audit-cycle
Flow A — fully automated audit-firm lifecycle. Runs scope → context → tool-assisted first pass → domain-partitioned manual review → independent reconciliation…
Flow B — AI-assisted iterative audit with a human in the loop. Same lifecycle as audit-cycle, but pauses at checkpoints to surface confirmed findings, the next-focus plan, and targeted questions only the human can answer (business context, trust model, severity calls). The human
> /plugin marketplace add solanabr/auditor-skill > /plugin install auditor@auditor
How it fires
How this command gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
/audit-assistContext preview
What this command does when you run it.
Flow B — AI-assisted iterative audit with a human in the loop. Same lifecycle as audit-cycle, but pauses at checkpoints to surface confirmed findings, the next-focus plan, and targeted questions only the human can answer (business context, trust model, severity calls). The human
name: auditor:audit-assist description: Flow B — AI-assisted iterative audit with a human in the loop. Same lifecycle as audit-cycle, but pauses at checkpoints to surface confirmed findings, the next-focus plan, and targeted questions only the human can answer (business context, trust model, severity calls). The human steers; the agent re-synthesizes toward the audit document. argument-hint: "[path] [--scope full|program|backend|frontend]" allowed-tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Task
**Arguments:** $ARGUMENTS
Run the same lifecycle as `/auditor:audit-cycle`, but **stop at checkpoints** and let the human steer. Read `OUTPUT-RULES.md` first (format, severity 1-10, **Rule 5b** gate) and `references/audit-lifecycle/methodology.md` (the firm-spine → skill-mechanism mapping). This is the collaborative mode: the agent does the mechanical review; the human resolves the judgment calls a tool cannot (business intent, trust boundaries, severity of a business-logic gap). Think ToB weekly progress report + Zellic client discussion.
At **every checkpoint**, surface a compact status and then **wait for the human** before proceeding:
Fold the human's answers back in, re-synthesize, and continue.
1. **Scope / intake.** Discover the repo, declare scope (Rule 0), pin the commit. **⏸ Checkpoint 1 — after scope:** confirm the scope boundary, the pinned commit, and any `QUESTIONS.md` answers the human wants to override before a single file is judged. Persist the confirmed answers to `audit_<n>/intake.md` (`/intake`) so both flows and the report read one source of truth.
2. **Context reconstruction (Phase 0.5).** Spawn `context-builder`; it writes worksheets to `audit_<n>/worksheets/context/`. **⏸ Checkpoint 2 — after context:** present the instruction matrix + state model and the reconstructed invariants/assumptions. Ask the human to correct any `UNKNOWN — needs manual review` items and confirm the trust model. Their corrections seed every later phase. With the trust model confirmed, build `audit_<n>/threat-model.md` (`/threat-model`) — asset inventory + actor×capability + trust boundaries — which feeds report §4.4/§4.6/§4.7 and the review's attacker goals.
3. **Tool-assisted first pass.** If `vendor/trailofbits/plugins` is present, run ToB `static-analysis` and fold SARIF as attention-directing evidence (`references/orchestration/boundary-map.md`); else native `discovery/grep-commands.md` and note the gap. Load in-scope `references/methodologies/*` per protocol markers.
4. **Domain-partitioned manual review.** Run `vuln-hunter` (checklists + vectors) and `economic-analyst` (checklist 06 + economic vectors + methodology refs) over their **disjoint** surfaces — partitioned, not cloned. Each candidate finding passes Rule 5b + `references/false-positives.md` **at the leaf** before it is emitted. **⏸ Checkpoint 3 — after each review phase:** surface (a)/(b)/(c). This is where the human resolves "is this intended?" and re-scopes the next phase.
4b. **Triage (`/triage`).** Before reconciliation, dedup by root-cause (`audit-mem` suppression/regression when `tools/auditor-tools` is built), re-apply Rule 5b with quantified downgrades, and split real findings from the Notes & Nitpicks list. **⏸ Checkpoint 3b — after triage:** show the human what was deduped/suppressed and why.
5. **Independent reconciliation.** Spawn `peer-reviewer` on the top-severity survivors (N≥8, plus any N≥7 the primary could not PoC); it re-derives from code, reusing the context worksheets. Reconcile CONFIRM / DISPUTE / DOWNGRADE. **⏸ Checkpoint 4 — after reconciliation:** present the reconciled set and any primary-vs-peer disagreements for the human to adjudicate.
6. **Converge to the audit document.** Spawn `audit-reporter`: dedup by root-cause, order by severity / business importance, and fill the **client-facing** `templates/audit-report.md` (maturity + trust-model caveats + disclaimers, **no deploy guarantee**); the numeric Repository Risk Score stays in the internal `templates/report-template.md`. Emit `audit_<n>/REPORT.md`. Iterate on human feedback until the document is agreed.
When re-auditing after the team has changed code in response to findings, do **not** re-run the whole flow — use **`/auditor:re-audit`** for a delta review that classifies each prior finding FIXED / STILL-OPEN / REGRESSED and sweeps for un-patched siblings (Zenith-style fix review).
Production-grade security audit for any codebase, powered by AI agents. 20 checklists · 1,413 verification items · 136 known attack vectors · executable PoCs + fix patches A full audit-firm lifecycle (automated + interactive) · Benchmarked against CertiK, SOC
Repo: solanabr/auditor-skill
Flow A — fully automated audit-firm lifecycle. Runs scope → context → tool-assisted first pass → domain-partitioned manual review → independent reconciliation…
Aggregate audit checkpoints into the final report — executive summary, Scope Coverage, findings by severity, maturity scorecard, and remediation roadmap.
Full scope-gated security audit of a Solana / full-stack repository — discovery, context reconstruction, per-item checklist verdicts, false-positive…
Deep single-instruction / single-function security review using the instruction worksheet, context reconstruction, and adversarial exploit modeling.
PR / commit-scoped differential audit — audits only changed functions (plus 1-hop callers), flags removed security checks, and prioritizes by risk × blast…
Quantify a candidate economic finding — compute attack cost vs extractable value and, when possible, reproduce deposit→manipulate→withdraw against a Surfpool…