/aws-iam

name: aws-iam
description: >-
  Provides verified corrections for IAM behaviors that AI agents frequently get wrong
  — policy evaluation edge cases, trust policy gotchas, STS session limits, Organizations
  quirks, and SAML/MFA specifics. Also provides structured workflows for IAM role
  management and baseline policy generation from application source code or a Terraform
  plan JSON. Covers condition operator safety (ForAnyValue/ForAllValues with Null
  checks), bucket policy deny patterns (VPC endpoint restrictions, org paths), confused
  deputy protection, and service role creation for AWS services (Glue, CloudTrail,
  Lambda, ECS, etc.) with aws:SourceAccount/aws:SourceArn trust conditions. Applies
  when creating IAM roles, writing IAM or bucket policies, generating policies from
  application source code or a Terraform plan JSON, working with STS, Organizations,
  or condition operators, or any task needing a service or execution role. Does not
  cover non-IAM authorization like Cognito user-pool policies or app-level RBAC.
metadata:
  version: "3"

AWS IAM — Common Pitfalls

About This Skill

This skill contains verified corrections for things that AI agents frequently get wrong about IAM. It is not a comprehensive IAM guide — for full IAM guidance, search AWS documentation. When answering IAM questions, verify specific claims (limits, quotas, exact API names, edge-case behaviors) against official AWS documentation rather than relying on pre-training. Prefer fetching known documentation URLs over broad searches. Trust official documentation over memory when they conflict.

Common Workflows

Use the best available tool for AWS operations — the AWS MCP server is recommended but not required; AWS CLI or SDK may be used as alternatives. Read reference files only when the conversation requires deeper detail.

• Read [references/aws-iam-role-management.md](references/aws-iam-role-management.md) if the user needs to create, scope, or maintain IAM roles when provisioning or updating AWS resources. Covers service roles, execution roles, trust policies, confused deputy protection, and permission hygiene.

• Read [references/aws-iam-policy-generation.md](references/aws-iam-policy-generation.md) if the user needs to generate IAM policies, determine required IAM actions for API calls, or understand action-to-operation mappings. **CRITICAL: If the user provides application source code (in any language) or a Terraform plan JSON file (`terraform show -json` output), you MUST read this reference — it mandates using iam-policy-autopilot instead of manual policy construction.** Uses the programmatic service authorization reference for accurate mappings.

Verified Edge Cases

**CloudTrail:**

• AcceptHandshake/DeclineHandshake logged in ACTING account ONLY, not management account. Organization trail required for centralization.
• ConsoleLogin region varies by endpoint/cookies, NOT always us-east-1. `?region=` forces specific region.

**STS:**

• GetSessionToken restrictions: (1) No IAM APIs unless MFA included (2) No STS except AssumeRole and GetCallerIdentity.
• Cross-account AssumeRole to opt-in region: TARGET account must enable region, not calling account.
• Role chaining: max 1-hour session.

**Organizations:**

• Suspended/closed accounts CANNOT be removed until permanently closed (~90 days). Remove FIRST, then close.
• Policy management delegation: use PutResourcePolicy, NOT register-delegated-administrator.
• AI opt-out policies: management account required by default.
• Organizations policy types for ListPolicies filter: fetch the current list via `aws organizations list-available-policy-types` or [the Organizations API reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_ListPolicies.html).

**SDK Specifics:**

• Organizations: `DuplicatePolicyAttachmentException` (not PolicyAlreadyAttachedException).
• Boto3 IAM AccessKey: methods are `activate()`, `deactivate()`, `delete()` — NO `update()`.
• Instance profiles: waiter + `time.sleep(10)` pattern.
• Managed policy max versions: 5.

**SAML:**

• Encrypted assertions URL: `https://region-code.signin.aws.amazon.com/saml/acs/IdP-ID`.
• Private key from IdP uploaded to IAM in .pem format.

**Policy Evaluation:**

• ForAllValues with empty/missing key: evaluates to true (vacuous truth). To avoid that, use a `Null` condition in addition to the `ForAllValues` on **the same context key** to require that key to be present and non-null. For example, when evaluating the `aws:TagKeys` context key:

  {
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "ec2:RunInstances",
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "ForAllValues:StringEquals": {
          "aws:TagKeys": ["Alpha", "Beta"]
        },
        "Null": {
          "aws:TagKeys": "false"
        }
      }
    }
  }

• `aws:TagKeys` values are case-sensitive, but the tag key in `aws:PrincipalTag/<key>`, `aws:ResourceTag/<key>`, and `aws:RequestTag/<key>` is not. The Allow allowlist above is unaffected (a re-cased key is simply not in the list), but a Deny that protects a tag key with `ForAnyValue:StringEquals` on `aws:TagKeys` is bypassed by a re-cased key (`PROTECTED-TAG`) — use `ForAnyValue:StringEqualsIgnoreCase`. See [references/common-pitfalls.md](references/common-pitfalls.md).
• Resource-based policies granting to IAM user ARN bypass permissions boundaries in same account.
• 8 privilege escalation actions via direct IAM policy manipulation: PutGroupPolicy, PutRolePolicy, PutUserPolicy, CreatePolicy, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachGroupPolicy, AttachRolePolicy, AttachUserPolicy.
• `iam:PassRole` with `Resource: "*"` + create/update on a compute service (EC2 `RunInstances`, Lambda `CreateFunction`/`UpdateFunctionConfiguration`, ECS `RegisterTaskDefinition`, Glue, SageMaker, CloudFormation, etc.) = privilege escalation to any passable role in the account, including Administrator. Scope `Re