analysis-pipeline
Reverse engineering - multi-source product intelligence analysis with provenance tracking. Master methodology for all analysis…
Independent audit of sanitized specs in workspace/output/. Three parallel LLM-based reviewer roles check structural leakage, content contamination, and behavioral completeness. Run AFTER Layer 5 sanitization, BEFORE implementation handoff.
Claude Code
$ npx -y skills add prime-radiant-inc/greenfield --skill second-pass-review --agent claude-code
Codex
$ npx skills add prime-radiant-inc/greenfield --skill second-pass-review -a codex -y
Cursor
$ npx skills add prime-radiant-inc/greenfield --skill second-pass-review -a cursor -y
Gemini CLI
$ npx skills add prime-radiant-inc/greenfield --skill second-pass-review -a gemini-cli -y
GitHub Copilot
$ npx skills add prime-radiant-inc/greenfield --skill second-pass-review -a github-copilot -y
OpenCode
$ npx skills add prime-radiant-inc/greenfield --skill second-pass-review -a opencode -y
Windsurf
$ npx skills add prime-radiant-inc/greenfield --skill second-pass-review -a windsurf -y
name: second-pass-review description: Independent audit of sanitized specs in workspace/output/. Three parallel LLM-based reviewer roles check structural leakage, content contamination, and behavioral completeness. Run AFTER Layer 5 sanitization, BEFORE implementation handoff.
Sanitization is necessary but insufficient. The author of a sanitized spec can't reliably catch their own leaks — the same assumptions that let implementation details slip in during the rewrite also let them slip past a self-review. A fresh read, with no access to the raw analysis, catches drift the author missed.
Sanitization alone misses contamination in predictable categories:
Root causes: 1. Sanitization agents copy-paste instead of rewriting 2. Gate 2 flags "zero leakage" but never defines what to look for 3. Grep patterns can't catch descriptive English identifiers 4. Without a second-pass review, authors can't catch their own blind spots
digraph audit_pipeline {
rankdir=TB;
compound=true;
"Layer 5 sanitization complete" [shape=doublecircle];
"Audit PASS — proceed to implementation" [shape=doublecircle];
"STOP: Audit failed after 3 remediation attempts" [shape=octagon, style=filled, fillcolor=red, fontcolor=white];
subgraph cluster_specialist {
label="Parallel Specialist Reviewers (read every file, apply semantic checklists)";
style=dashed;
"structural-leakage-reviewer" [shape=box];
"content-contamination-reviewer" [shape=box];
"behavioral-completeness-reviewer" [shape=box];
}
subgraph cluster_generalist {
label="Parallel Deep-Read Generalists (4-5 files each, full contextual judgment)";
style=dashed;
"deep-read-auditor-1" [shape=box];
"deep-read-auditor-2" [shape=box];
"deep-read-auditor-N" [shape=box];
}
"Merge all audit reports" [shape=box];
"Any FAIL?" [shape=diamond];
"Dispatch targeted fix agents" [shape=box];
"Re-audit failing files" [shape=box];
"Attempts < 3?" [shape=diamond];
"Layer 5 sanitization complete" -> "structural-leakage-reviewer";
"Layer 5 sanitization complete" -> "content-contamination-reviewer";
"Layer 5 sanitization complete" -> "behavioral-completeness-reviewer";
"Layer 5 sanitization complete" -> "deep-read-auditor-1";
"Layer 5 sanitization complete" -> "deep-read-auditor-2";
"Layer 5 sanitization complete" -> "deep-read-auditor-N";
"structural-leakage-reviewer" -> "Merge all audit reports";
"content-contamination-reviewer" -> "Merge all audit reports";
"behavioral-completeness-reviewer" -> "Merge all audit reports";
"deep-read-auditor-1" -> "Merge all audit reports";
"deep-read-auditor-2" -> "Merge all audit reports";
"deep-read-auditor-N" -> "Merge all audit reports";
"Merge all audit reports" -> "Any FAIL?";
"Any FAIL?" -> "Audit PASS — proceed to implementation" [label="all PASS"];
"Any FAIL?" -> "Dispatch targeted fix agents" [label="any FAIL"];
"Dispatch targeted fix agents" -> "Re-audit failing files";
"Re-audit failing files" -> "Attempts < 3?";
"Attempts < 3?" -> "structural-leakage-reviewer" [label="yes"];
"Attempts < 3?" -> "STOP: Audit failed after 3 remediation attempts" [label="no"];
}---
Pattern matching is fundamentally the wrong tool for contamination detection. It produces both false positives and false negatives at rates that make it unreliable as a primary mechanism.
**False positives are pervasive.** Patterns that detect minified identifiers also match regex character classes, priority levels (P0, P1), and standard technology names. Patterns for code structure language match natural English ("cannot function without"). Patterns for module counts match legitimate behavioral quantities ("supports 3 output formats"). An auditor drowning in false positives either wastes time on noise or starts ignoring real findings.
**Contextual contamination is invisible to patterns.** No regex can detect:
**Semantic judgment catches everything patterns miss.** The core test is simple: "Would an implementor encounter this exact string without seeing the source code?" An LLM can apply this test to every identifier, name, and reference in a spec, using contextual understanding that patterns lack. This catches minified symbols, internal function names, vendor-specific flags, and structural leakage — all with a single semantic criterion rather than a brittle pattern library.
All auditors — specialist r
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