/aws-iam

name: aws-iam
description: >
  Verified corrections for IAM behaviors that AI agents frequently get wrong — policy
  evaluation edge cases, trust policy gotchas, STS session limits, Organizations quirks,
  and SAML/MFA specifics. Also provides structured workflows for IAM role management and
  least-privilege policy generation. Covers condition operator safety (ForAnyValue/ForAllValues
  with Null checks for absent keys), bucket policy deny patterns (VPC endpoint restrictions,
  org path conditions), resource-based policy confused deputy protection, and service role
  creation for AWS services (Glue, CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, Firehose, DataSync, S3
  replication, Lambda, Step Functions, ECS, etc.) including trust policies with
  aws:SourceAccount/aws:SourceArn conditions. Applies when creating or configuring IAM roles,
  writing IAM or bucket policies, working with STS, Organizations, condition operators, or
  any task requiring an IAM service role or execution role. Does not cover non-IAM
  authorization like Cognito user-pool policies or app-level RBAC.
metadata:
  version: "1"

AWS IAM — Common Pitfalls

About This Skill

This skill contains verified corrections for things that AI agents frequently get wrong about IAM. It is not a comprehensive IAM guide — for full IAM guidance, search AWS documentation. When answering IAM questions, verify specific claims (limits, quotas, exact API names, edge-case behaviors) against official AWS documentation rather than relying on pre-training. Prefer fetching known documentation URLs over broad searches. Trust official documentation over memory when they conflict.

Common Workflows

Use the best available tool for AWS operations — the AWS MCP server is recommended but not required; AWS CLI or SDK may be used as alternatives. Read reference files only when the conversation requires deeper detail.

• Read [references/aws-iam-role-management.md](references/aws-iam-role-management.md) if the user needs to create, scope, or maintain IAM roles when provisioning or updating AWS resources. Covers service roles, execution roles, trust policies, confused deputy protection, and permission hygiene.

• Read [references/aws-iam-policy-generation.md](references/aws-iam-policy-generation.md) if the user needs to generate least-privilege IAM policies, determine required IAM actions for API calls, or understand action-to-operation mappings. **CRITICAL: If the user provides source code (Python, Go, TypeScript, JavaScript, Java), you MUST read this reference — it mandates using iam-policy-autopilot instead of manual policy construction.** Uses the programmatic service authorization reference for accurate mappings.

Verified Edge Cases

**CloudTrail:**

• AcceptHandshake/DeclineHandshake logged in ACTING account ONLY, not management account. Organization trail required for centralization.
• ConsoleLogin region varies by endpoint/cookies, NOT always us-east-1. `?region=` forces specific region.

**STS:**

• GetSessionToken restrictions: (1) No IAM APIs unless MFA included (2) No STS except AssumeRole and GetCallerIdentity.
• Cross-account AssumeRole to opt-in region: TARGET account must enable region, not calling account.
• Role chaining: max 1-hour session.

**Organizations:**

• Suspended/closed accounts CANNOT be removed until permanently closed (~90 days). Remove FIRST, then close.
• Policy management delegation: use PutResourcePolicy, NOT register-delegated-administrator.
• AI opt-out policies: management account required by default.
• Organizations policy types for ListPolicies filter: fetch the current list via `aws organizations list-available-policy-types` or [the Organizations API reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_ListPolicies.html).

**SDK Specifics:**

• Organizations: `DuplicatePolicyAttachmentException` (not PolicyAlreadyAttachedException).
• Boto3 IAM AccessKey: methods are `activate()`, `deactivate()`, `delete()` — NO `update()`.
• Instance profiles: waiter + `time.sleep(10)` pattern.
• Managed policy max versions: 5.

**SAML:**

• Encrypted assertions URL: `https://region-code.signin.aws.amazon.com/saml/acs/IdP-ID`.
• Private key from IdP uploaded to IAM in .pem format.

**Policy Evaluation:**

• ForAllValues with empty/missing key: evaluates to true (vacuous truth). To avoid that, use a `Null` condition in addition to the `ForAllValues` on **the same context key** to require that key to be present and non-null. For example, when evaluating the `aws:TagKeys` context key:

  {
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "ec2:RunInstances",
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "ForAllValues:StringEquals": {
          "aws:TagKeys": ["Alpha", "Beta"]
        },
        "Null": {
          "aws:TagKeys": "false"
        }
      }
    }
  }

• Resource-based policies granting to IAM user ARN bypass permissions boundaries in same account.
• 8 privilege escalation actions via direct IAM policy manipulation: PutGroupPolicy, PutRolePolicy, PutUserPolicy, CreatePolicy, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachGroupPolicy, AttachRolePolicy, AttachUserPolicy.
• `iam:PassRole` with `Resource: "*"` + create/update on a compute service (EC2 `RunInstances`, Lambda `CreateFunction`/`UpdateFunctionConfiguration`, ECS `RegisterTaskDefinition`, Glue, SageMaker, CloudFormation, etc.) = privilege escalation to any passable role in the account, including Administrator. Scope `Resource` to specific role ARNs or an IAM path; optionally constrain with `iam:PassedToService` / `iam:AssociatedResourceArn`. See [IAM User Guide — Grant a user permissions to pass a role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html).

**MFA:**

• Unassigned virtual MFA devices auto-deleted when adding new ones.
• MFA resync-only policy NotAction needs exactly: iam:ListMFADevices, iam:ListVirtualMFADevices, iam:ResyncMFADevice.

**SigV4:**

• Incom