crown Jewel Targets

CSRF becomes high-value when it touches **state-changing actions with account-level or financial consequences**. The highest-paying targets are:

• **Account takeover vectors**: OAuth/SSO flows (RelayState manipulation), social account linking/unlinking (Oculus-Facebook, SocialClub), import-friends features that expose OAuth tokens
• **Authentication infrastructure**: Login CSRF, session fixation via CSRF, forced account association
• **API endpoints accepting cross-origin POST**: JSON APIs, heartbeat/activity APIs, anything that skips Content-Type enforcement
• **Third-party integrations**: Grafana, monitoring dashboards, embedded analytics — often lag on CSRF protections
• **Social platforms**: Twitter/X collections, friend imports, social graph mutations — high-volume, authenticated actions with real user impact

**Asset types that pay most:** Core product auth flows > API gateways > third-party integrations running on subdomains > admin panels.

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Attack Surface Signals

URL Patterns

/oauth/authorize?RelayState=
/accounts/link
/import/friends
/api/v*/heartbeat
/api/v*/collect
/monitoring/* (Grafana, Prow, Prometheus)
/auth/saml/callback
/connect/* (social integrations)

Response Header Signals

# Missing or weak SameSite cookie attributes
Set-Cookie: session=abc123; HttpOnly        # no SameSite = vulnerable
Set-Cookie: session=abc123; SameSite=None   # explicitly allows cross-site

# Missing CSRF headers
# No X-Frame-Options or permissive CORS
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true      # dangerous combo

JS / DOM Patterns

// Static or predictable CSRF tokens
meta[name="csrf-token"]   // grep if value changes across sessions
authenticity_token        // Rails — check if reused across page loads

// JSON endpoints without Content-Type enforcement
fetch('/api/heartbeat', {method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(data)})

// No CSRF token in form at all
<form method="POST" action="/accounts/link">  // no hidden token field

Tech Stack Sign