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/jtagprobe

Probe IoT/embedded targets for exposed SWD/JTAG debug interfaces using a SEGGER J-Link. Detects whether debug is OPEN, LOCKED (readout-protected), or DEAD (fused off). Use when assessing whether a target's on-chip debug port can be reached, identifying the silicon vendor from

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$ npx -y skills add brownfinesecurity/iothackbot --skill jtagprobe --agent claude-code

SKILL.md

jtagprobe.SKILL.md
name: jtagprobe
description: Probe IoT/embedded targets for exposed SWD/JTAG debug interfaces using a SEGGER J-Link. Detects whether debug is OPEN, LOCKED (readout-protected), or DEAD (fused off). Use when assessing whether a target's on-chip debug port can be reached, identifying the silicon vendor from DPIDR/IDCODE, and confirming halt+memory access for full debugger control.

Jtagprobe — SWD/JTAG Debug Interface Tester

You are helping the user determine whether a target's on-chip debug interface is exposed via SWD or JTAG, using the `jtagprobe` tool. This drives a SEGGER J-Link physically wired to the target.

What the tool tests

Three nested access layers are checked, and the target is classified into one of:

  • `OPEN` — DP responds, CPU halts, memory reads return plausible data. Full debugger control. Critical finding.
  • `LOCKED` — DP/IDCODE accessible but memory reads fail or return readout-protection sentinels (0xFFFFFFFF). Indicates STM32 RDP, NXP CRP, Nordic APPROTECT, etc. are engaged. Still a finding — the port should not respond at all in production.
  • `DEAD` — No DP/IDCODE response on any tested interface/speed. Debug fused off, pins not wired, or wrong target.

Prerequisites

  • A SEGGER J-Link (any variant) connected via USB
  • `JLinkExe` on PATH — verify with `which JLinkExe`. If it is installed but not on PATH, point the tool at it with `--jlink-binary /path/to/JLinkExe` instead of relying on PATH.
  • Target wired to the J-Link 20-pin (or 10-pin Cortex Debug) header. Confirm SWDIO/SWCLK or TDI/TDO/TMS/TCK identification before energizing the target.

If `JLinkExe` cannot be found at all, tell the user to install SEGGER J-Link software from segger.com. Do not attempt to install it without explicit approval.

Basic usage

Default — sweep SWD then JTAG at 4000/1000/100 kHz, halt, read memory, classify:

jtagprobe

Save per-attempt JLinkExe logs as evidence (recommended for pentest writeups):

jtagprobe --evidence-dir ./evidence/jtagprobe-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)

JSON for chaining:

jtagprobe --format json

Common workflows

1. Unknown target, unknown protocol

Just run with defaults. The tool will: 1. Try SWD at 4 MHz → 1 MHz → 100 kHz 2. Fall back to JTAG with the same speed sweep 3. Run a JTAG chain auto-scan as last resort 4. Identify vendor from DPIDR/IDCODE JEP106 designer field 5. Halt CPU and read memory to confirm access level

jtagprobe --evidence-dir ./evidence

2. Known target — pass the device name

If the user knows the chip, pass `--device` for a more accurate halt/memory test. Use the same device strings J-Link accepts (`STM32F407VG`, `nRF52840_xxAA`, `MK64FN1M0xxx12`, etc.):

jtagprobe --device STM32F407VG

3. Slow targets / long traces / level-shifted boards

Some pirate-flagged boards or long ribbon cables need a slower clock. Limit the sweep:

jtagprobe --speeds 1000,100,10

4. Layer-1 only (no halt)

If the target is in a state where halting would crash an active firmware path you care about (rare in pentests, common in live systems), stop after the connect probe:

jtagprobe --skip-memory

5. SWD only or JTAG only

jtagprobe --interfaces SWD
jtagprobe --interfaces JTAG --speeds 4000,1000

Interpreting the output

The text format leads with the classification and reason:

CLASSIFICATION: LOCKED
DP/IDCODE accessible but CPU halt or memory read failed. Typical of RDP / CRP / APPROTECT engaged.

Vendor: STMicroelectronics
  SW-DP DPIDR=0x2BA01477 partno=0xBA version=2 designer_identity=0x20

Access test:
  Halted: True
  CPUID @ 0xE000ED00 = 0x410FC241
  0x08000000: 0xFFFFFFFF 0xFFFFFFFF 0xFFFFFFFF 0xFFFFFFFF [all-0xFF, possible RDP]

Protection hint: STM32 RDP Level 1/2 (see RM, FLASH_OPTR bits 15:8).

Key signals:

  • A non-zero DPIDR / IDCODE means the silicon answered. Even alone this is reportable.
  • `0xFFFFFFFF` flash reads after a successful halt = readout protection. Capture the DPIDR and document the protection mechanism.
  • A "plausible vector table" (initial SP in SRAM range, reset vector with Thumb bit set) is the strongest signal of OPEN access — call this out in writeups.

Writeup-relevant detail

For a pentest finding under CWE-1191 (improper access control on debug interface) or CWE-1244 (asset exposed via debug):

  • Command run: full `jtagprobe` invocation
  • Classification + reason from the output
  • DPIDR / IDCODE raw value and decoded vendor
  • For OPEN: vector table words proving memory was read
  • For LOCKED: the all-0xFF read proving readout protection is the only line of defense (and that the port itself is still exposed)
  • Evidence files from `--evidence-dir` for the appendix

When the user says "test for JTAG"

Default assumption: they want both SWD and JTAG checked, full halt+memory test, and evidence captured. Run:

jtagprobe --evidence-dir ./evidence/jtagprobe-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)

If `JLinkExe` isn't on PATH, stop and report that the SEGGER tools aren't installed.

Limitations

  • Requires physical access to the debug header and a J-Link probe wired up. This is not a network or pcap-based check.
  • Generic Cortex-M device profiles are used when no `--device` is passed. Halt/memory access may succeed under a generic device even when the vendor-specific erase/unlock would not.
  • JLinkExe stdout parsing is regex-based. If SEGGER changes the format in a future release the parser may need updating — `--format json` shows what was extracted.
  • Does not attempt unlock / mass-erase. That is destructive and out of scope for a probe. Use the vendor's bootrom or `unlock` commands separately with explicit authorization.
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Questions about jtagprobe.

Which coding agents can use jtagprobe?
jtagprobe installs in Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, OpenCode and Windsurf with the skills CLI, using each agent's flag shown on this page. Flowy's auto-invocation, which fires a skill when your prompt matches, runs in Claude Code only.