/code-review
Two-mode skill: (1) adversarial review — spec compliance + code quality + security, confidence-scored findings with file:line evidence; (2) receiving review — verify-before- agreeing discipline for acting on external/human review feedback.
$ npx -y skills add romiluz13/cc10x --skill code-review --agent claude-codeHow it fires
How this skill gets triggered: by you, by Claude, or both.
- Fires itselfAuto-invocation. Claude auto-loads it when your prompt matches the work.
- You can call itInvoke it directly when you want it.
- Slash command
/code-review
Context preview
The summary Claude sees to decide when to auto-load this skill.
Two-mode skill: (1) adversarial review — spec compliance + code quality + security, confidence-scored findings with file:line evidence; (2) receiving review — verify-before- agreeing discipline for acting on external/human review feedback.
SKILL.md
code-review.SKILL.mdname: code-review
description: |
Two-mode skill: (1) adversarial review — spec compliance + code quality + security,
confidence-scored findings with file:line evidence; (2) receiving review — verify-before-
agreeing discipline for acting on external/human review feedback.
allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob LSP Bash
user-invocable: false
Code Review (Adversarial + Receiving)
Reference Files
Read only what's needed:
- `references/review-order-and-checkpoints.md` — review order, checkpoint discipline; load when starting a review that spans multiple files or needs a checkpointed pass
- `references/code-review-heuristics.md` — heuristics, pattern recognition, false-positive prevention; load when the diff is non-trivial or before reporting CLEAN (Zero-Finding Halt re-scan)
- `references/security-review-checklist.md` — security review checklist; load whenever the diff touches auth, input handling, network, secrets, or data access
---
Run ADVERSARIAL when producing findings on a diff; run RECEIVING when acting on findings someone else produced. The Code Smells catalog, AI-Generated Anti-Patterns, Metric Honesty Rule, and Deferred Findings handling below apply in both modes.
Mode: ADVERSARIAL REVIEW
Only report issues with confidence ≥80 — below that, a finding is more likely noise than signal, and noise burns the fix loop's time and trust. Do not inflate a score to smuggle a hunch through; a genuine security hunch goes to the Summary as an open question (see the Security exception under Confidence Scoring). Every finding states category, impact, and why it matters. Present a recommendation, not a menu. Be opinionated.
**Signal quality rule:** One finding with `file:line` evidence and a fix is worth more than ten generic observations. Never report a pattern without showing where it lives.
Two-Stage Review
**Stage 1: Spec Compliance** — Does the code do what the plan/spec asked? Check: phase exit criteria met, interfaces match plan's Consumes/Produces, no scope drift, no missing scenarios.
**Stage 2: Code Quality** — Is the code well-built? Check: correctness, performance, security, clarity, test coverage.
Review Order
Top-down (spec → architecture → module → function → line) for first pass. Bottom-up (line → function → module) for detail pass. See `references/review-order-and-checkpoints.md`.
Severity Classification
| Severity | Criteria | | ---------- | ---------- | | CRITICAL | Data loss, security breach, silent data corruption | | HIGH | User-visible broken behavior | | MEDIUM | Suboptimal but functional | | LOW | Code smell, style |
Confidence Scoring
| Confidence | Meaning | | ----------- | --------- | | 90-100 | Verified: read the code, confirmed the issue, can cite file:line | | 80-89 | Strong: read surrounding context, pattern is clear | | <80 | Do not report — insufficient evidence |
**Security exception:** a security-category finding below 80 confidence is NOT silently dropped. Surface it as an explicit open question in the review Summary (e.g., "Possible auth bypass at `file:line` — could not confirm exploit path"), not as a finding. The <80 floor drops everything else.
Parallel Review + Router Merge
When `code-reviewer` and `failure-hunter` run in parallel (BUILD workflow):
- **code-reviewer** (Assessment A): correctness, performance, spec compliance. Forms opinion WITHOUT seeing the hunter's scan.
- **failure-hunter** (Assessment B): silent failure scan using red-flags table. Does NOT see the reviewer's findings.
- **Router-owned merge:** after both complete, the router writes a merged findings summary into the workflow artifact before verifier handoff. Where both agree → high confidence. Where the hunter caught what the reviewer missed → keep. Where the hunter finding is a false positive → drop with reason. Contradictory verdicts: stricter verdict wins, logged in `status_history`.
Zero-Finding Halt
Zero findings on a non-trivial change → insufficient depth, not perfect code. Re-scan against heuristics and security checklist before reporting CLEAN.
Code Smells (Fowler Catalog)
Scan for these 16 named smells during review. Each is actionable — not a style preference. "Messy" is not actionable; "Mysterious Name" is. Each smell is a labelled heuristic and always a judgement call ("possible Feature Envy"), never a hard violation:
| Smell | Signal | Fix | | ------ | ------ | ---- | | **Mysterious Name** | Function/variable name doesn't reveal intent | Rename to describe what it does | | **Long Method** | Method > 20 lines doing multiple things | Extract sub-methods | | **Long Parameter List** | > 4 parameters — consider parameter object | Extract into an object | | **Large Class** | Class with too many responsibilities | Split by responsibility | | **Data Class** | Holds data, no behavior — anemic domain model | Move behavior in, or inline the class | | **Duplicated Code** | Same logic in 3+ places | Extract shared function | | **Feature Envy** | Method reads more from another class than its own | Move method to the class it envies | | **Shotgun Surgery** | One change requires touching many files | Consolidate responsibility | | **Divergent Change** | One class changes for different reasons | Split into separate classes | | **Primitive Obsession** | Using primitives where a small value object would add meaning | Create a value object | | **Repeated Switches** | Same switch/if-else on a type across files | Replace with polymorphism | | **Speculative Generality** | Abstraction for future use that never comes | Delete it (YAGNI) | | **Message Chains** | `a.b().c().d()` — client knows the object graph | Hide the chain behind a method | | **Middle Man** | Class just delegates to another — adds no logic | Remove the middleman, use the real object | | **Refused Bequest** | Subclass doesn't use parent's methods | Replace inheritance with composition | | **Data Clumps** | 3+ values always passed together | Extract into an obje
Read more
name: code-review description: | Two-mode skill: (1) adversarial review — spec compliance + code quality + security, confidence-scored findings with file:line evidence; (2) receiving review — verify-before- agreeing discipline for acting on external/human review feedback. allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob LSP Bash user-invocable: false
Code Review (Adversarial + Receiving)
Reference Files
Read only what's needed:
- `references/review-order-and-checkpoints.md` — review order, checkpoint discipline; load when starting a review that spans multiple files or needs a checkpointed pass
- `references/code-review-heuristics.md` — heuristics, pattern recognition, false-positive prevention; load when the diff is non-trivial or before reporting CLEAN (Zero-Finding Halt re-scan)
- `references/security-review-checklist.md` — security review checklist; load whenever the diff touches auth, input handling, network, secrets, or data access
---
Run ADVERSARIAL when producing findings on a diff; run RECEIVING when acting on findings someone else produced. The Code Smells catalog, AI-Generated Anti-Patterns, Metric Honesty Rule, and Deferred Findings handling below apply in both modes.
Mode: ADVERSARIAL REVIEW
Only report issues with confidence ≥80 — below that, a finding is more likely noise than signal, and noise burns the fix loop's time and trust. Do not inflate a score to smuggle a hunch through; a genuine security hunch goes to the Summary as an open question (see the Security exception under Confidence Scoring). Every finding states category, impact, and why it matters. Present a recommendation, not a menu. Be opinionated.
**Signal quality rule:** One finding with `file:line` evidence and a fix is worth more than ten generic observations. Never report a pattern without showing where it lives.
Two-Stage Review
**Stage 1: Spec Compliance** — Does the code do what the plan/spec asked? Check: phase exit criteria met, interfaces match plan's Consumes/Produces, no scope drift, no missing scenarios.
**Stage 2: Code Quality** — Is the code well-built? Check: correctness, performance, security, clarity, test coverage.
Review Order
Top-down (spec → architecture → module → function → line) for first pass. Bottom-up (line → function → module) for detail pass. See `references/review-order-and-checkpoints.md`.
Severity Classification
| Severity | Criteria | | ---------- | ---------- | | CRITICAL | Data loss, security breach, silent data corruption | | HIGH | User-visible broken behavior | | MEDIUM | Suboptimal but functional | | LOW | Code smell, style |
Confidence Scoring
| Confidence | Meaning | | ----------- | --------- | | 90-100 | Verified: read the code, confirmed the issue, can cite file:line | | 80-89 | Strong: read surrounding context, pattern is clear | | <80 | Do not report — insufficient evidence |
**Security exception:** a security-category finding below 80 confidence is NOT silently dropped. Surface it as an explicit open question in the review Summary (e.g., "Possible auth bypass at `file:line` — could not confirm exploit path"), not as a finding. The <80 floor drops everything else.
Parallel Review + Router Merge
When `code-reviewer` and `failure-hunter` run in parallel (BUILD workflow):
- **code-reviewer** (Assessment A): correctness, performance, spec compliance. Forms opinion WITHOUT seeing the hunter's scan.
- **failure-hunter** (Assessment B): silent failure scan using red-flags table. Does NOT see the reviewer's findings.
- **Router-owned merge:** after both complete, the router writes a merged findings summary into the workflow artifact before verifier handoff. Where both agree → high confidence. Where the hunter caught what the reviewer missed → keep. Where the hunter finding is a false positive → drop with reason. Contradictory verdicts: stricter verdict wins, logged in `status_history`.
Zero-Finding Halt
Zero findings on a non-trivial change → insufficient depth, not perfect code. Re-scan against heuristics and security checklist before reporting CLEAN.
Code Smells (Fowler Catalog)
Scan for these 16 named smells during review. Each is actionable — not a style preference. "Messy" is not actionable; "Mysterious Name" is. Each smell is a labelled heuristic and always a judgement call ("possible Feature Envy"), never a hard violation:
| Smell | Signal | Fix | | ------ | ------ | ---- | | **Mysterious Name** | Function/variable name doesn't reveal intent | Rename to describe what it does | | **Long Method** | Method > 20 lines doing multiple things | Extract sub-methods | | **Long Parameter List** | > 4 parameters — consider parameter object | Extract into an object | | **Large Class** | Class with too many responsibilities | Split by responsibility | | **Data Class** | Holds data, no behavior — anemic domain model | Move behavior in, or inline the class | | **Duplicated Code** | Same logic in 3+ places | Extract shared function | | **Feature Envy** | Method reads more from another class than its own | Move method to the class it envies | | **Shotgun Surgery** | One change requires touching many files | Consolidate responsibility | | **Divergent Change** | One class changes for different reasons | Split into separate classes | | **Primitive Obsession** | Using primitives where a small value object would add meaning | Create a value object | | **Repeated Switches** | Same switch/if-else on a type across files | Replace with polymorphism | | **Speculative Generality** | Abstraction for future use that never comes | Delete it (YAGNI) | | **Message Chains** | `a.b().c().d()` — client knows the object graph | Hide the chain behind a method | | **Middle Man** | Class just delegates to another — adds no logic | Remove the middleman, use the real object | | **Refused Bequest** | Subclass doesn't use parent's methods | Replace inheritance with composition | | **Data Clumps** | 3+ values always passed together | Extract into an obje
Showing the first part of this file.
The Loop Engine for Claude Code — engineer the loop, not the prompt. 1 router · 9 agents · 16 skills · 4 workflows. Fail-closed gates, test honesty, anti-anchored review.
Repo: romiluz13/cc10x
Other skills on cc10x.
- /agent-common
Shared preamble loaded by all cc10x agents — memory protocol, contract format, output rules.
Open skill - /architecture
Greenfield architecture design: map functionality flows, draw components, design APIs, classify dependencies, plan observability. For multi-component, API, schema, auth, or integration-heavy work. For retrofitting existing code, use codebase-hygiene instead.
Open skill - /building
Implementation skill for writing production code with TDD. Covers the RED-GREEN-REFACTOR cycle, false-RED detection, vertical slicing, scope escalation, test process discipline, and code generation patterns. Loaded by component-builder and bug-investigator.
Open skill - /cc10x-router
THE ONLY ENTRY POINT FOR CC10X. Activate this skill for build, debug, review, and plan requests. Use when the user asks to implement, fix, review, plan, test, refactor, or continue code work. Trigger keywords: build, implement, create, write, add, review, audit, debug, fix,
Open skill - /codebase-design
Canonical deep-module vocabulary (module, interface, depth, seam, adapter, leverage, locality) for designing a module's shape — a lot of behaviour behind a small interface at a clean seam, testable through that interface. The single source of truth for these terms; other skills
Open skill - /codebase-hygiene
Two-mode skill: (1) find semantic duplicates — functions doing the same thing under different names, invisible to copy-paste detectors; (2) deepen shallow modules — thin wrappers and pass-through layers that spread complexity. Advisory and read-only; changes route through BUILD
Open skill

