coder-eval-code-review…
CommandReview the codebase across critical quality axes
Run a multi-model code review on uncommitted changes or a described set of files
> /plugin marketplace add UiPath/coder_eval> /plugin install coder-eval@coder-eval
description: Run a multi-model code review on uncommitted changes or a described set of files
Run a thorough code review using multiple AI models in parallel, then fix all high-confidence medium-severity and above findings.
**Cost note**: This command runs `make verify` + a multi-model review (`gemini-3` + `gpt-5` via MCP, plus an Opus sub-agent) + automatic fixes. Expensive in time and tokens. Use this for changes you're about to ship; for broad codebase audits use `/coder-eval-code-review-full`; for quick local checks, run targeted tools (`ruff`, `pyright`, `pytest`) directly.
Input: $ARGUMENTS
**If input was provided**: Interpret it as a description of what was changed. Use it to identify the relevant files — search the codebase, read recent commits, check git status — then read those files in full.
**If no input was provided**: Review all locally modified files (unstaged + staged, not yet committed). Identify them from `git diff --name-only` and `git diff --name-only --cached`. If there are no uncommitted changes, review the files changed in the most recent commit (`git diff HEAD~1 --name-only`).
Read all identified files in full before launching any review.
Tag every finding 🔴 Critical / 🟠 High / 🟡 Medium / 🔵 Low. Calibrate by **impact if shipped**, not by fix difficulty. When torn between two levels, pick the lower one. Use the anchors below to keep ratings reproducible across runs and across reviewers.
| 🔴 Critical | 🟠 High | 🟡 Medium | 🔵 Low | |------------|--------|----------|-------| | Data loss; secrets/credentials leak; security hole reachable in production; crash on the golden path; silently-wrong `EvaluationResult` | Wrong behavior on a common path; race condition; resource leak (subprocess, tempdir, file handle); bare `except` swallowing a specific error class; logic fix landing without a regression test | Design issue (KISS/DRY/CLAUDE.md violation); Checklist hit outside a hot path; weak test that wouldn't catch the regression; missing `extra="forbid"` on a config model | Style or naming nit; missing internal docstring; redundant comment; example in `--help` is stale |
**Security findings additional requirement**: any finding whose `Trigger` is security-class (Checklist items 5, 7, 14, anything about secrets/auth/subprocess injection, or a `bandit` / `pip-audit` hit) MUST include a CVSS v3.1 vector string (e.g. `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`). Map base score to severity: 9.0–10.0 → 🔴, 7.0–8.9 → 🟠, 4.0–6.9 → 🟡, 0.1–3.9 → 🔵.
**Severity is NOT**:
**Fix threshold**: Step 4 fixes everything 🟡 and above. 🔵 is reported in the summary but not auto-fixed.
Before reviewing, confirm the code is in a passing state:
make verify
If `pyproject.toml` or `uv.lock` is in the diff, also run `uv run pip-audit` to surface new dependency CVEs.
If it fails, report what's failing and stop — code review on broken code is premature. Ask the user whether to fix the failures first or proceed anyway.
Launch two reviews **in parallel**:
**Review A — Multi-model (via `mcp__multi__codereview`)**: run it per the shared procedure in `.claude/shared/multi-model-review.md` — `models: ["gemini-3", "gpt-5"]`, `relevant_files` = absolute paths of all changed files, `content` = a review request citing the Severity Standard, Review Principles, and Checklist. **Heed the multi-step protocol described there** (the step-1 response is usually an `in_progress` checklist, not findings — you must make the `step_number: 2` follow-up call with the same `thread_id`). Falls back to two Opus sub-agents if the tool is unavailable.
**Review B — Opus sub-agent**: Use the `Agent` tool with `model: "opus"`. Give it the list of changed files and the following specialized tasks to run in parallel internally:
**Required return shape** (each reviewer, no prose preamble or trailing summary):
- [severity: 🔴 Critical | 🟠 High | 🟡 Medium | 🔵 Low] One-line description - File: `path:line` - Trigger: which Principle / Checklist item / Severity anchor matched - Recommendation: what to do (or `open question`) - (Security findings only) CVSS vector: `CVSS:3.1/...`
Positives go in a separate list at the bottom of the response, not interleaved with findings. This shape lets Step 3 concatenate reviewer outputs with minimal reformatting.
Combine surviving findings across all reviewers:
Fix all critical, high, and medium severity findings that survived the confidence filter:
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You are performing static code quality analysis on the Scopy package: `$ARGUMENTS`