/signed-audit-trails-recipe

name: signed-audit-trails-recipe
description: Step-by-step cookbook for setting up cryptographically signed audit trails on Claude Code tool calls. Use when explaining, evaluating, or demonstrating the pattern before committing to the protect-mcp runtime hooks. Covers Cedar policy, Ed25519 receipts, offline verification, tamper detection, CI/CD integration, and SLSA composition.

Signed Audit Trails for Claude Code Tool Calls

Cookbook-style walkthrough for cryptographically signed receipts on every Claude Code tool call. This is the teaching skill. For the runtime implementation, install the [`protect-mcp`](../../protect-mcp/) plugin.

What this gives you

Every tool call (`Bash`, `Edit`, `Write`, `WebFetch`) is:

1. **Evaluated against a Cedar policy** before execution. If the policy denies the call, the tool does not run. 2. **Signed as an Ed25519 receipt** after execution. Receipts are JCS-canonical, hash-chained, and verifiable offline by anyone with the public key.

An auditor, regulator, or counterparty can verify the full chain later with a single CLI command (`npx @veritasacta/verify receipts/*.json`). No network call, no vendor lookup, no trust in the operator.

When to use the pattern

• **Regulated environments** (finance, healthcare, critical infrastructure)

where you need tamper-evident evidence of agent behavior

• **CI/CD pipelines** where you want to prove that a policy gate held for

every automated build step

• **Multi-party collaboration** where a counterparty wants to verify your

agent's behavior without trusting your operator

• **Compliance contexts** (EU AI Act Article 12, SLSA provenance for

agent-built software) where standard logging is not sufficient

Step 1: Install the hook configuration

Create `.claude/settings.json` in your project root:

{
  "hooks": {
    "PreToolUse": [
      {
        "matcher": ".*",
        "hook": {
          "type": "command",
          "command": "npx protect-mcp@latest evaluate --policy ./protect.cedar --tool \"$TOOL_NAME\" --input \"$TOOL_INPUT\" --fail-on-missing-policy false"
        }
      }
    ],
    "PostToolUse": [
      {
        "matcher": ".*",
        "hook": {
          "type": "command",
          "command": "npx protect-mcp@latest sign --tool \"$TOOL_NAME\" --input \"$TOOL_INPUT\" --output \"$TOOL_OUTPUT\" --receipts ./receipts/ --key ./protect-mcp.key"
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

The first run of `protect-mcp sign` generates `./protect-mcp.key` (Ed25519 private key) if one does not exist. Commit the **public** key fingerprint (visible in any receipt's `public_key` field); do not commit the private key.

Add the private key and receipt directory to `.gitignore`:

echo "./protect-mcp.key" >> .gitignore
echo "./receipts/" >> .gitignore

Step 2: Write a Cedar policy

Create `./protect.cedar`:

// Allow all read-oriented tools by default.
permit (
    principal,
    action in [Action::"Read", Action::"Glob", Action::"Grep", Action::"WebSearch"],
    resource
);

// Allow Bash commands from a safe list only.
permit (
    principal,
    action == Action::"Bash",
    resource
) when {
    context.command_pattern in [
        "git", "npm", "pnpm", "yarn", "ls", "cat", "pwd",
        "echo", "test", "node", "python", "make"
    ]
};

// Explicit deny on destructive commands. Cedar deny is authoritative.
forbid (
    principal,
    action == Action::"Bash",
    resource
) when {
    context.command_pattern in ["rm -rf", "dd", "mkfs", "shred"]
};

// Restrict writes to the project directory.
permit (
    principal,
    action in [Action::"Write", Action::"Edit"],
    resource
) when {
    context.path_starts_with == "./"
};

Four rules:

• Read-oriented tools always allowed
• `Bash` allowed for safe command patterns (`git`, `npm`, etc.)
• `Bash rm -rf` and similar destructive commands explicitly denied
• Writes allowed only within the project (`./` prefix)

Cedar `forbid` rules take precedence over `permit` rules, so destructive commands cannot be bypassed by a later permissive rule.

Step 3: Use Claude Code normally

Start Claude Code. Every tool call goes through both hooks:

You: Please read the README and summarize it.

Claude: I will read README.md.
  [PreToolUse: Read ./README.md -> allow]
  [Tool: Read executes]
  [PostToolUse: receipt rcpt-a8f3c9d2 signed to ./receipts/]

... summary of README ...

A session of 20 tool calls produces 20 receipts, each hash-chained to its predecessor.

Step 4: Inspect a receipt

cat ./receipts/$(ls -t ./receipts/ | head -1)

{
  "receipt_id": "rcpt-a8f3c9d2",
  "receipt_version": "1.0",
  "issuer_id": "claude-code-protect-mcp",
  "event_time": "2026-04-17T12:34:56.123Z",
  "tool_name": "Read",
  "input_hash": "sha256:a3f8c9d2e1b7465f...",
  "decision": "allow",
  "policy_id": "protect.cedar",
  "policy_digest": "sha256:b7e2f4a6c8d0e1f3...",
  "parent_receipt_id": "rcpt-3d1ab7c2",
  "public_key": "4437ca56815c0516...",
  "signature": "4cde814b7889e987..."
}

Every field except `signature` and `public_key` is covered by the Ed25519 signature. Modifying any field after signing invalidates the signature.

Step 5: Verify the receipt chain

npx @veritasacta/verify ./receipts/*.json

Exit codes:

| Code | Meaning | |------|---------| | `0` | All receipts verified; chain intact | | `1` | A receipt failed signature verification (tampered, or wrong key) | | `2` | A receipt was malformed |

Step 6: Demonstrate tamper detection

Modify any receipt's `decision` field from `allow` to `deny`:

python3 -c "
import json, os
path = './receipts/' + sorted(os.listdir('./receipts'))[-1]
r = json.loads(open(path).read())
r['decision'] = 'deny'
open(path, 'w').write(json.dumps(r))
"

npx @veritasacta/verify ./receipts/*.json

The verifier exits with code `1` and reports which receipt failed. The Ed25519 signature no longer matches the JCS-canonical bytes of the