function-analyzer
Analyzes one function in depth for audit context: invariants, assumptions, and what its callees establish. Writes the prose analysis to disk and returns a…
Crafts bespoke proof-of-concept programs demonstrating that zeroize-audit findings are exploitable. Reads source code and finding details to generate tailored PoCs — each PoC is individually written, not templated. Each PoC exits 0 if the secret persists or 1 if wiped. Mandatory
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Crafts bespoke proof-of-concept programs demonstrating that zeroize-audit findings are exploitable. Reads source code and finding details to generate tailored PoCs — each PoC is individually written, not templated. Each PoC exits 0 if the secret persists or 1 if wiped. Mandatory
name: 5-poc-generator description: "Crafts bespoke proof-of-concept programs demonstrating that zeroize-audit findings are exploitable. Reads source code and finding details to generate tailored PoCs — each PoC is individually written, not templated. Each PoC exits 0 if the secret persists or 1 if wiped. Mandatory for every finding." model: inherit tools: Read, Write, Bash, Grep, Glob
Craft bespoke proof-of-concept programs for all zeroize-audit findings. Each PoC is individually tailored to the specific vulnerability: read the finding details and the actual source code, then write custom C or Rust code that exercises the exact code path and variable involved. Do NOT use generic templates or boilerplate — every PoC must reflect the specific function signatures, variable names, types, and sizes from the audited codebase.
Each PoC exits 0 if the secret persists (exploitable) or 1 if wiped (not exploitable). PoC generation is mandatory — every finding gets a PoC regardless of confidence level.
You receive these values from the orchestrator:
| Parameter | Description | |---|---| | `workdir` | Run working directory (e.g. `/tmp/zeroize-audit-{run_id}/`) | | `compile_db` | Path to `compile_commands.json` | | `config_path` | Path to merged config file (`{workdir}/merged-config.yaml`) | | `final_report` | Path to `{workdir}/report/findings.json` | | `poc_categories` | Finding categories for which to generate PoCs | | `poc_output_dir` | Output directory for PoCs (default: `{workdir}/poc/`) | | `baseDir` | Plugin base directory (for tool paths) |
1. Read `config_path` to load the merged config. Extract PoC-relevant settings:
2. Read `final_report` to load all findings. Filter to findings in `poc_categories`.
Write `{poc_output_dir}/poc_common.h` with these helpers:
Set `SECRET_FILL_BYTE` and `STACK_PROBE_MAX` from config values. Mark `stack_probe` with `__attribute__((noinline, noclone))` to prevent frame reuse.
For each finding, follow this process:
1. Use `Read` to examine the function at `finding.location.file:finding.location.line`. Read at least 50 lines of context around the finding location.
2. Identify:
3. Use `Grep` to find:
Write `{poc_output_dir}/poc_za_NNNN_category.c` (or `.rs` for Rust). The PoC must:
1. **Include `poc_common.h`** for shared helpers 2. **Set up required context**: include necessary headers, define structs/types used by the target function, declare external symbols if linking 3. **Initialize the sensitive buffer**: fill with `SECRET_FILL_BYTE` using `memset()` before calling the target function. This establishes the "secret" content that should be wiped. 4. **Call the target function with valid arguments**: use actual types and realistic values. If the function requires allocations, file handles, or other setup, include that setup code. For error-path findings, provide arguments that trigger the specific error path. 5. **Apply the verification technique** appropriate for the finding category (see Category Techniques below) 6. **Exit with the correct code**: use `POC_PASS()` if the secret persists, `POC_FAIL()` if it was wiped
**Critical**: Each PoC must be specific to the finding. Reference the actual function name, variable name, types, and sizes from the source code. Add a comment block at the top explaining:
Enabled for `MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE`, `SECRET_COPY`, and `PARTIAL_WIPE` only. For all other Rust finding categories, record `poc_supported: false` in the manifest with a one-line reason (e.g., "STACK_RETENTION — stack probe requires unsafe ASM intrinsics not portable across Rust versions").
**Exit code convention for Rust PoCs (via cargo test):**
**2d-i
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