scan-types-and-tools
Vulnerability scanning is not one activity — it is a family of complementary techniques, each with a different blind spot. A credible scan combines several. Use this reference to pick the right family for the target and to understand what each one *cannot* see.
$ npx -y skills add vanara-agents/skills --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this agent gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
- Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.Auto-invocation is when the right skill fires by itself at the right moment, driven by a FLOW.md router and a hook, instead of you invoking it by name. It is the difference between a skill being installed and a skill actually getting used.Read the full definition →
- You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
Context preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this agent.
Vulnerability scanning is not one activity — it is a family of complementary techniques, each with a different blind spot. A credible scan combines several. Use this reference to pick the right family for the target and to understand what each one *cannot* see.
Agent definition
scan-types-and-tools.mdScan Types and Tools
Vulnerability scanning is not one activity — it is a family of complementary techniques, each with a different blind spot. A credible scan combines several. Use this reference to pick the right family for the target and to understand what each one *cannot* see.
SCA — Software Composition Analysis (dependency scanning)
Matches your resolved dependency versions against known-vulnerability databases (CVE/NVD, GitHub Advisory, OSV).
- **Inputs:** lockfiles (`package-lock.json`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, `poetry.lock`, `Cargo.lock`, `go.sum`).
Always read the **lockfile**, not the manifest range — `^1.2.0` tells you nothing about what shipped.
- **Strengths:** high-precision for *known* CVEs; cheap; covers transitive deps.
- **Blind spots:** zero-days, logic bugs, anything not yet in an advisory DB. Version-only matching can
over-report (advisory may need a specific feature flag).
- **Triage hook:** flag direct vs. transitive — a transitive CVE may be fixable only by bumping the
parent, or pinning via an override/resolution.
# Inventory before judging — never trust the manifest range alone
node -e "const l=require('./package-lock.json');console.log(Object.keys(l.packages||{}).length,'resolved packages')"Secret scanning
Finds credentials committed to the repo: API keys, tokens, private keys, connection strings, high-entropy blobs.
- **Inputs:** working tree by default; git history when explicitly requested.
- **Detection:** known-format regexes (e.g. `AKIA…` AWS keys, `ghp_…` GitHub tokens, `-----BEGIN ...
PRIVATE KEY-----`) plus entropy heuristics.
- **Blind spots:** secrets in untracked files, encrypted blobs, or rotated-but-still-referenced values.
- **Critical rule:** a found secret is assumed compromised. Removal ≠ remediation. See
[remediation-and-severity](remediation-and-severity.md) for the rotation playbook.
# Cheap first pass for common key formats (illustrative — a real scan uses a tool)
grep -rERn 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----' . \
--include='*.*' || echo "no obvious key-format matches"SAST — Static Application Security Testing
Analyzes source/AST for vulnerable patterns: injection sinks, unsafe deserialization, path traversal, hardcoded crypto, tainted-data flows.
- **Strengths:** finds bugs in *your* code, not just dependencies; runs without deploying.
- **Blind spots:** high false-positive rate; struggles with dynamic dispatch and framework magic;
cannot judge runtime config.
- **Triage hook:** SAST output needs the heaviest false-positive filtering. Confirm the sink is
reachable with attacker-controlled input before alarming.
DAST — Dynamic Application Security Testing
Probes a *running* application from the outside: injection, auth handling, misconfigured headers, TLS.
- **Strengths:** finds runtime/config issues SAST can't see; low false positives for what it confirms.
- **Blind spots:** only covers exercised endpoints; needs a deployed target; can be destructive.
- **Boundary:** this agent does **not** perform live DAST/exploitation — that is a pen-test activity.
Note when DAST is warranted and hand off.
Container & IaC scanning
When a `Dockerfile`, image, or infra-as-code (Terraform, Kubernetes manifests) is present:
- **Base-image CVEs:** OS packages in the image carry their own advisories; a clean app on a stale base
image is still vulnerable.
- **Image hygiene:** running as root, secrets baked into layers, unpinned `latest` tags.
- **IaC misconfig:** public S3 buckets, `0.0.0.0/0` security groups, disabled encryption.
Choosing per target
| Target present | Run | Primary risk caught | |---|---|---| | Lockfile | SCA | Known CVEs in deps | | Any source | Secret scan + SAST | Leaked creds, injection sinks | | Dockerfile / image | Container scan | Base-image CVEs, root, baked secrets | | Terraform / k8s | IaC scan | Public exposure, weak crypto config | | Deployed URL | DAST (hand off) | Runtime/config exploits |
No single family is sufficient. Combine, then triage everything through [triage-and-false-positives](triage-and-false-positives.md).
Read more
Scan Types and Tools
Vulnerability scanning is not one activity — it is a family of complementary techniques, each with a different blind spot. A credible scan combines several. Use this reference to pick the right family for the target and to understand what each one *cannot* see.
SCA — Software Composition Analysis (dependency scanning)
Matches your resolved dependency versions against known-vulnerability databases (CVE/NVD, GitHub Advisory, OSV).
- **Inputs:** lockfiles (`package-lock.json`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, `poetry.lock`, `Cargo.lock`, `go.sum`).
Always read the **lockfile**, not the manifest range — `^1.2.0` tells you nothing about what shipped.
- **Strengths:** high-precision for *known* CVEs; cheap; covers transitive deps.
- **Blind spots:** zero-days, logic bugs, anything not yet in an advisory DB. Version-only matching can
over-report (advisory may need a specific feature flag).
- **Triage hook:** flag direct vs. transitive — a transitive CVE may be fixable only by bumping the
parent, or pinning via an override/resolution.
# Inventory before judging — never trust the manifest range alone
node -e "const l=require('./package-lock.json');console.log(Object.keys(l.packages||{}).length,'resolved packages')"Secret scanning
Finds credentials committed to the repo: API keys, tokens, private keys, connection strings, high-entropy blobs.
- **Inputs:** working tree by default; git history when explicitly requested.
- **Detection:** known-format regexes (e.g. `AKIA…` AWS keys, `ghp_…` GitHub tokens, `-----BEGIN ...
PRIVATE KEY-----`) plus entropy heuristics.
- **Blind spots:** secrets in untracked files, encrypted blobs, or rotated-but-still-referenced values.
- **Critical rule:** a found secret is assumed compromised. Removal ≠ remediation. See
[remediation-and-severity](remediation-and-severity.md) for the rotation playbook.
# Cheap first pass for common key formats (illustrative — a real scan uses a tool)
grep -rERn 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----' . \
--include='*.*' || echo "no obvious key-format matches"SAST — Static Application Security Testing
Analyzes source/AST for vulnerable patterns: injection sinks, unsafe deserialization, path traversal, hardcoded crypto, tainted-data flows.
- **Strengths:** finds bugs in *your* code, not just dependencies; runs without deploying.
- **Blind spots:** high false-positive rate; struggles with dynamic dispatch and framework magic;
cannot judge runtime config.
- **Triage hook:** SAST output needs the heaviest false-positive filtering. Confirm the sink is
reachable with attacker-controlled input before alarming.
DAST — Dynamic Application Security Testing
Probes a *running* application from the outside: injection, auth handling, misconfigured headers, TLS.
- **Strengths:** finds runtime/config issues SAST can't see; low false positives for what it confirms.
- **Blind spots:** only covers exercised endpoints; needs a deployed target; can be destructive.
- **Boundary:** this agent does **not** perform live DAST/exploitation — that is a pen-test activity.
Note when DAST is warranted and hand off.
Container & IaC scanning
When a `Dockerfile`, image, or infra-as-code (Terraform, Kubernetes manifests) is present:
- **Base-image CVEs:** OS packages in the image carry their own advisories; a clean app on a stale base
image is still vulnerable.
- **Image hygiene:** running as root, secrets baked into layers, unpinned `latest` tags.
- **IaC misconfig:** public S3 buckets, `0.0.0.0/0` security groups, disabled encryption.
Choosing per target
| Target present | Run | Primary risk caught | |---|---|---| | Lockfile | SCA | Known CVEs in deps | | Any source | Secret scan + SAST | Leaked creds, injection sinks | | Dockerfile / image | Container scan | Base-image CVEs, root, baked secrets | | Terraform / k8s | IaC scan | Public exposure, weak crypto config | | Deployed URL | DAST (hand off) | Runtime/config exploits |
No single family is sufficient. Combine, then triage everything through [triage-and-false-positives](triage-and-false-positives.md).
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Repo: vanara-agents/skills
Other agents on vanara-agents-skills.
- AGENT
Use when designing a new HTTP/GraphQL API or changing an existing one — modeling resources, defining endpoint contracts, choosing status codes, pagination, filtering, error envelopes, versioning, and idempotency. Produces a reviewable API contract plus an OpenAPI snippet, not
Open agent - review-notes
This shows how the api-designer agent reviews a flawed draft. Findings are severity-ranked so the implementer fixes the contract-breakers first. Severity legend: **CRITICAL** (breaks clients / data risk), **HIGH** (real bug or inconsistency), **MEDIUM** (maintainability),
Open agent - contract-and-openapi
The contract is the deliverable. Express it as an **OpenAPI 3.1** document so it is human-readable *and* machine-checkable. This reference covers how to structure that document and what `scripts/lint-openapi.mjs` enforces.
Open agent - design-checklist
Run through this before declaring an API contract done. It is ordered the way you should *design*: resources first, cross-cutting rules last. Every box is a place real APIs go wrong in production.
Open agent - versioning-and-evolution
APIs are forever once published: a consumer you've never met may depend on any field you expose. Design so you can **add without breaking**, and version explicitly when you must break.
Open agent - pr-comment-template
Copy-paste templates for leaving review comments. Keep each comment to one finding: an anchor, the problem, and the fix.
Open agent

