/hunt-cors

name: hunt-cors
description: "Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDENTIALED cross-origin read of sensitive data and you have proven it in a browser. Use when testing API endpoints, SPAs, or any app emitting Access-Control-* headers."
sources: hackerone_public

HUNT-CORS — Cross-Origin Resource Sharing Misconfiguration

What actually pays (and what does not)

CORS pays High **only** when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a **credentialed** cross-origin read of sensitive authenticated data, and you have a browser PoC proving the response body is readable from `evil.com`.

Two hard browser rules that kill most "findings" — check these FIRST:

• **`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` CANNOT be combined with credentials.**

If the server returns `ACAO: *`, the browser refuses to send/expose the response for a `credentials: include` request. A wildcard-only endpoint is **not** credential-exploitable. It is only interesting if the data it serves is sensitive *without* a session (rare) — usually this is Informational/Low.

• **`Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` is meaningless on its own.** It

matters only if `ACAO` reflects/allows your specific attacker origin AND a cross-origin credentialed `fetch` actually returns a readable body. ACAC on a response that does not reflect your origin proves nothing.

If you cannot demonstrate a readable cross-origin authed body in a real browser, you do not have a High. Do not submit header-diffing alone.

---

Crown Jewel Targets

• **Reflect-any-origin + credentials** — server echoes the `Origin` header AND

sets `ACAC: true` → any site reads authed API responses. The classic High.

• **Null-origin trust** — `ACAO: null` + `ACAC: true`. A `sandbox` iframe (or a

`data:`/redirect chain) emits `Origin: null`, so any page can read authed data.

• **Subdomain-regex bypass** — trusted-origin regex with a parsing flaw. The

correct payload depends on *which* flaw (see Phase 3 — this is where most skills get it wrong).

• **Subdomain takeover → trusted origin** — a dangling subdomain that the CORS

policy trusts; take it over, host the PoC there (see hunt-subdomain).

• **postMessage missing/loose origin check** — handler that processes

`event.data` without strictly validating `event.origin`.

---

Attack Surface Signals

Any endpoint returning an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header
API endpoints:   /api/*, /v1/*, /graphql
Profile/account: /api/me, /api/profile, /api/user, /api/session
Secrets/tokens:  /api/tokens, /api/keys, /api/csrf, /api/account/settings
Financial:       /api/balance, /api/transactions
Admin/internal:  /api/admin/*, /api/internal/*

Prioritize endpoints that (a) require a session cookie and (b) return PII, tokens, CSRF tokens, or other secrets in the body.

---

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

Phase 1 — Discover CORS endpoints

# Probe API endpoints. Use GET (not -I): some servers only emit CORS on GET,
# and -I sends HEAD which may be handled differently.
while read url; do
  result=$(curl -s -D - -o /dev/null "$url" \
    -H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
    -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control")
  [ -n "$result" ] && echo "=== $url ===" && echo "$result"
done < recon/$TARGET/api-endpoints.txt

# httpx bulk check
cat recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt | awk '{print $1}' | \
  httpx -H "Origin: https://evil.com" -match-string "access-control-allow-origin"

Phase 2 — Reflect-any-origin + null origin

# Does the server reflect an arbitrary Origin back?
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null https://$TARGET/api/me \
  -H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
  -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control"

# Vulnerable (the High case):
#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com   <- reflects attacker origin
#   Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true          <- + credentials => readable
#
# NOT exploitable for credentialed theft:
#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *                   <- browser blocks creds read
#   (no ACAC, or ACAC absent)                        <- not credentialed

# Null-origin trust
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null https://$TARGET/api/me \
  -H "Origin: null" \
  -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control"
# Looking for:  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null  +  ACAC: true

Phase 3 — Subdomain / trusted-origin regex bypass

The right payload depends on **which** regex flaw the server has. Identify the class first, then send the matching payload. Getting this wrong wastes the test and produces false negatives.

| Server regex (intended: trust `*.target.com`) | Flaw | Bypass origin that matches | Why | |---|---|---|---| | `^https?://.*\.target\.com$` | **None** — escaped dot + end-anchor. Correct. | (no simple bypass) | `evil.target.com` is in-scope by design; `x.target.com.evil.com` ENDS in `.evil.com`, fails `$`. Move on or look for subdomain-takeover. | | `^https?://.*target\.com$` | **Missing dot separator** (no `\.` before `target`) | `https://eviltarget.com` | `.*target\.com$` matches `eviltarget.com` — attacker registers `eviltarget.com`. | | `^https?://.*\.target\.com` | **Missing end-anchor `$`** | `https://x.target.com.evil.com` | regex matches a prefix; `.target.com` appears, then `.evil.com` is ignored (no `$`). | | `^https?://target\.com` | **Prefix-only, no `$`** | `https://target.com.evil.com` | matches the `target.com` prefix; the rest is unconstrained. | | `^https?://.*\.target\.com$` but dot in regex is **unescaped** (`.*.target.com$`) | **Unescaped dot** = "any char" | `https://xtargetXcom...` style, or `https://evilZtargetZcom` where `Z` is any single char | `.` matches any character, widening the match. | | Any of the above | **Special chars browsers send in Origin** | `https